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Abstract
In Sickness and in Health, In Good Times and in Bad:
A Comparative Analysis of the Ideologies Governing Health Care Reform
in Canada and the United States, 1962–1974
Michael A. Todt
This study explores the ideology of health care reform in Canada and the United
States from 1962 to 1974. During that time, Canada enacted Medicare, which provided a
universal physician services program designed by the provinces and supported financially
by the federal government. Rejecting a private-sector approach and Quebec’s desire for
complete autonomy in the program design, the joint federal-provincial program supported
the Canadian values of government responsibility for health care (paternal statism) and
the belief that Canadians have a responsibility to care for each other (collectivism).
From 1970 to 1974, the U.S. Congress failed to enact any national health insurance
(NHI) program, even though NHI had the support of two presidents, Congress, and a
large variety of organizations. Key ideological differences that explain the failure of the
U.S. to enact an NHI program arose during controversies about maintaining the
pluralistic system versus creating a federally run program, upholding the individual
choice to participate versus mandating participation (individualism), and guaranteeing the
right to access health care versus the inherent right to health care. These differences were
impossible to overcome, and they remain at the heart of current debates about the
recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordability Act of 2010, including challenges
regarding its constitutionality.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Health care reform remains a major policy dilemma for the United States and
Canada. An ever-growing percentage of both countries’ gross domestic product (GDP)
continues to be consumed by health care costs. Advanced medical technology, which
provides more effective care, is a major contributor to the accelerating cost of health care
delivery, and access to services remains problematic for both countries but for vastly
different reasons.
Until recently, the United States was the only industrialized country in the world
that did not provide some form of universal coverage for its citizens. On March 21, 2010,
President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordability Act, legislation
that will implement strategies to lower health costs, improve the quality of care, and
provide the opportunity for 30 million or more uninsured American citizens to acquire
health insurance. Beginning in 2014, all citizens will be required to obtain insurance or
pay a penalty. The federal government will assist states in setting up exchanges where
affordable health insurance can be obtained. Insurance companies will no longer be able
to drop people with preexisting conditions or catastrophic disorders, and constraints will
control rising premiums and costs. Finally, procedures that achieve the best medical
result will be determined. Clearly, this bill is the beginning of reform, and most
importantly, an opportunity for most Americans to receive affordable health care
services.

While Canada provides publicly funded health care insurance for all citizens,
ensuring timely access to health care services haunts Canadian policymakers, providers,
and citizens. Given the rising costs and need for additional resources, insufficient funding
for medical resources such as equipment and health care personnel, by both the federal
and provincial governments, remains a fundamental problem. Timely access to services is
another major issue. In 2005, the access to health care issue led the Canadian Supreme
Court to challenge the very existence of Canada’s universal health care. In a case
involving a Quebec citizen who wanted to buy and use private insurance to reduce
waiting time for a surgery, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that citizens were not
permitted to buy private health insurance when public health insurance was provided by
the province. The Supreme Court, however, did recognize that timely access to health
care is a significant problem, and that costs are rising and additional resources are
needed.1
Some provinces, such as Alberta and Quebec, have suggested alternatives to the
present structure, such as requesting more provincial control over health care policy;
additional services, such as pharmaceuticals, for citizens; and the development of private
alternatives to the public system. Though problems exist with the Canadian system,
Canadians’ pride in their health care system and Canada’s policy that all citizens should
be able to obtain good quality health care through a social insurance system, are cited
often as major ideological and policy differences between the United States and Canada.2

1

Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General) [2005] 1 S.C.R.791, 2005 SCC 35.

2

Robert G. Evans, “Two Systems in Restraint: Contrasting Experiences with Cost Control in the 1990s,” in
Canada and the United States: Differences that Count, ed. David M. Thomas (Peterborough, Ontaria:
Broadview Press Ltd., 2004).
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The evolutionary history of national health insurance (NHI) for both countries
continues to receive scholarly attention. In the past twelve years, historians, political
scientists, and policy experts have published ten major scholarly books detailing the
events and persons involved in NHI efforts, as well as analyses of the history of NHI in
each country.3 Most works focus on one country, though three of these works by
Canadian scholars—Boychuck, Maioni, and Touhy—are comparative analyses of the
development of NHI in Canada and the U.S. during similar periods.
Each of these ten works offers a particular theoretical approach and narrative,
from Quadagno’s and Gordon’s view of the shifting power of key interest groups, to
Hacker’s and Maioni’s view that political structures and past policy provide opportunities
and constraints for future policy, to Funigiello’s idea that the actions of individual actors
matter and policies derived are fairly determined. Explanations of NHI’s evolution
generally fall into one of three major theoretical approaches: political structures,
institutionalism, and political culture.The political structures approach examines how the
political system is organized and how it functions to develop and implement social
policy. Historical institutionalism and policy legacy examines how social policy, once
3

The more recent works include Gerard W. Boychuck, National Health Insurance in the United States and
Canada: Race, Territory, and the Roots of Difference (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
2008); Alan Derickson, Health Security for All: Dreams of Universal Health Care in America (Baltimore,
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Paul V. Dutton, Differential Diagnosis: A Comparative
History of Health Care Problems and Solutions in the United States and France (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2007); Phillip J. Funigiello, Chronic Politics: Health Care Security Reform from FDR to
George W. Bush (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 2005); Colin Gordon, Dead on Arrival: The
Politics of Health Care in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003);
Beatrix Hoffman, The Wages of Sickness: The Politics of Health Insurance in Progressive America (Chapel
Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Antonia Maioni, Parting at the Crossroads: The
Emergence of Health Insurance in the United States and Canada (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1998); Rick Mays, Universal Coverage: The Elusive Quest for National Health Insurance (Ann
Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2004); Jill Quadagno, One Nation Uninsured: Why the U.S.
Has No National Health Insurance (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005); Carolyn Hughes
Touhy, Accidental Logics: The Dynamics of Change in the Health Care Arena in the United States, Britain,
and Canada (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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implemented, sets a precedent for any future policy. Finally, political culture delves into
the values and beliefs within a political system that lead to or prevent the enactment of
social policy. All three approaches play a significant role in the evolution and fate of a
social policy like national health insurance.

Political Structures
The political structural school examines the effects of each country’s political
systems, organization, and processes on policy outcomes. Three aspects of political
structure are particularly important in the evolution of NHI. First, federalism—the basis
for each country’s political system and the mechanism for the sharing of responsibilities
between the national government and the provinces or states—has been implemented
differently in each country. Canadian federalism, in particular, has shaped both national
and provincial health care policy. Second, the way in which the executive and legislative
functions interact in each country played an important role in the passage of critical
health care legislation. Finally, the existence and importance of third parties in provincial
and national politics has been important to the passage of much social reform legislation,
especially health care reform.4

Canada’s Political Structure
In Canada, the responsibilities of the national and provincial parliaments are
delineated in two major Canadian constitutional documents, the Constitution Acts of

4

Gerard W. Boychuck, National Health Insurance in the United States and Canada: Race, Territory, and
the Roots of Difference (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 12.

4

1867 and 1982; the latter includes also the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Canada’s
federalist government tends to be more decentralized compared to the U.S., due, first of
all, to very specific provincial and federal responsibilities set down in the constitutional
documents, and second, to the lack of a parliamentary body that represents provinces in a
way similar to how senators represent large states and national interests in the U.S.
Senate. Canada’s Senate, part of the parliamentary system, is not a legislative body
representing provincial interests; rather, its members, appointed by the Prime Minister,
represent political interests. As a result, provinces have become very influential in
national policy development, although the original intent, when Canada became a
dominion in 1867, was to have a strong central government. 5
In Canada’s federalist system, provinces frequently challenge the power and
responsibility of the federal government in health affairs. While provinces are
constitutionally responsible for health care and they implement provincially designed
health care programs, the federal government achieves some control over health care
policy by providing significant funding if the province adheres to general federal
principles.
During the early discussions of Canada’s Medicare program in 1965, both Quebec
and Ontario challenged the federal government’s power to dictate the principles of the
program required to obtain the needed federal funding. Both provinces wanted control
over the program by virtue of their constitutional responsibility for health care, and both
provinces believed that Medicare’s federally mandated requirements of universality,

5

Antonia Maioni, “Parting at the Crossroads: The Development of Health Insurance in Canada and the
United States, 1940–1965,” Comparative Politics 29, no. 4 (July 1997): 412–413; Boychuck, National
Health Insurance in the United States and Canada, 12–13.
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comprehensiveness, public administration, and portability violated constitutional
principles. The federal government prevailed by utilizing its power of the purse to tax and
provide significant levels of funding to the provinces. As a concession to the provinces
and in accordance with the constitution, the federal government gave provinces greater
latitude by allowing them to develop the details of the program, provided that they abided
by the required four principles.6 Provinces continue to challenge the federal role in health
care and other areas, an important and ongoing aspect of Canadian federalism reinforced
by the nature of legislative decision making in Canada.
The fusion of the executive and legislation functions in Canada powerfully affects
the timely passage of legislation. The Prime Minister—the nation’s chief of state, a
member of as well as the leader of Parliament, and head of the government and cabinet—
defines a particular legislative agenda, and that agenda is generally adopted because the
Prime Minister and his/her party control both the definition of potential public policy and
the legislative approval process, with strong party discipline. Once the Prime Minister
and the cabinet determine the direction of public policy, Parliament enacts appropriate
legislation.7 Exceptions occur when the Prime Minister and his/her party are a minority
government and must negotiate policy and power with third parties. When a minority
government is in power, political coalitions develop, which may allow the minority party
to govern successfully because of third-party formation and influence at both the
provincial and national level.

6

Malcolm Taylor, Health Insurance and Canadian Public Policy, 2nd ed. (Montreal, Quebec: McGill
University Press, 1987), 364–365.
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Maioni, Parting at the Crossroads, 23.
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Canada’s parliamentary system and the regionalism of Canadian politics provides
more opportunities for third-party formation than in the U.S., a critical factor in
Medicare’s inception. While the Liberal and Conservative parties have dominated
Canadian provincial and national politics since Canada became a dominion in 1867,
provincial-level third parties have had a powerful effect on provincial health care policy.
The Social Credit Party’s (SCP) 1930s hospital insurance program in Alberta and the
Cooperative Commonwealth Party’s (CCP) hospital and medical care insurance program
in Saskatchewan from the 1940s to the 1960s are good examples. At the national level,
the existence of third parties led to minority governments, but third parties such as the
New Democratic Party [NDP, formed in 1961 from a loose alliance of the Canadian
Labour Congress (CLC) and the CCP], though with a small number of members of
Parliament, provided the minority government with the votes and support needed for
legislative passage and influencing policy.
A minority government, headed by Prime Minister Lester Pearson, leader of the
Liberal Party, enacted the 1966 Medical Care Act (Medicare). Once Prime Minister
Pearson and his cabinet determined that universal health care insurance was a major
policy objective, strong party discipline and critical voting support from the NDP—which
had enacted Saskatchewan’s hospital and medical insurance programs and was a long
time advocate of national health insurance—ensured Medicare’s successful passage.
Thus, the nature of Canada’s political system—federalism, the fusion of the executive
and legislation bodies, and third parties—remains an important explanatory factor in
Canada’s NHI; whereas, the U.S. political system is viewed as a field of landmines for
NHI.

7

U.S. Political Structure
The nature and complexity of the United States political system is cited frequently
as one significant factor in the failure to achieve NHI, specifically the nature of
federalism and the diffused power within the U.S. federal government.8 As in Canada,
federal and state responsibilities delineated in the U.S. Constitution define health care as
a dual responsibility of both the federal government and states. The federal government’s
authority is contained in the constitutional language ensuring the public welfare and the
power to tax. Since the constitution does not indicate a specific federal responsibility for
health care, then the authority to regulate health care devolves to the states, as specified
in the 10th Amendment. The federal government provides funds for a variety of health
care programs, along with regulations regarding how funds are to be used. States regulate
health insurance companies, provide for public health programs, and regulate workplace
health. There is significant overlap in some of these responsibilities; for example, both
the federal and state governments play a role in workplace health through federal and
state offices of the Occupational, Safety, and Health Administration (OSHA) and through
public health initiatives.
Until the passage of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in 1965, the U.S.
federal government’s role in health care remained somewhat limited to funding for
hospital construction, disease research and prevention, and some public health initiatives

8

Three comparative studies describe the complexity and difficulty of enacting legislation: Gerard W.
Boychuck, National Health Insurance in the United States and Canada: Race, Territory, and the Roots of
Difference (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008); Antonia Maioni, Parting at the
Crossroads: The Emergence of Health Insurance in the United States and Canada (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1998); and Carolyn Hughes Touhy, Accidental Logics: The Dynamics of
Change in the Health Care Arena in the United States, Britain, and Canada (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 1999).
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such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and Food and Drug Acts. This limited involvement resulted from
the predominant political ideology regarding the role of the federal government, which
viewed the federal involvement in private sector medical affairs as a violation of free
enterprise and professional autonomy, as well as the diffused structure of the U.S.
political system that makes enacting major legislation problematical.
Diffused power aptly defines the U.S. national political system.9 Authority is
divided between the federal government and states, and within the federal government
itself, authority is further divided between the three branches: Executive, Legislative, and
Judicial. Furthermore, multiple veto points within the legislative process complicate the
enactment of major legislation such as NHI.
Legislative authority, vested in the House of Representatives and the Senate,
provides each chamber with specific responsibilities regarding particular types of
legislation. For example, budgetary bills must begin in the House; whereas, foreign
treaties are approved by the Senate. Health care legislation can begin in either branch,
and while the president may influence legislation that is introduced, the president does
not have the authority to introduce legislation.
Legislative authority splits further between the Senate and House, and within each
chamber, authority remains diffused between various committees and subcommittees,
often with many committees having responsibility for the same legislation. For example,
health care legislation in the Senate must pass muster with both the Finance Committee

9

See, for example, Antonia Maioni, Parting at the Crossroads, 25–28; Jill Quadagno, One Nation,
Uninsured, 14–15.

9

and Health and Education Committees, and similar types of committees exist in the
House, all of which much approve a particular bill. Legislative leaders and committee
chairs within one congressional body affect the timing and ultimate success or failure of
any potential legislation. Or, unless cloture is invoked, one member of the Senate can
filibuster to its demise a bill passed by the House. The bills ultimately passed by the
House and Senate then must achieve the president’s approval and, ultimately, the courts
review. This decentralized authority, power, and decision making structure allows special
interest groups to exert significant influence on social legislation at a wide variety of
critical points.10 Such diffusion of legislative responsibility and separation of executive
and legislative functions remains a significant factor in the failure to enact NHI.
Since 1946, four presidents—Presidents Truman, Nixon, Ford, and Clinton—who
actively supported national health insurance, had their bills introduced by members of
Congress. These bills enjoyed strong congressional support, and yet NHI was not enacted
in any case. In 1946, the Republican-controlled congress defeated President Truman’s
NHI proposal. Though Democrats regained control of Congress in 1949, a coalition of
southern Democrats (Dixiecrats) and Republicans meant failure again. With President
Nixon’s support, numerous members of Congress introduced over 44 NHI bills from
1970 to 1974, yet none prevailed because of the disagreement within the two legislative
branches and the various committees considering NHI. Within days of assuming the
presidency in August 1974, President Ford strongly encouraged enactment of NHI
legislation before the end of the year, and while Congress was supportive of NHI, a bill,
marked up in late August by the House Ways and Means Committee, failed to be

10

Quadagno, One Nation Uninsured, 14–15.

10

reported—by Chairman Wilbur Mills—to the full House because of significant
disagreement within the Committee regarding how to finance the bill and whether health
insurance should be mandatory for all Americans. President Clinton’s health care
initiative, supported by many legislators and a variety of interest groups in 1993, died in
1994, despite a Congress controlled by Democrats. Within the Democratic caucus itself,
factions and pressures from special interest groups prevented passage of his health care
initiative.
Each county’s political system provides a partial explanation for Canada’s success
in enacting NHI in 1966, and the U.S.’s failure to enact NHI until 2010. Yet political
structure and process alone cannot adequately explain how public policy comes into
being or is evolutionary in nature. New policy, such as NHI, doesn’t just appear out of
nowhere; new policy is often a culmination of past political, and other types of policy,
decisions that set a precedent for future policy, which is the second theoretical approach
known as institutionalism.

Historical Institutionalism
The historical institutionalism school views NHI as part of an evolutionary
process and policy development as a function of path dependence; that is, once policy
becomes established at critical points in time, incentives are established that lock in
future policy development. According to Hacker, “policies may alter administrative
capacities, create incentives for group formation, teach specific lessons to policy makers,

11

or give rise to widespread public expectations or vast networks of special interests.”11
Therefore, existing public policy, for public and private institutions, becomes difficult to
change over time because of the cumulative nature of policymaking—its history, culture,
and practices.

Canadian Institutionalism
In Canada, the national health care insurance movement began at both the federal
and provincial levels at a similar point in time, setting a precedent for joint federalprovincial participation in NHI. In 1919, McKenzie King, future Prime Minister of
Canada, committed the Liberal Party to universal health care. Roughly at the same time,
two western provinces, British Columbia and Alberta, developed proposals for universal
health care in the 1920s, though neither proposal was enacted by the provincial
legislatures because of opposition by labor organizations, business, and the medical
societies.12
Post-World War II, the Canadian federal government became more involved in
health care policy, submitting the Green Book Proposals during the 1945 DominionProvincial Conference for Post-War Reconstruction. These were proposals that included
grants-in-aid to provinces for the provision of province-determined medical and dental
care, hospital construction, and pharmaceutical services. Although the DominionProvincial Conference failed to achieve these specific policy objectives as a result of

11

Jacob S. Hacker, “The Historical Logic of National Health Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the
Development of British, Canadian, and U.S. Medical Policy,” Studies in American Political Development
12 (Spring 1998): 77.
12

Boychuck, National Health Insurance in the United States and Canada, 31–33.
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opposition by Quebec and Ontario, which viewed these proposals as an infringement on
their autonomy and authority over health care policy,13 other provinces, led by
Saskatchewan, began developing hospital insurance for their provincial citizens. Thus,
the federal government’s involvement in nationwide hospital insurance would set the
stage for Saskatchewan to develop medical care insurance for its citizens.
With the failure to enact universal health care coverage during the DominionProvincial Conference, private health care insurance quickly proliferated, similar to the
development of private health care insurance in the U.S after World War II, with both
countries adopting a fee-for-service model for physician reimbursement.14 However,
unlike the United States, which would retain private health insurance as a policy
precedent, Canada did not fully embrace the private solution; rather, it remained on a path
toward government involvement, which had begun after World War I.
In 1957, the Canadian federal government, led by Liberal Prime Minister Louis
St. Laurent, enacted the Hospital Services and Diagnostic Services Act, providing
universal hospital care for all Canadians. This act carved out a financial role for the
federal government, with provinces designing their own programs, utilizing federally
mandated broad-based principles. This federal-provincial relationship set the precedent
for the 1966 Medical Care Act, which allowed provinces latitude in designing their own
programs of medical care insurance along the federally mandated four principles of
comprehensiveness, universality, portability, and public administration. Thus, policy
precedents set in the 1940s, with the Canadian federal government assuming fiscal

13

Ibid.,101.

14

Ibid.
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responsibility for health care programs and provinces having authority over program
design, became and remained the basis for the later universal hospital and physician
insurance programs in Canada today.

U.S. Institutionalism
Path dependence explains, in part, the course of U.S. policy regarding publicly
provided health insurance being limited to the special classes of elderly, disabled, and
poor citizens, with an employer-based system for all other Americans. As early as 1916,
when the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL) developed the first
(unsuccessful) proposals for universal health care insurance, the federal government was
not deemed responsible for providing citizens with health care services. Given the lack of
any government involvement in the health insurance arena, Blue Cross began offering
private hospital insurance in the 1930s, and by the early1940s, health insurance for
physician and hospital services was provided by private insurance companies. The
American Medical Association (AMA) played an important role in the development of
the private health insurance sector.
When the social security program was being developed by President Roosevelt’s
Committee for Economic Security, the committee recommended including some form of
health insurance in the bill. However, given Roosevelt’s concern that AMA opposition to
any form of health insurance would impede passage of the Social Security Act of 1935,
he decided not to include any form of national health insurance in the Social Security Act

14

of 1935.15 After the passage of the Social Security Act, the AMA actively supported the
private sector’s development of health insurance as a way to impede any further federal
government involvement in health care. The AMA’s support for the private basis for
health, along with the development of Blue Cross, Blue Shield, and commercial health
insurance, began an important policy precedent that would be reinforced continually by
both U.S. federal government policies and the private sector.16
During World War II, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations
allowed group health insurance that provided benefits to workers in lieu of wage
increases to be treated as a tax deduction; thus, the federal government allowed for and
encouraged private employers to offer health insurance, further reinforcing the basis of a
privately funded health care system.17 With the defeat of Truman’s NHI bills in 1946 and
1949, unions moved away from supporting a federal national health insurance program to
supporting employer-based health insurance programs through collective bargaining,
upholding a Supreme Court ruling that benefits were a condition of employment and
subject to collective bargaining.18
Employer-based benefits grew in the U.S. during the 1950s, though the health
care plight of the elderly and poor became more urgent, along with organized labor’s
concern for the funding of retiree health benefits. In 1965, the Medicare and Medicaid

15

Edward D. Berkowitz, America’s Welfare State: From Roosevelt to Reagan (The American Movement)
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 157.

16

Funigiello, Chronic Politics: Health Care Security Reform from FDR to George W. Bush, 36; Jacob S.
Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Private Social Benefits in the United States
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 210–212.
17

Ibid., 217.

18

Colin Gordon, Dead on Arrival: The Politics of Health Care in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 67.
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programs in the U.S. provided health care for the poor, elderly, and disabled, but most
Americans remained insured within the employer-based system.
Attempts to move toward a government-based system similar to Canada’s health
care system failed throughout the 1970s, because of intense opposition by the Health
Insurance Association of America (HIAA), the AMA, and corporations. As various NHI
bills were considered, the AMA wanted to maintain the voluntary nature of health
insurance, with no federal involvement other than tax credits and the setting of minimum
standards for benefits, claiming that medicine would become socialistic with any further
government involvement. Since Canada largely excluded private insurance companies,
American insurance companies and businesses consistently and vehemently opposed any
form of government-run NHI program, claiming that such a program would severely
diminish or eliminate an important and fundamental aspect of their overall free enterprise
business model. Federal involvement in any NHI program should be limited to setting
standards and funding for the poor and elderly, they claimed. Even the Clinton and
Obama administrations’ health care plans ensured that the private sector play the
dominant role in any health care reform. Thus, an employer-based system, steeped in
policy precedent and reinforced by repeated failures to change the health care system,
remains the policy preference for the United States, ensuring an expansive role for private
insurance companies in America.

Political Culture
The involvement of powerful special interest groups is clear in the development
of the employer-based system in the U.S. and the public partnership in Canada, though

16

the results are dissimilar. Special interest group involvement remains an important part of
the third major theoretical approach: the political cultural explanation of NHI. Political
culture, defined as the shared understandings that motivate political action and shape
policy, examines and assumes differences in values and ideology, emanating from special
interest groups, which underlie the politics of health care. These values and ideologies
form the basis for political action. 19

Canadian Political Culture and Ideologies
Canada’s success at achieving NHI has been attributed partly to values, partly to
ideology, and partly to the power of a key interest group: organized labor.20 Prior to
Medicare’s passage in 1965, Canada achieved universal hospital coverage with the
passage of the Hospital and Diagnostic Act of 1957. Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, at
the urging of the Canadian Medical Association (CMA,) established a royal commission
in 1961 to examine the next steps needed to solve the Canadian health care crisis. Health
costs were rising; many Canadians lacked health care; and services in many areas were
fragmented and uncoordinated. Additionally, the CMA was concerned that
Saskatchewan’s passage of insurance for physician services would set a precedent for
other provinces and federal involvement.21

19

This definition is consistent with various authors, such as Jacob S. Hacker, “The Historic Logic of
National Health Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the Development of British, Canadian, and U.S.
Medical Policy,” Studies in American Political Development 12 (Spring 1998); Michael H. Hunt,
“Ideology,” The Journal of Amerian History 77, no. 1 (June 1990): 108–115; and Seymour Martin Lipset,
Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada (New York, NY:
Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc., 1990).
20

Maioni, Parting at the Crossroads, 414.
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The Royal Commission on Health Care concluded in a 1964 report that the
federal government should implement a universal medical services insurance program for
all citizens, complementing the hospital insurance program and achieving “the highest
possible health standards for all our people. . . as a primary objective of national policy
and a cohesive factor contributing to national unity, involving individual and community
responsibilities and actions. . .”22 During the 1964 elections in Canada, the New
Democratic Party (NDP)—strong advocates for universal health care coverage as a
matter of right—provided the Liberal Party with the support needed to form a
government and enact Medicare in 1966.23
Medicare was opposed by a variety of powerful interest groups, such as the
Canadian Medical Association and the Canadian Health Insurance Association (CHIA),
because they viewed government intrusion as a violation of the principles of free
enterprise and the negation of choice for the Canadian people. The power of social
democratic principles, expressed through the NDP, was instrumental;24 clearly, the social
democratic principles of the CCP, NDP, and Liberal Party—such as collectivism and
government responsibility for citizen’s welfare—combined with the ideology of the
Royal Commission on Health Services, were key to Medicare’s passage. These
principles, best expressed in the Royal Commission’s Health Charter, stated that all
Canadians were entitled to the best possible care as a matter of societal interest, and the
federal and provincial governments had the primary responsibility to ensure that
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universal and comprehensive care was available to all citizens. Federal and provincial
involvement in the welfare of their citizens was expected, welcomed, and trusted

American Political Culture and Ideologies
The ideologies of special interest groups have been instrumental in the failure
until 2010 for the U.S. to achieve NHI. Since 1917, when the AALL introduced sickness
insurance for workers, the AMA has been the primary opponent because it feared that
government involvement in medicine would affect doctors’ independence to practice
medicine and to ensure their financial well-being. Beginning in the 1970s, the HIAA and
corporations began their strong opposition to universal health care proposals, and the
AMA continued its opposition to NHI throughout this period, viewing NHI as the path to
socialized medicine. The AMA feared that, ultimately, NHI would allow the government
to control how physicians practiced medicine and that such control would limit a person’s
freedom of choice regarding health care providers. The HIAA and corporations opposed
NHI because such a bill would threaten the free enterprise system by replacing the
significant and profitable health insurance industry with a huge government-run
bureaucratic insurance system, thus reducing competition that, ultimately, would lead to
lowered health care costs and improved quality. All of these groups were concerned that
the voluntary and private-sector nature of health care—which allowed individualism to
flourish and ensured that collectivism would never see the light of day, and which
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guaranteed the individual’s choice of how to pay for health care and the right to choose
health care providers—would be eliminated.25
Health care as a right has not been supported in the United States.26 In the U.S.,
individualism has remained a focal and prominent value in the constant demise of NHI
over the past century; individuals, not the government, have a responsibility for their
health care and health care insurance. The exceptions to individualism and government
involvement were in providing health care to those unable to do so: the poor, the elderly,
and the disabled. NHI could protect these groups against the exigencies of life that they
often did not control. They were considered a special class of citizens that deserved
government aid.

Purpose of This Study
All three major schools of thought—political structures, institutionalism, and
political culture—provide explanations for Canada’s success in achieving NHI and the
U.S. failure to do so until 2010. Scholarly works provide rich details of the events,
individuals, and groups involved in the quest for NHI in each country. What these works
barely touch upon are the complex ideologies of individuals and groups that played
important roles in the success or failure of NHI in each country. Too often, those
ideologies were assumed or scantily described. The key staff member, William
Fullerton, working with the House of Representative Ways and Means Committee during
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the 1970-1974 period argued that the 1970s debate “would be argued on broad
philosophical grounds, not on the specifics of the bills . . . yet did not talk about those
philosophical differences.”27 Too often, the CMA and AMA ideologies were reduced to
their concern about physicians losing their ability to practice medicine without
government interference or loss of income. The health insurance industry’s ideology is
often summed up simply as losing a major source of revenue. The inability of U.S.
reformers to be influential in achieving NHI has been attributed to the lack of resources
rather than an effective ideological argument or the power of individualism. An
examination of historical documents, such as Congressional hearings or Royal
Commission briefs, suggests a greater complexity to the ideology that has been guiding
the development of health care reform in these two countries.28
This study fills a gap in the story of NHI in each country by providing a
comprehensive description and analysis of the ideologies that prevailed during the 1962–
1966 period when Canada enacted Medicare and physician services for its citizens, and
the 1970–1974 period, infrequently analyzed by scholars, when the U.S. came close to
enacting NHI for its citizens, but failed. During this period of intensive legislative
activity in the heath care arena, the economies of both countries were strong—with GDP
growth, as well as the proliferation of new domestic programs and policies. Both Canada
and the U.S. enjoyed high levels of employment and few budgetary problems, at least
until the late 1960s and early 1970s, when unemployment and inflation began to increase
for both countries.
27
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In both countries, the role of government increased in the provision of services to
their citizens through a wide variety of new policies and programs. In Canada, such
programs included Medicare, pensions for the elderly, and programs for the disabled. In
the United States, the Johnson-era Great Society included medical care for the elderly and
poor, the Office of Economic Opportunity, the War on Poverty, and the Model Cities
Program, among others. President Nixon initially continued many of these domestic
programs and attempted others, such as the guaranteed income program for the poor,
although many of the Great Society programs were eventually dismantled during the
1970s.
A strong liberal ideology and social democratic element in each country
facilitated development of these programs during this period. Government’s role to
enhance the lives of citizens, especially those needing special attention, such as the
elderly, poor, and disabled, greatly expanded. Society would improve itself through
improving the lives of its citizens. This broad ideology was the basis for many of the
legislative successes in social program expansion during this period, but it does not
adequately explain Canada’s success with Medicare and the U.S. failure to enact health
care reform.
Achieving a broader and deeper understanding of the values and ideologies that
prevailed during this period as both countries considered universal health care can
provide a better understanding of the basis for the political and collective actions of
politicians, interest groups, and powerful elites who influence public policy. What groups
and individuals did is clear from the scholarly literature, but what ideological positions
they held and their subsequent actions are less apparent. For example, the ideologies that
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led the CMA and AMA to oppose NHI are more complex than concerns about
government involvement in health care leading to government dictating medical practice
or limiting what doctors would earn. And the reasons for U.S. labor’s opposition to many
of the 1974 NHI bills are elusive. When the ideologies of all of the major proponents and
opponents of NHI in each country are examined, a far more complex understanding will
evolve.

Defining ‘Ideology’
Unfortunately, the first task—that of defining ideology—is difficult. The
definitions and parameters of ideology are numerous. In an analysis of ideology, John
Gerring provided fourteen definitions,29 and in a separate work on ideology’s definitions
and approaches, seventeen different definitions were offered by Terry Eagleton.30
Malcom B. Hamilton noted that ideology involves twenty-five different elements, from a
system of ideas to advocating action.31 According to David M. Minar, ideology is
important in that “. . . those who engage in policy study are engaged in ideology which
preconditions political actions,”32 and studies of political ideology “. . . presume to
demonstrate that political ideology makes a difference to political behavior.”33 American
historian Michael Hunt noted that ideology allows policy makers to reduce the
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complexity of their world to finite terms, provides them with an understanding of their
environment, and thus, provides the clarity needed in policy making.34 Ideology, a
fundamental ingredient in the creation of public policy, implies both ideas and action.
While there are many similarities and differences in the various definitions of
ideology, the following definition brings together the common elements of the various
definitions encountered.35 For this study, ideology will be defined as a set of collectively
held, logically interrelated and coherent beliefs, ideas, and values that can be conceptual,
normative, explanatory, or factual in nature. These ideas, beliefs, and values describe
patterns of social relationships and arrangements among persons, social structures,
society, and nature. Finally, ideology can contain prescriptions or justifications for
conducts and actions that are desired in order to maintain, alter, or improve the social or
physical world. Ideology does not guarantee policy or political action; ideology is one of
the bases of policy development and political action.
This study argues that a clash of ideologies and values between the proponents
and opponents of universal health care coverage existed in Canada and in the U.S. as NHI
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was pursued and that these ideological battles were important in Canada’s ultimate
success and the United States’ failure to enact NHI during the 1960s and 1970s. The
underlying ideologies of powerful individuals and special interest groups remain an
important explanatory factor that has not been sufficiently explored or integrated into the
existing narrative of NHI. The story of ideology will add to the existing narrative, not
supplant the importance of institutions, policy precedents, and other aspects of political
culture.

Methodology
To examine the clash of ideologies, the ideologies of powerful and critical interest
groups and political leaders will be identified and analyzed. These groups will be chosen
on the basis of their power to influence whether social policy was introduced, how policy
was developed, and whether or not that policy was enacted into law. Where possible,
similar special interest groups in both countries will be examined, since comparison of
similar groups, such as the medical societies and labor unions, can provide an opportunity
to understand how groups with seemingly similar missions and goals viewed and reacted
to the same social policy. Such comparative analyses may provide insight into the health
care ideologies extant in both countries.
These groups will include, minimally, the various medical and other health care
professional societies, insurance associations, representative church groups, chambers of
commerce, manufacturing organizations, and organized labor groups. The written and
oral positions of these various groups and other key individuals as the policy and
legislative development process evolved will provide the content for examining and
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analyzing the ideologies involved in the health care debate. Ideology will be determined
from position papers and oral testimony provided to the Royal Commission,
Parliamentary bodies, Congressional committees, Parliamentary and Congressional
debates on NHI, speeches, private correspondence and papers, and other relevant sources.
Because this study will involve examining the views of similar groups in two countries
regarding a similar issue, a comparative analysis of these ideologies can be achieved,
which is useful in the larger question of Canadian-U.S. similarities and differences.
Comparative historical studies provide opportunities to ask new questions,
identify new historical problems that merit research, and design and test hypotheses.
Societal themes and historical processes are the focuses of comparative studies.36
Comparative studies provide a contrast of contexts to find the unique features that affect
social processes.37 Since this study examines the development of health care policy in
two countries at a particular point in time, this comparative analysis can provide
additional understanding of the larger question of how Canada and the U.S. are similar or
different regarding ideology and values, a question relevant to scholars, politicians, and
citizens.
Scholars point to the similarities and interdependencies between both countries:
shared borders; capitalist economy; democratic form of government; integration of trade
union movements; immigration; adaption of Canadian laws to U.S. laws; military
alliances; U.S. cultural dominance; similarity of language for most Americans and
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Canadians; complexity of the urban setting; and values about religion, government, and
social programs. They also point out critical differences between Canada and the U.S.,
including Canada’s French factor, U.S. imperialism, ability of the Canadian government
to solve social problems and engender trust, Canadian middle power diplomacy, and
resistance to universal social programs in the U.S.38
The answer to this perplexing question of the similarities and differences between
both nations is elusive. Seymour Martin Lipsett, in his classic and comprehensive
examination of U.S. and Canadian differences concluded that Canadians were “. . . more
aware of class, elitist, law abiding, statist, collectivity oriented, and particularistic,” and
that had the American Revolution been lost to the British, Americans would be more
“. . . leftist than the revolutionary children, more status, much more socially democratic,
more disposed to perceive equality in redistributionist rather than meritocratic
terms . . . more conducive to third parties. . . less individualistic and more deferential to
authority.”39 However, a comprehensive study of the values of Canadians and Americans
found that large differences did not exist. In fact, the values of English-speaking
Canadians and Americans living in the northeast were similar to each other and different
from French Canadians and U.S. southerners.40 A recent historical analysis of the
comparative political development and jurisdictional law concluded that the U.S. and
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Canada are vastly different in the area of political culture because of the development of
legal institutions and law, and as a result, differences are apparent in the areas of civil
rights, identity politics, comparative federalism, economic development, and social
policy.41
The question of if and how Canada and the U.S. are similar or different remains
an open question that will be addressed in this study by examining how a single policy
issue—national health insurance—is viewed by similar groups with similar goals in two
seemingly similar countries during a similar period of time. While this study cannot
provide a definitive answer to this question of national similarities and differences,
additional analyses and conclusions will be provided.

Summary
In summary, by providing a comprehensive description and analysis of the
ideologies of proponents and opponents of universal health care coverage, this study adds
to the existing narrative of Canada’s Medicare program development during the 1960s
and the U.S. failure to enact a similar social policy in the early 1970s, when opportunities
abounded. The comprehensive story of NHI ideology has yet to be told, and the larger
question of Canadian-U.S. political and cultural similarities and differences has yet to be
definitively answered.
Understanding the complex ideologies that led to Canada’s successful passage of
Medicare and the ideologies that prevented the passage of a U.S. NHI bill during a period
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of significant legislative activity can provide current scholars of NHI and social policy
with a broader and deeper understanding of the ideologies that have facilitated and those
that have inhibited social policy development in North America. Furthermore, the
ideological battles during this period can be compared to the ideological battles that
occurred during the recent successful passage of U.S. health care reform and current
attempts to modify Canada’s health care system.
Finally, this study adds to the discussion of values and ideological differences
between the U.S. and Canada, which may provide some answers to questions concerning
similarities and differences between the two nations, questions that have not been
sufficiently answered. Since this study will examine a single policy issue and the
ideologies of similar special interest groups in both countries regarding this singular
issue, ideological similarities and differences between these countries can be discerned.
Examining and comparing how the two major medical societies—the CMA in Canada
and the AMA in the U.S.—and labor—viewed national health care insurance can suggest
basic underlying ideological similarities and dissimilarities between both countries.
This study is broken down into six chapters. Chapter 2 traces the development of
Canada’s health care system, with an emphasis on the period of 1962 to 1968, when
Medicare was enacted. Chapter 3 is an examination and comparative analysis of the
ideologies of individuals and key interest groups in Canada that were involved in the
debate over national health care. Chapter 4 provides a brief narrative of the development
of health care reform in the U.S. during the 20th century, with a more detailed narrative
of the early 1970s, the focus period of the U.S. portion of this study. Chapter 5 examines
the ideologies of the key American interest groups and individuals supporting and

29

opposing the various health care reform bills proposed during this period. A comparative
analysis of those ideologies highlights critical similarities and differences. Chapter 6
concludes this work with a comparative analysis of the ideologies influential in the
success or failure of NHI in each country, along with a comparison of how similar groups
in Canada and the U.S. viewed NHI, which will answer the larger question of how the
two countries are ideologically similar and different.
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Chapter 2
Health Care in Canada

In the early days of Canada’s growth as a nation, health care was a regional and
local responsibility. The first contract between a physician and the residents of Quebec,
initiated in 1655, led to additional contracts between hospitals and towns. By the late
nineteenth century, mining companies provided health care to their workers using a
check-off system, and miners could choose doctors and hospitals. In 1899, the first
publically supported hospital began providing services in Medicine Hat, located in the
Northwest Territory. In Ontario, the most populous province at the turn of the century,
Friendly Societies, which collected dues from their members and formulated contracts
with physicians to provide care, rather than fees for service, were founded. Physicians
groups immediately opposed these contract plans—as they would over the next century—
because they believed that such plans had the potential to compromise the medical and
financial autonomy of physicians.1
As Canada’s population grew in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
health care became the responsibility of municipalities and provinces. The Constitution
Act of 1867, creating Canada as a British dominion, provided a clear delineation of
responsibilities between the provincial and federal governments regarding health care.
The powers of the federal parliament included the “Establishment and Maintenance of
Marine Hospitals,” while the provincial responsibility was for “the Establishment,
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Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals, Asylums, Charities, and Institutions in and
for the Province, other than Marine Hospitals.”2
Initially, the development of provincial health care began at the level the rural
municipalities. Saskatchewan, a sparsely populated prairie province, enacted the Rural
Municipality Act of 1916, as a strategy to recruit and retain doctors. Municipalities could
utilize local tax dollars to enter into contracts with physicians. The first such contract,
signed in 1916, was in the town of Sarnia, Ontario. This provincial act, by 1948, led to
over 180 municipalities, towns, and villages contracting with physicians.3
Hospital care remained a municipal responsibility. Both Saskatchewan and
Alberta enacted legislation allowing towns to combine hospital districts, which funded
the building and maintenance of hospitals. In Saskatchewan, the Union Hospital Act of
1916 led to ten hospital districts by 1920, and by 1990, these hospital districts served
over one half of Saskatchewan’s population. In 1919, the town of Lloydminster,
straddling the Saskatchewan-Alberta border, began the first government-operated
hospital insurance program.4 Since provinces were responsible for their citizens’ health,
these innovations were important because they would ensure healthy citizens vital to
fulfilling a growing nation’s needs.
World War I led to further changes in the development of health care in Canada.
Similar to the situation that confronted the U.S. armed forces, the rejection rate of
potential new recruits during WWI was over 50 percent, which resulted from the lack of
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basic health care for many young Canadian men. To ensure the nation’s defense, new
systems of health care would be vital. Further impetus for such improvements came from
Canadian soldiers acquainted with Britain’s new national health care system, launched in
1911, which provided health insurance to many British workers, though not their
families.5 These events were instrumental in creating the first federal political party
initiative after World War I, and they also encouraged more aggressive provincial
actions.
During the 1919 national convention of the Liberal Party, the newly elected party
leader, William Lyon McKenzie King called for a comprehensive system of insurance—
pensions, disability, sickness, maternity, and unemployment—to be implemented jointly
by the federal and provincial governments. Although the federal government would not
begin taking action on these proposals until World War II, King created an expectation
that would remain an active part of the federal scene and political process from World
War II to the enactment of medical insurance in 1966.6 During the 1920 and 1930s, health
care remained an important concern, although only two western provinces, British
Columbia and Alberta, attempted to implement a plan. Both attempts proved
unsuccessful, and further federal involvement would not come until the 1940s.
British Columbia, the first provincial legislature to call for some form of
government health insurance, authorized a commission in 1919 that issued a proposal
three years later calling for government-supported health insurance, but provincial
leaders chose not to release the report to the public, providing no reasons for this
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decision. A second British Columbia legislative commission created in 1929, and
reporting in 1932, called for compulsory health insurance for all employed people and
voluntary insurance for others. After negotiations with the Canadian Medical Association
(CMA), the British Columbia Hospital Association (BCHA), and the British Columbia
College of Physicians and Surgeons (BCCPS), the bill was enacted in 1936, but it drew
immediate opposition. Physician resistance to fee arrangements; a depressed economy;
pressure from the British Columbia Manufacturers Association (BCMA), which feared
that the program would hurt the fishing and lumber industry; and finally, dissent from
within the Liberal Party, led to the decision not to implement the program.7 During the
1937 election, which led to the Liberal Party regaining power, a provincial referendum
was held in which the public clearly favored a “comprehensive health insurance scheme
progressively applied.”8
Alberta was the second province that attempted to implement some form of health
insurance. A campaign begun in 1929 by the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA) resulted
in a 1934 legislative report that recommended additional municipal hospital and doctor
plans, in addition to future province-wide health insurance. Legislation to those ends,
enacted in 1935, failed to be implemented by the “newly formed Social Credit party,
which believed that with its ‘social credit dividend’ such measures as health insurance
would be unnecessary.”9
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Throughout this period of provincial action on health care, some federal inroads
were made. During the thirties, Canada experienced one of the worst economic calamities
in its history, with an unemployment rate estimated at 50 percent, which led to immense
suffering by its citizens. The Conservative government, led by Prime Minister Robert
Bennett, enacted social and employment insurance in 1935 to ease the economic pain, but
the unemployment programs were deemed unconstitutional by Canada’s Supreme Court
in 1937. Bennett’s government also passed legislation calling for the establishment of a
commission that would examine and make recommendations on medical, hospital, and
sickness benefits.10 During the 1937 federal elections, frustrated voters ousted the
Conservative government in favor of a new Liberal one led by King, who first advocated
national health insurance. The Liberals would hold power until 1957.
To find solutions to the continuing economic troubles and the constitutional crisis
brought about by the 1937 court decision overturning unemployment insurance, the King
government appointed a Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations. The
Commission’s report, known familiarly as the Rowell-Sirois report, recognized that
provinces were not prepared to provide a national standard of social services, given the
imbalance in their financial capabilities. The Commission reaffirmed that health care was
a provincial responsibility, while pensions and unemployment were federal
responsibilities. Finally, it determined that federal conditional grants-in-aid were not
effective instruments for solving provincial financial problems since grants-in-aid created
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strict conditions for their use. A different financial arrangement between provinces and
the federal government would be needed.11
Given that lack of concrete government action to ease the problems of Canadians,
health care at the local level had reached a crisis. During this period, the denial of health
care for many Canadians and doctors providing services without remuneration were both
commonplace. Medical associations demanded government relief from the high levels of
uncompensated care. The Ontario Medical Association administered a province-wide
medical relief program, while in Manitoba, doctors withdrew all but emergency services
in protest of the lack of monetary relief.12 This health care crisis would continue as World
War II commenced.13
Federal government efforts to promote health insurance moved forward with the
efforts of Ian McKenzie, Minister of Pensions and National Health. Using studies
completed by his department during the late 1930s, McKenzie proposed both
unemployment insurance and health insurance to the cabinet, neither of which was acted
upon initially. A key figure in this effort was Dr. J. J. Heagerty, Director of Public Health
Services, appointed by McKenzie to chair an internal committee that eventually proposed
a variety of bills.14 Despite Prime Minister King’s endorsement of national health
insurance, the time was not ripe for such a move, and two additional cabinet committees
were formed to examine health insurance and a variety of other postwar social programs:
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the Interdepartmental Committee on Health Insurance and the Committee on Post War
Reconstruction. Both committees gained momentum from the 1942 publication of the
British Beveridge Report, which provided important planning tools, as well as the
impetus and motivation to move forward and expand the welfare state by providing social
benefits—health care, unemployment assistance, education, housing, and pensions—to
all citizens.15 Visiting Canada during the War, Beveridge promoted postwar
reconstruction, which perked the public’s support for health and other social insurance
reforms. Support for health care reached 75 percent, and 71 percent favored postwar
reconstruction.16 Draft bills developed by these committees led to public hearings in
1943, although the cabinet remained reluctant to proceed until the jurisdictional and
funding issues were resolved.17
The House of Commons Committee on Social Insurance found strong support and
demand for health insurance from the CMA, the Canadian Hospital Association (CHA),
the Canadian Life Insurance Association (CLIA), and most importantly, the public.
Public opinion polls found a 75 percent favorable view toward a health insurance
program and a 90 percent favorable view toward postwar reform programs.18 The
committee proposed nineteen principles, including, for example, that health insurance be
administered by a commission, health insurance be mandatory for the indigent and those
with annual incomes of less the $2,400, and fees be under the control of the provincial
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physicians. The CMA supported such a compulsory program but only if limited to the
indigent, as it was highly unlikely that the CMA nor the CHA would accept a universal
and compulsory program. The CMA supported government intervention to assist the
poor, and the CHA preferred the continued growth of the voluntary hospital plans such as
Blue Cross.19 Although the committee’s report was widely accepted by many key
organizations, movement toward a national health insurance program ground to a halt.
The report and the idea of NHI would be included in how a variety of other postwar
social issues would be resolved and how these social programs would be taxed and
funded in the future.20 Clearly, health insurance was going to become an important issue
for future federal and provincial elections, given the levels of public and government
support. One province—Saskatchewan—and one party—the Co-operative
Commonwealth Federation (CCF)—would take the lead in Canada’s health care reform
after World War II.
The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, a political party that advocated
hospital and medical insurance in the 1950s and 1960s, that became models for the
federal programs, broadened its electoral support in the 1940s. With its roots in Alberta,
the CCF began in 1932 as a coalition of farmers, labor, cooperative, and socialist groups
that advocated a public approach to solving social problems. In 1943, the CCF became
the official opposition party in Ontario, and in 1944, after winning the Saskatchewan
provincial election, they became the first socialist party to govern a province. The CCF
supported government-sponsored and -administered universal health insurance for all
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Canadians. As a result of the provincial election and public sentiment, the Conservative
Party of Saskatchewan changed its name to the Progressive Conservative Party. The
political landscape was changing.21
By the 1945 elections, ensuring Canadians access to health care had the support of
all four major parties and the public, with an 80 percent approval of a contributory plan
for hospital and medical insurance, clearly a continuation of the public’s support during
the war. Although the Liberal Party prevailed in the federal election, their majority
decreased significantly, affecting their ability to achieve the health care goal set by
McKenzie King in 1919.22
At the 1945 Dominion-Provincial Conference on Post-War Reconstruction, in
which the government’s plan for postwar Canada was reviewed, health insurance was a
major topic. Other key and related health care issues on the agenda included the
restructuring of the federal-provincial taxing system, the federal-provincial relationship,
and funding mechanisms for future social programs. The decisions on these issues would
be made by with difficulty. The federal government led by the Liberals held a slim
parliamentary majority, and provincial leaders represented both rich and poor provinces,
which led to different needs and demands. Finally, political ideologies about postwar
reconstruction and social reform were widespread and varied.23 Success was not a
foregone conclusion.
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The 1945 Dominion-Provincial Conference on Post War Construction began with
optimism. Prime Minister King, reminiscent of Sir William Beveridge, stated that, “the
enemies that we shall overcome . . . will make their presence known in the guise of
sickness, unemployment and want,” and to this end, he proposed a series of reforms,
known as the Green Book Proposals, which was “ . . . a plan for a unified campaign in
Canada against these enemies of progress and human well being . . . this may well be the
most important Canadian conference since Confederation.”24 The next future Prime
Minister, Minister of Justice Louis St. Laurent, believed that the government needed to
take “. . . greater responsibility for individual security and welfare . . . (and) provide for
such hazards and disabilities such as unemployment, sickness, and old age”25
With regard to health care, the Green Book Proposals would establish provincial
planning staffs to prepare for and organize health insurance benefits for provinces. The
development and administration of comprehensive health insurance would be worked out
in stages and on an agreed-upon basis. The federal share for provision of health insurance
would be one-fifth of the estimated cost and one-half of the additional actual cost. Other
health grants would be available for public health and loans for hospital construction.
While some provinces were concerned about any federal involvement in health care, the
most critical issue and that which led to the conference’s failure to achieve agreement on
the Green Book Proposals was the taxing power of the federal government and how the
health care proposal and other social reforms would be funded.26
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During the war, the federal government assumed responsibility for collecting all
personal, corporate, and estate taxes, which, prior to the war, were the joint responsibility
of the federal and provincial governments. Taxes were shared as provinces were given
funds on a per capita basis. The federal government now proposed that it retain the power
to collect these taxes and that provinces receive payments from the Dominion, which
would ensure their financial stability and future growth. The small provinces found these
proposals quite acceptable as more tax dollars would be return to them, but the larger
provinces, such as Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia, found these proposals difficult
to swallow because they provided the bulk of the tax revenue but would receive only a
percentage in return. The rich would be subsidizing the poor when the rich provinces
needed funds for provincial economic growth. Without agreement on funding, the social
reform proposals were doomed.27
While the provinces and the federal government failed to find solutions to vexing
financing and social reform issues during the conference, one major positive outcome
was the 1948 Hospital Grant Program, which provided hospital construction and health
survey grants designed to plan for the organization of hospital and medical insurance,
extension of hospital accommodations, and grants for public health. The provinces and
federal government also moved toward a general agreement on taxation, with provincial
agreements in place for all provinces by 1950.28 The failure of the Dominion Provincial
Conference led to three additional outcomes that would affect the development of
universal health care: 1) a new Liberal Party Prime Minister in 1948, 2) the development
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of physician-sponsored prepayment plans, and 3) commercial insurance and the
Saskatchewan Hospital Insurance Program, a key provincial development that would set
the stage for universal hospital and health care in Canada.
Having served as prime minister for over 28 years, King, a L
iberal voice for government health care, chose Minister of Justice Louis St. Laurent as his
replacement, and with this choice, a new and less aggressive approach to federal
government involvement in health care evolved for the Liberal Party and the nation.
St. Laurent, a corporate lawyer, believed that government’s role was to care for the
weaker members of society—children, poor, elderly, disabled—but that free enterprise
should not be replaced by government programs for the vast majority of Canadians. He
feared that government health care would exclude private industry. While St. Laurent’s
personal views would mitigate any federal programs initially, both the Liberal and
Conservative parties affirmed their commitment to social security and health insurance,
given a 1949 public opinion poll which indicated that 80 percent of Canadians favored
complete hospital and medical care insurance from the Dominion government at a flat
rate.29 Since the federal government under St. Laurent’s leadership would not be
significantly involved in the development of health insurance, commercial health
insurance boomed during this period, though its origin began in the 1930s.
Cooperative hospital plans began during the 1930s, with multiple hospitals in
cities offering prepayment plans. This endeavor became the nucleus of the Canadian Blue
Cross movement, with the first Blue Cross plan initiated in Manitoba in 1939. By 1948,
Blue Cross was established throughout Canada. Blue Cross, unlike most commercial
29
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companies, developed the service contract, which provided a certain number of days of
hospital care regardless of the per diem rate and rate standardization across all employee
groups. This type of plan led to the low utilization groups, such as secretaries,
subsidizing the high utilization groups, such as oil service workers.30
Voluntary and not-for-profit medical care plans also developed during this period.
The Windsor (Ontario) Medical Services Plan, begun in 1937 and sponsored by the Essex
Country Medical Society, provided service contracts for physician services to those with
incomes less than $4,000 per annum and indemnity contracts to those above $4,000.
Other plans also developed in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia during the
war. 31 Through this period, the CMA, as a result of its involvement with various federallevel committees that designed health insurance proposals during the war, knew that
health insurance was imminent. As a result, the CMA strongly encouraged provincial
CMA groups to develop and implement profession-sponsored health care plans, a goal
largely accomplished by 1948.32 The problem for provincial physician plans competing
with commercial plans was that a provincial plan could not offer service contracts to
employers in two or more provinces. Contracts were limited to employees within a
specific province, which limited the portability of the plans.
By 1949, the CMA formally approved physician participation in voluntary health
plans, including both physician-sponsored and commercial plans, reversing its former
support for government plans. The CHA and CLIA also reversed their support for
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government plans in favor of private plans. These organizations asserted that government
should be involved only with those having low incomes or using some form of social
insurance.33 By 1951, the Trans-Canada Medical Plan (TCMP), a physician-owned and
-operated plan similar to Blue Shield in the U.S., was launched under the leadership of
the CMA.
Designed to compete with the commercial sector the TCMP would eventually
include all physician-sponsored plans throughout Canada. TCMP prepayment plans,
unlike commercial insurance plans, frequently offered comprehensive services, including
both house and office calls, uniform provincial fee schedules, and standardized provincial
premium structures. These plans required extraordinary physician cooperation, given the
negotiated uniform fee schedules. Between 1950 and 1961, membership in these plans
grew from 1.8 to 4.8 million Canadians or approximately 23 percent of all Canadian
citizens.34 The downside to these plans was that a TCMP in one province could not
provide insurance in other provinces, and TCMP insurance was not portable from
province to province.
Commercial insurance also grew after the failed postwar Dominion-Provincial
Conference. Two types of companies expanded hospital and medical insurance. The first
type, represented by the Canadian Life Insurance Association, focused on group policies.
The second type, represented by the Association of Accident and Health Underwriters,
focused on both group and individual policies. Unlike prepayment plans, commercial
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insurance offered indemnity contracts, which reimbursed beneficiaries according to fee
schedules and generally included deductibles and co-pays. Unlike physician-sponsored
prepayment plans and Blue Cross, commercial insurance used experience ratings rather
than community ratings, which led to more contracts with employee groups of healthy
individuals. By 1952, only 37.6 percent of Canada’s population was covered by
commercial hospital insurance, and only 20 percent of Canadians had some form of
medical insurance. Prepayment and commercial plans had grown, but many Canadians
still lacked protection. Yet in two provinces—Saskatchewan and British Columbia—all
citizens had attained hospital care by 1950, while in other provinces, innovation
broadened health care to more citizens.
Given the rural nature of much of Canada and the resulting scarcity of doctors and
health care services, municipalities developed agreements with doctors that paid doctors
stipends to supplement the meager fees they collected from farmers, who were not only
few in number, but poor. However, during the depression and World War II, doctors
began advocating for system change, and as a result, Saskatchewan launched two major
initiatives that would aid physicians and the rural population.
The first initiative was a comprehensive, universal, regional and experimental
health care plan in the Saskatchewan’s Swift Current Health Region in 1946. 35 This new
comprehensive program resulted from legislation initiated by the CCF and the leadership
of Premier Tommy Douglas (who would be known as the father of Canadian Medicare),
by using the prior precedent of municipal arrangements with doctors to expand health
care. After winning the 1944 election and gaining control of the Saskatchewan
35
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legislature, a second major Co-operative Credit Party initiative enacted by the provincial
legislature was the Saskatchewan Hospital Services Act (SHSA), which provided
universal, compulsory hospital insurance that included unlimited benefit days, $5 per
person or $30 per family premiums, and provincial subsidies for hospitals.36 This plan
avoided potential conflict with doctors, since the plan did not include medical services.
The province would contribute funds for the blind, disabled, and poor. The SHSA,
formally implemented in 1947, allowed the province time to develop an appropriate
administrative structure and ensure the completion of a sufficient number of hospital
beds. During the initial years of operation, the hospital utilization rate increased
significantly, and the costs of the provincial plan achieved its budget goals.37 Western
provincial leadership in health care was evident as a second province enacted health care
reforms. The rural nature of western provinces likely made health care a priority.
British Columbia enacted compulsory hospital insurance in 1948, with a liberalConservative coalition cabinet that included significant pressure by the CCF and labor
organizations.38 British Columbia, like Saskatchewan, had significant numbers of citizens
living outside the largest cities of Victoria, Vancouver, and New Westminster. The
British Columbia Hospital Insurance Service (BCHIS) began operation in 1949 with
premiums collected either through payroll deduction or direct pay. It provided
comprehensive services, deductibles, and co-pays. As a result of administrative problems
with the premium collection system, the Social Credit Party replaced the liberal-
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Conservative coalition government, and a retail sales tax program replaced premiums in
1954.39
Alberta and Newfoundland also implemented hospital insurance programs in the
early 1950s. The Alberta Municipal Hospital Plan (AMHP), enacted in 1950, provided
hospital benefits for recipients of social services and offered subsidized municipal plans
that gave basic hospital care to all taxpayers, including dependents. By 1953, the AMHP
covered approximately 75 percent of Alberta’s population. Newfoundland provided
hospital services through provincially owned hospitals and salaried doctors for
Newfoundlanders living in the most isolated areas. This plan was financed by annual
premiums and covered approximately 47 percent of the province’s population.40 The
hospital plans in these four provinces would set the stage for a federal hospital program
by mid-decade.
During the early 1950s, the Liberal government began developing plans for
dominion wide hospital insurance, though significant barriers existed. First and foremost,
Prime Minister St. Laurent advocated a private insurance approach, and CMA leadership
believed that federally supported universal hospital insurance was not feasible, given the
insufficient number of hospital beds, and that any government commitment would be
difficult to achieve and, thus, unethical if the government could not meet that
commitment. Second, there was no justification for the government to levy a tax on all
citizens for the benefit of a minority living in provinces with plans already in place.
Third, most provinces had some form of hospital insurance, only Ontario and Quebec
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withstanding. Finally, St. Laurent, a Quebecor, knew of Quebec’s concerns and antipathy
toward federal intrusion into a provincial responsibility. St. Laurent finally agreed during
the 1953 federal election that support for a federal hospital insurance program would
occur when the majority of provinces were ready to join a national program.41 Ontario
and Quebec’s agreement would be critical to moving forward.
Within the Liberal government and cabinet, Paul Martin, the minister of National
Health and Welfare, championed national hospital insurance, despite St. Laurent’s
concerns. Martin understood that the CCF, organized labor, and many provincial leaders
wanted the federal government to act; a 1919 liberal commitment to universal and
comprehensive health care remained a critical political issue. To this end, Martin created
numerous working committees that examined the staging of benefits, the need for
hospital insurance before medical care insurance, and a focus on workers first. Labor
favored universal coverage, while the CCF favored a comprehensive and universal
program funded by general revenue.42
Pressures mounted after the 1953 election. The CMA supported voluntary and
physician-controlled insurance, with government subsidies to those who could not afford
the premiums. The Canadian Hospital Council (CHC) supported government subsidies to
help low-income persons pay for Blue Cross or commercial insurance. The Catholic
Hospital Association, powerful and largely limited to Quebec, eschewed government
intervention, as they wanted to maintain control of the hospitals. Other key groups
opposed to federal involvement included the Canadian Chamber of Commerce (CCC),
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Canadian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (CPMA), and the CLIA, most of
whom believed that the private sector had been successful and government involvement
should be limited to subsidies and tax credits. 43
Equally strong pressure came from the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) and
the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL); both believed that voluntary insurance was
inadequate, given the difficulty of obtaining health insurance through collective
bargaining, the high cost of premiums for employers and employees, and the gaps that
existed in the coverage of Canadian population. Unionists argued that federal action was
required to move provinces toward unified action, provide funding, and ensure through
national standards that all Canadians would receive the same level of health care. While
The CCL supported the CCF’s efforts, the TLC remained more neutral. In 1956, the CCL
and the TLC merged to form the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), and strong support
for universal and comprehensive health care ensued. That same year, the CCF moved
closer to organized labor and used House of Commons debates to bring attention to the
issues of health care, which prompted other parties to express their opinions publically.44
As a result, health care reform became a more prominent national issue.
The 1955 Federal-Provincial Conference agenda included health and welfare
benefits, along with taxation issues. Although St. Laurent was reluctant to include health
care, the threatened resignation of the minister of National Health and Welfare (Paul
Martin) and pressure from Ontario’s Premier Leslie Frost led to placing hospital
insurance on the agenda. Ontario’s CCF and labor organizations supported strong and

43

Ibid., 98.

44

Ibid., 99–100.

49

quick action. Also evident was strong public support in Ontario and other provinces for
federal action on hospital insurance, even if higher taxes resulted. The federal proposal
called for the federal government to pay one-half the costs with no deterrent fees, such as
deductibles and co-pays, and provincial development of plans, which had to be universal
and compulsory. A majority of provinces would have to agree to and develop such plans,
but by 1955, only three provinces were prepared to participate in the federal program:
Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia.45
Though support existed for a federally sponsored hospital services plan,
legislation was not submitted in 1956, nor was hospital insurance included in the 1957
throne speech. After the Conservative Party had won the 1955 election, Ontario Premier
Leslie Frost, leader of the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, withdrew his support
for universal hospital insurance, which resulted in a lack of federal action. Strong public
pressure, however, led Frost to give his approval to Ontario’s participation two years
later, and the federal bill—the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act (HIDS),
introduced on March 25, 1957—was unanimously passed by the House of Commons on
April 10, 1957, demonstrating political unity on this important issue.46 Finally, all four
political parties—Liberals, Conservatives, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation,
and the Social Credit Party—had agreed to universally available and comprehensive
hospital insurance. However, two months after passing this act, St Laurent’s Liberal
government was defeated in federal elections. Implementation barriers remained to
achieve universal and comprehensive hospital coverage.
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HIDS stated that technical and financial support would be forthcoming when a
majority of provinces, representing a majority of Canadians, were ready to participate.47
During a federal-provincial conference in 1957, this majority requirement was eliminated
by the new Conservative government led by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker.48 While
opinions for and against HIDS were evident, a major campaign against the new federal
program did not emerge, even though the CMA refused to endorse the new program.
While HIDS would not be compulsory for citizens, the act stated that hospital
insurance needed to be available on uniform terms and conditions, with no means testing
or subsidizing of private plans.49 Hospital and diagnostic services would be covered.
Comprehensive and specific services would be provided to all inpatients, with a phased
implementation for out-patient services. Limits would be placed on co-insurance so as to
ensure no undue burden. The federal contribution, set at 25 percent of the average per
capita costs in Canada as a whole and 25 percent of the average per capita costs for
provinces, would cover normal and maintenance costs at the standard ward rate, with no
additional monies provided for hospital construction or administration. Tuberculosis and
mental health care were not covered.50
HIDS became the largest federal-provincial undertaking to date and required
intensive federal-provincial cooperation, given the provincial view that health care was a
provincial, not federal, responsibility. Yet the federal government determined all
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requirements for provincial participation. Provinces were required to establish hospital
planning functions, license and inspect all hospitals, supervise hospitals to ensure
maintenance of standards, approve hospital budgets and equipment purchases, ensure all
services on uniform terms and conditions, and accept federal audits of provincial
expenditures. In effect, this new program was a difficult and complicated contract for
provinces to swallow and to follow if they wanted valuable federal funds. 51
On July 1, 1958, the Conservative government began releasing funds to the
provinces, and by 1961, all ten provinces and the two territories participated in this
program. Hospital utilization did not increase significantly when this program began, as
the CMA had predicted and feared, and in fact, hospital utilization declined from 1958 to
1962. Although mental health hospitals were not included in HIDS, general hospitals
added psychiatric wards to obtain sharable costs.52
Implementation of this program had three major effects. First, many more
Canadians were eligible for basic hospital care, although the program was neither
universal nor comprehensive. Second, the CMA, concerned about this major government
intrusion into health care, petitioned Prime Minister Diefenbaker to examine the
Canadian health system, and this examination by the Royal Commission on Health
Services eventually led to universal medical care services for all Canadians in 1966.
Finally, HIDS became an important factor in the implementation of the 1962
Saskatchewan Medical Services Act, another important precedent for the 1966 Medicare
program.
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With funds received from the federal government for hospital care under HIDS,
the Saskatchewan government now had the financial resources necessary to achieve the
next step, which would ensure universal and comprehensive health care for all
Saskatchewan citizens, thus fulfilling its 1944 commitment to provide provincial citizens
with universal and compulsory medical care insurance.53 Other factors also played an
important role in the decision to move ahead with a provincial medical services program.
First, the groundwork for such a program, set initially with the 1944 Health Services Act,
which established health planning commissions, allowed regions to offer a broad range of
services, including hospital and medical insurance. The provincial experiment in the
Swift Current Health Region demonstrated the efficacy of comprehensive and
government-supported health care. Second, the hospital insurance program had been a
success and a model for other provinces and the federal government.54 Finally, Premier
Tommy Douglas needed to enact this legislation to solidify the CCF rapprochement with
organized labor.55
Strong initial resistance against government-sponsored medical care insurance
came from the medical community, specifically the powerful Saskatchewan College of
Physicians and Surgeons (SCPS). Because of the limited number of provincial doctors in
Saskatchewan, unlike other provinces, the 1937 Liberal government allowed the SCPS to
combine the regulatory functions usually conducted by the provincial government—
determining and certifying the qualifications of doctors, issuing licenses, and providing
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penalties for misbehavior—with the political functions normally associated with a
provincial medical association.56 This combination of functions, along with physiciancontrolled voluntary insurance plans that covered almost 40 percent of the population,
gave Saskatchewan doctors and the SCPS significant economic and political power, a
power described by many as “private government in health care.”57 The SCPS led the
opposition in 1955 that proposed the establishment of two additional regions similar to
Swift River Current Region, thus further expanding government health care. More
germane to their political power, the combined functions made physician dissent within
the SCPS difficult or leaving the SCPS problematical, because differing political opinions
with the leadership could result in disciplinary action or loss of one’s license if one left
the organization. The SCPS had absolute power over Saskatchewan doctors.58
With a provincial election planned for 1960, Premier Tommy Douglas wanted to
show for a second time that the CCF party was the party of change and progress. In April
1959, he announced that the government would embark on a comprehensive health care
program, and a committee would be appointed to examine different models. In a
December 16, 1959 radio speech, Douglas described a universal and governmentsponsored prepayment medical insurance program that would provide a high quality of
medical services to all citizens. The plan would be administered by a public body
reporting to the legislature and be acceptable to those both providing and receiving
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medical services. By retaining the fee-for-service model, Douglas hoped to obtain
physician support.59
During a fall 1959 meeting of the SPCS, a unanimous resolution passed opposing
any government-sponsored universal and mandatory health care bill, because the SPCS
believed such a program would lead to a deterioration of medical services. Furthermore,
they stated, physicians had always treated those without financial resources, and any
further extension of health services should be accomplished through voluntary
prepayment and indemnity plans. 60 A few months later, a second SPCS policy statement
drew a line in the sand with the government.
The SPCS declared that basic freedoms and democratic rights would need to be
preserved to ensure medical services, and the treatment and maintenance of health was
important to doctors and the people. Both groups had certain rights and responsibilities.
The people had a right to a prepay program, an insuring agency, comprehensive care,
choice of hospital and doctor, recourse to the courts for all disputes, and a choice of how
to pay or prepay for health care. The provider had a responsibility to provide a high
quality of care, have its opinion considered by the legislature, refuse to participate in any
plan not conducive to good health care, evaluate the worth of services, retain fee-forservice, and maintain mediation committees. The rights of doctors included freedom to
choose location and patients (except in emergencies), and the choice to participate in any

59

Maioni, Parting at the Crossroads, 120; Taylor, Insuring National Health Care, 100–101.

60

Ibid., 101.

55

insurance plan and to determine their method of compensation.61 These principles, clearly
at odds with the Douglas proposal, would set the stage for a bruising battle.
Elsewhere in Canada, the federal government and the CMA were also developing
their strategies during this period. The government convened numerous committees to
work on proposals during the 1959–1960 period, and these committees represented all of
the various and major interest groups, including provincial doctors, labor, provincial
chambers of commerce, government, and the public. During this same period, the CMA
began a public relations campaign against any government plan by assessing its members
$100. The CMA portrayed government insurance as communistic and a threat to both
personal freedom and the economic system. Strong opposition also included the
Saskatchewan Liberal Party, the CCC, dental and pharmaceutical associations, and the
insurance industry.
The June 1960 Saskatchewan election produced mixed results for the CCF,
winning only 40 percent of the vote but obtaining 38 of the 55 seats in the legislature, a
clear majority needed to complete passage of the medical care bill. The government
pushed the committees to finish their work, as Douglas wanted to keep the CCF promise
regarding reform and wanted a program enacted, implemented, and debugged by the next
election—in three years. Douglas also knew that passage of this program would be
necessary if he was to become the national leader of the New Democratic Party, which
was being formed at the time by combining the CCF and CLC. 62
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On September 25, 1961, the government committee’s report recommended a
universal and comprehensive program paid for by premiums and public revenue. The
program would be administered by a public committee that would be responsible to the
Minister of Health. The SCPS and the CCC dissented primarily because low-income
persons could get health insurance from public agencies. Labor dissented because they
wanted doctors paid by salary and not fee-for-services, and payment for the provincial
program would come from increased taxes and not premiums.63
The Saskatchewan Medical Care Insurance Act (SMCIA), enacted by the
legislature in November 1961, was be implemented on April 1, 1962, well before the next
provincial election. SMCIA provided for compulsory, universal, and comprehensive
physician services. Other key aspects of this bill included freedom of choice in choosing
one’s physician or one’s patient, payment through premiums or subsidies, confidentiality
of reports, and administration by a Medical Care Insurance Commission (MCIC).64
Tommy Douglas, the newly elected leader of the new NDP party as of September, 1961,
was succeeded by William Lloyd as the new Saskatchewan provincial premier.
The implementation process began with the naming of the Medical Care
Insurance Commission responsible for establishing and administering the new program.
The MCIC membership included government health officials and at least two physician
members. By January 1962, the SCPS had not appointed any representatives, and
implementation was then reset for July 1, 1962. During meetings to work out
implementation details, the SCPS made an alternative reimbursement proposal that
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doctors could bill patients whatever amount they desired, and private insurance plans
would be allowed to charge whatever premiums they desired. The government would
subsidize some citizens and pay the premiums for the poor. The government conceded
that doctors would not have to receive payment from the commission, but the
commission was reluctant to accept the remainder of the physician proposal, given the
increased costs to citizens and the administrative cost of an indemnity system.65 An
impasse was reached, which would be difficult to overcome.
During a May 1962 meeting of the SCPS, the mood remained defiant, and
preparations for strike action began as other options such as acceptance, court action, and
physicians physically leaving the province were deemed unacceptable.66 In May, the
MCIC, anticipating a strike action, began recruiting physicians from Britain and other
countries. Public pressure groups began forming, the most prominent being the grassroots
Keep our Doctors Committees (KODC), which would prove to be a formidable opponent
of the government’s program.67
The KODC included many women who worried that their gynecologists would
leave the province. On May 18, 1962, a large cavalcade of 400 cars converged on Regina
and presented Premier Lloyd with petitions containing 46,000 names. The KODC
provided the three parties—Liberal, Conservative, and Social Credit—with a single issue
they could coalesce around. The CMA mounted a major campaign against the program
and those supporting the program. The June 18, 1962 federal elections, in which the
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Conservative Party prevailed, found Tommy Douglas, former premier and father of
Medicare, defeated for a parliamentary seat in his home city of Regina. However, strong
support for the program’s implementation came from labor, farmers, teachers, and
churches.68
To head off the potential strike, the MCIC conceded to the physicians that they
could practice outside the act on a reimbursement basis. The government, prepared to
sacrifice the service plan, could reluctantly accept the consequences of a fragmented
payment system.69
The SCPS, wanting to preserve its prepayment plans intact, and believing that the
government would collapse, did not accept the government’s offer. Doctors had only two
weapons available: withdraw services or leave the province. So, physician services began
their withdrawal at midnight, July 1, 1962, and the strike lasted for 23 days.70 When the
strike began, only 240 doctors manned emergency rooms, and only 35 other physicians
cooperated with the plan. The government recruited 110 doctors from Britain, U.S., and
other parts of Canada.71
The political and ideological lines were drawn. For the SCPS to agree to the
government proposal meant a loss of three things: 1) part of the territorial domain of the
SCPS, 2) control of the three physician-controlled prepayment programs, and 3) its power
as a “private government in medicine.”72 Though the government’s strategy to bring the
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physicians on board had failed, Premier Lloyd declared that the issue was “whether
Saskatchewan will be governed by a democratically controlled legislature, or by a small,
highly organized group.”73
Clear support for either the government or physicians did not materialize. The
Canadian press was divided. Major public relations campaigns were begun by the major
interest groups. The KODC held a major rally on July 11, 1962, during which over
45,000 persons were anticipated but only 4,500 attended. The foreign press, including the
United States, generally supported the government and found the doctors in violation of
important ethical and legal principles. The AMA supported the doctors.74
As public pressure mounted against the doctors, the government engaged Lord
Stephan Taylor, a British physician instrumental in the development of the British Health
Service as a negotiator. His efforts led to the Saskatoon Agreement, and the strike ended
on July 23, 1962. Doctors conceded the universal and compulsory nature of the program
and the role of the government as the sole collector of revenues and payments. The
government conceded that voluntary plans could be retained as billing and payment
conduits for doctors who did not want to deal with the MCIC. Thus, doctors would not be
civil servants since the government was not the single paymaster.
Most important to the physicians, numerous reimbursement options would be
available. One, they could choose direct payment from the MCIC with payment in full,
using either salary, fee-for-service, or some combination. Two, with a private practice
within a voluntary agency, the physician would bill the agency at an agreed-upon-rate,
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and the agency would pay the physician, after the agency received payment from the
MCIC. Third, the physician could practice outside the MCIC and bill patients directly,
and the patient would receive reimbursement from the MCIC. Finally, the physician
could practice with only private fees, if the patient agreed to this payment in advance and
also agreed not to bill the MCIC. 75 How the physician was reimbursed was a core issue
for the medical profession because it challenged their professional autonomy.
The Saskatchewan Medical Services Act and resultant strike had significant
implications for the province and the future of medical services in Canada. First and as a
result of the strike and legislation, 68 physicians left the province by the beginning of the
strike, and 240 physicians in practice in 1962 were no longer in practice by 1972. By
1964, the physician losses abated. These losses created a significant resource shortfall in
a province already short on physicians, and the strike and physician abandonment of the
province led to significant acrimony between citizens and physicians for a period of time.
Second, three provinces—Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta—quickly introduced
medical services proposals similar to a proposal espoused by the CMA. These plans
would allow for voluntary plans while mandating government support for the poor and
others on forms of social assistance. Plans would not be compulsory or universal. Third,
the “private government system of physicians” lost a significant revenue stream as fees
were negotiated with the government and issues of co-insurance were no longer unilateral
physician decisions. Yet despite the acrimony, doctor’s incomes in Saskatchewan rose by
35 percent from 1960 to 1963. By 1970, the majority of physicians were billing the
MCIC. Finally, the Saskatchewan Liberal Party, forming a new government in 1964 and
75
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a major opponent of the SMCIA, chose not to change the medical services plan though
they had supported the SCPS. 76
Given the success the Saskatchewan government had in implementing this
momentous plan, the Canadian Medical Association, determined to abate any further
breach in the physician-controlled TCMP in other provinces and any medical services
plan at the national level, requested Conservative Party Prime Minister John Diefenbaker
to conduct a study of the health service needs of Canadians and how to ensure the highest
standards of health care for all Canadians. To this end, Diefenbaker appointed a Royal
Commission on Health Services, known as the Hall Commission, on December 21, 1960.
For Diefenbaker, a Royal Commission would ensure that the health care issue would not
be prominent immediately, and such a commission would likely produce rational
recommendations based on extensive research. However, governments rarely implement
commission recommendations. For the CMA, forestalling any federal foray into the
health care system would allow the TCMP time to increase enrollment, giving physicians
more power in negotiating health care in the future.77
The Commission was to make “a comprehensive and independent study . . . of the
needs of the Canadian people for health care and the resources available to meet such
needs.”78 The Honorable Emmett Hall, Chief Justice of Saskatchewan, was appointed as
chair, and other members included two physicians, a dentist, a nurse, an industrialist, and
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an economist. The commission conducted three months of public hearings during 1962,
in addition to completing numerous research studies and examining briefs submitted by
over 200 organizations. Three days before the CMA held its 1964 annual meeting, the
Royal Commission released its two-volume report.
The Commission recommended first and foremost that the federal and provincial
governments take whatever legislative, organizational, and financial decisions to ensure
that the scientific knowledge and skills in health care be made available to all Canadian
citizens without barriers.79 The Commission also recommended that a Health Charter
become national policy for Canada. The Health Charter required that a
. . . comprehensive, universal Health Service Program for the Canadian
People, (be) implemented in accordance with Canada’s evolving
constitutional arrangements, . . . based on freedom of choice, and upon
free and self-government professions, financed through prepayment
arrangements, accomplished with the full cooperation of the general
public, the health professions, voluntary agencies, all political parties and
governments, federal, provincial and municipal, and directed toward the
most effective use of the nation’s health resources to attain the highest
possible levels of physical and mental well-being.80
This charter would set the stage for Canada’s Medicare program.
To this end, over 200 recommendations sought to expand on this health care
charter. The Hall Commission suggested that the provinces establish programs that
provided comprehensive coverage, including medical, dental, prescription, optical,
prosthetic, and home care services. The programs should be universal and provided on
uniform terms and conditions to ensure that age, condition, and ability to pay would not
be barriers to participation. Means testing and extra-billing should be forbidden as they
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prevented people from seeking care. The provincial programs should be publically
administered to ensure integration of provincial health services. Finally, the federal
government should provide grants to the provinces to initiate these health care
programs.81 The costs of such a program were affordable since future economic growth
would provide the necessary funds for the programs, and future Canadian expenditures
for implementing the Commission’s recommendations were in line with what other
industrialized nation’s spent.82 Ninety percent of health care costs were being expended
by government and private programs, with only the needy not receiving medical
services.83
The release of this report was both highly praised and greatly criticized. The
Toronto Globe and Mail newspaper declared that “doctors were stunned by [the]
magnitude” of the report and the “NDP leader [Tommy Douglas was] pleased.”84 The
Canadian Labor Confederation and Liberal Party generally supported the Commission’s
recommendations, while the CCC, CLIA, CHIA, and CMA opposed the Commission’s
recommendations, given the strides these organizations had made to keep the federal
government from expanding its role in health care. The medical profession, insurance
companies, and provinces had implemented various types of health insurance programs
that would make federal government involvement more difficult.85
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The Hall Commission rejected a number of the CMA’s principles. The CMA was
incensed particularly by the government’s plan to subsidize individuals, not just the
indigent, which if enacted, would further reduce the financial and political power of the
physician-sponsored plans. The CMA charged that requiring a mandatory, universal, and
publically administered plan would threaten the freedom-of-choice prerogatives for
physicians and patients, as well as the time-honored fee-for-service system. Government
involvement would mean government intrusion into medical decision making and
physician autonomy.86 The medical professional, through the TCMP and CMA, vowed to
fight back with the help of other health insurance and business organizations also upset
with the recommendations.
The TCMP, initially concerned about impending government involvement in
Saskatchewan, joined forces with the insurance industry by creating a new organization,
the Canadian Conference on Health Care in 1960, which produced a new lobby, the
Canadian Health Insurance Association. The Conference’s goals included making health
care available to all while, at the same time, protecting doctors from government
involvement, which it believed would make them prisoners of government bureaucracy
by controlling methods of reimbursement and terms of services. Multiple insurance
companies battling the government would be critical in achieving these ends.87
While joined in a common battle to prevent further government involvement in
health care, the TCMP-CMA alliance competed for insurance subscribers with the CHIA,
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yet also found ways to work with it. The TCMP, CMA, and CHIA made progress to
improve and expand health care coverage for provincial citizens by working with
provincial governments. Three provinces—Alberta, Ontario, and British Columbia—
introduced programs based on the CMA-CHIA model. The focus of this strategy was to
mitigate the demand for federal government-sponsored health insurance by ensuring that
the poor could receive government subsidies to buy health insurance and that the vast
majority of other Canadians would be covered by commercial or TCMP policies.88
Alberta’s Social Credit Party established a program in 1963 that provided lowincome persons with government subsidies to obtain medical insurance through either the
physician-controlled provincial (TCMP) Medical Services program or a consortium of
health insurance companies. By 1964, more than 200,000 out of 1.3 million Albertans
were still without health insurance, although the Canadian Conference on Health Care
claimed victory.89 The Ontario government attempted to assist low-income persons in
obtaining health insurance through a prepayment or commercial plan, beginning in 1963.
Plans would be voluntary, renewable, and contain specific benefits and maximum
premium levels. After a public outcry by the Liberal Party and the NDP, and a review by
an independent commission, the Ontario Medical Services Insurance Plan (OMSIP) was
enacted. The OMSIP would provide subsidies to the indigent, the medically needy, and
low-income earners, as well as self-paying individuals and families. Finally, the British
Columbia Medical Plan (BCMP) was adopted, which was similar to the OMSIP. The
majority of citizens who could afford voluntary insurance would be served by the private
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sector, while the government would assume responsibility for the low-income earners,
the poor, and the medically indigent.90
During the period of the Hall Commission meetings and provincial efforts to stave
off federal involvement, the Liberal Party returned to power in 1963, as a minority
government under the leadership of Prime Minister Lester Pearson, who succeeded
St. Laurent as party leader in 1958. During a 1960 party conference, the Liberal Party
created a new reform agenda. This new major emphasis on welfare liberalism would lead
ultimately to health reform. The Liberals hoped to co-opt the CCF-NDP health reform
agenda in the next federal election.91
Cooperative federalism, positive Canadianism, and social reform were three
central election themes of the 1963 election. Canada experienced new domestic unrest
with a 1963 bombing in Montreal, the creation of new political parties, provincial
governments demanding more federal funding and less federal intrusion, and the
awakening of Quebec with the Révolution tranquille (Quiet Revolution), and a new
Liberal premier, Jean LeSage. Nation building would require the cooperation and support
of Quebec. Social reforms, including pensions and health insurance, were also important
nation builders and political commitments. The Liberal Party wanted to fulfill its 1919
commitment of health insurance for all Canadians, and with national hospital insurance
enacted by the Liberal government in 1957, at least part of the dream had been realized.
In Insuring National Health Care, author Malcolm Taylor notes that the Pearson
government decided to pursue medical care insurance in 1963, given the. . . . political
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instability; intense political rivalry; the Royal Commission’s findings and
recommendations; the continuing expansion of prepayment plans; the decisions of
Alberta, Ontario, and British Columbia to establish subsidized programs; and the
increasing aggressiveness of the CMA and the CHIA in pursuit of their subsidization
policy.92

With the appointment of Liberal progressives Judy LaMarsh as Minister of Health
and Welfare and Walter Gordon as Minister of Finance—both of whom were strongly
supportive of a federal health insurance plan—Pearson set the stage for government
movement on health care. 93 With the release of the Hall Commission Report and the
cabinet leadership supporting federal health insurance in place, work began in a variety of
government committees to develop proposals to implement the Commission’s findings
and find ways to overcome the many barriers that still existed, including the growing
power of the provinces, the vast differences in provincial policy regarding health care, the
views of powerful interest groups, and adequate methods to fund such a program.
Initial progress was made. At a Health Minister’s Conference in 1964, held after
the release of the Hall Commission Report, health ministers and the Minister of Health
and Welfare agreed that a Health Resources Fund was necessary immediately to increase
the supply of physicians, other professionals, and additional facilities needed if a national
program were to be enacted.94 The constitutionality of federal government involvement in
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health care also was resolved by the Canadian Supreme Court when it ruled that the
federal government had the right to proceed under its blanket right to spend.95 The
problem area of finances and conditions regarding how funds were to be utilized
remained a major contentious issue between the federal government and provinces.
Although the various committees recommended using grants-in-aid to establish
national standards, Pearson realized that with the growing power of the provinces,
imposing conditions similar to those mandated by the HIDS program was no longer
acceptable to the provinces. A new cost-sharing program would need to incorporate
principles rather than mandates. The four principles finally adopted by Pearson and
similar to those in the Hall Commission Report included 1) comprehensiveness,
2) universality, 3) public administration, and 4) portable benefits.96
How to fund the program remained problematical. Prior program models such as
the HIDS method or a fixed province per capita amount would not be acceptable to all the
provinces as the poorer provinces would not have adequate resources to implement such
a program. An alternative would be a national per capita cost applied equally to all
provinces, which would benefit the poorer provinces by providing up to 80 percent of
their costs, while the richer provinces would obtain only 20 percent of their costs, an
outcome most provinces would applaud.97 With the concept of principles versus mandates
to stave off provincial resistance and a financing scheme that would likely be accepted by
most provinces, enactment of a national health insurance program seemed possible.
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While this was a period of scandals for the Liberal Party, internal party dissension, and
on-going political issues with Quebec,98 the Pearson government moved forward on
health care by committing to a conference of ministers to discuss health care rather than
proposing specific legislation during the April 5, 1965 Speech from the Throne. The First
Ministers’ Conference was scheduled to begin on July 19, 1965.
During the early part of 1965, and before the First Ministers’ Conference, the
CMA actively continued its efforts to resist government involvement in medical services
insurance. During a January 1965 special meeting of their executive council, the CMA
developed and approved a new ideological framework.99 This fifty-five page report
iterated its support for prepaid insurance; agreed that the Australian medical services
approach (the only country examined) was appropriate, given its focus on voluntary
insurance; and continued to advocate for limiting government’s role in ensuring the
indigent were served and, in conjunction with the medical profession, that standards for
the provision of health services were promulgated and enforced.100 Movement toward a
tax-supported, compulsory program would be destructive to medical progress and
administratively burdensome. Self-supporting individuals were better served by pre-paid
plans in the private sector.101 These principles were discussed with Prime Minister
Pearson, Minister of Health LaMarsh, and Minister of Finance Gordon on June 9, 1965.
The CMA advisory committee wanted agreement that physicians and patients could opt
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out of any programs and reiterated their support for the Alberta, Ontario, and British
Columbia plans.102 No decision by government leadership was made, given the upcoming
First Ministers’ Conference in July.
The First Minister’s Conference opened with an impassioned speech by Prime
Minister Pearson, who emphasized that the federal government would work with
provinces rather than impose mandates, saying that “it is now the responsibility of the
federal government to cooperate with all provinces in making Medicare financially
possible for all Canadians. The Government now accepts that responsibility.”103 To this
end, the federal government would support provincial Medicare plans by means of a
predetermined financial contribution rather than a shared-cost program. There would be
no detailed agreements, similar to HIDS, with only federal-provincial understanding of
and agreement to the four principles of comprehensiveness of benefits to be provided by
general practitioners and specialists, universality including uniform terms and conditions,
public administration by the provincial government or non-profit provincial agency, and
portability of benefits from province to province. There would also be a Health Resources
Fund for health care facility development and health professionals training.104 If
provinces chose not to participate, there would be financial assistance at some point.
Although the proposal was at odds with business, medicine, and insurance interests such
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that no public/private program would be acceptable, private insurance for services not
covered by the federal proposal would be tolerated in the federal proposal.105
Opposition to the federal proposal came from all quarters, although opposition
from the premiers was somewhat muted or minor. Ontario Premier John Robarts had few
comments about Medicare and confined his remarks to mental health and hospital
construction. Quebec’s Premier LeSage wanted to opt out of programs within the
province’s competence and wanted only the funds, not adherence to the enunciated
principles. New Brunswick needed the funds, given its small size. Manitoba planned on
implementing a program similar to Alberta’s plan. Saskatchewan, with a medical services
program in place, emphasized the degree of cooperation that would be necessary for a
national program to work.106 By the end of the conference, Pearson believed that the
provinces were in agreement to move ahead with the Medicare program and “. . . that the
only question that remained was the time to implement Medicare.”107
In an effort to delay passage of a final bill, as the conference ended, the CMA
utilized its relationships with the cabinet to emphasize its opposition to compulsory
insurance. As a result, their opposition ultimately would win concessions in the final
bills, including extra-billing and the use of private insurers to collect premiums. While
the CMA supported the government’s position on portability, which the CMA and TCMP
had supported for years, the CMA stated that the transfer of funding of medical services
from the private sector to the public sector would lower the quality of medicine, that

105

Maioni, Parting at the Crossroads, 132–133.

106

Taylor, Insuring National Health Care, 147–148.

107

John A. Munroe and Alex I. Inglis (Eds.), Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honorable Lester B.
Pearson, (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 227.

72

freedom of choice of participating in any medical insurance program was preferable to
compulsion, and that the administration of any health care plan should not be limited to
provinces, given the successful records of private plans such as the TCMP. Finally, the
CMA raised its concern that maintaining physician private practice was central to
superior medical service.108 The issue of compulsory participation concerned other
groups.
Conservative and Social Credit parliament members echoed concerns about a
compulsory approach, and Liberal parliament members resisted the huge financial burden
of such a program. The NDP and organized labor believed that the lack of uniformity of
provincial proposals and provincial responsibility for implementation would jeopardize
universality and access, a concern shared by some in the federal government, including
the prime minister. A patchwork of social reform programs would threaten the strategy to
strengthen the presence of the federal government across Canada and encourage national
building.109 Finally, prior to the 1965 federal election, a public opinion poll showed
52 percent of Canadians favoring a voluntary approach versus 41 percent favoring a
compulsory approach.110
The 1965 federal election led to a second minority government headed by Prime
Minister Pearson. Important changes were made in the cabinet, with Minister of Health
and Welfare Judy LaMarsh replaced by Alan McEachen, a strong advocate of Medicare,
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and Minister of Finance Walter Gordon replaced by Mitchell Sharp, only a lukewarm
supporter of Medicare, given the precarious condition of the economy.111 The Pearson
government decided to undertake enactment of Medicare for a variety of reasons
including the following: the continued minority status of the government, growing
opposition of the medical profession and insurance industry, resistance by some
provinces to the federal principles, rising inflation and an increased federal budget, and
vocal support by the NDP for the proposal.112 There would not be another opportunity to
take action on this important Liberal commitment made almost 50 years ago and
reiterated in the most recent election.
The 100th anniversary of Canada becoming a dominion—July 1, 1967—became a
symbolic target date for implementing Medicare. After clearing the cabinet with the only
opposition from Sharp regarding the timing of implementation given inflation, the
Medical Care Insurance Bill (Bill C–277)113 was introduced in July, 1966, with the only
major change allowing private insurance companies to serve as carriers, provided that
they accrued no profits, their books were open for public review, and they were
responsible to the provinces.114
Opposition mounted quickly within parliament, from key interest groups, and
from within the cabinet. During a Provincial Minister’s Conference held in August, one
reporter wondered whether Medicare would pass intact. Even within the cabinet, the
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resistance of some ministers, especially Sharp, led to a delay in implementation from July
1, 1967 to July 1, 1968, which inflamed centrist ministers like McEachen and LaMarsh.
Prime Minister Pearson finally agreed that no further delays would occur.115
The final reading and passage occurred on December 8, 1966 with a vote of 177–
2, an amazing feat, given the level of opposition to Medicare within Parliament. It was a
“major triumph” for Prime Minister Pearson and the Liberal Party.116 Only two Social
Credit Party members voted against the bill. One explanation for the overwhelming
support is that the political stakes for voting against the bill would be high in the
upcoming federal election of 1968. 117
Since there was no minimum requirement regarding the number of provinces that
must agree to the program before implementation, there were staggered starting dates.
Saskatchewan and British Columbia began the program on July 1, 1968. Newfoundland,
Nova Scotia and Manitoba commenced their programs on April 1, 1969. Others
commencement dates included Alberta, July 1, 1969; Ontario, October 1, 1969; Quebec,
October 1, 1970; Prince Edward Island, December 1, 1970; New Brunswick, January 1,
1971; Northwest Territories, April 1, 1971;Yukon Territory, April 1, 1972.118
Forty-seven years had passed since the Liberal Party’s commitment to health care
for all Canadians became law. While political exigencies were largely responsible for the
passage of Medicare, the national health care program finally achieved would encounter
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continuing political and ideological differences in the years ahead, including issues
regarding financing, health care resources, and most importantly, physician extra-billing.
After exhaustive government reviews during the later 1970s and early 1980s, the
Canada Health Care Act, enacted in 1984, accomplished a number of objectives. First, it
consolidated the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Act of 1957 and the Medical Care
Insurance Act of 1966 into one act. The principles upon which federal financial
assistance rested were refined. Universality required 100 percent citizen participation
rather than the 95 percent required under the original hospital insurance bill. Portability
and comprehensiveness were tightened up. The major change occurred by expanding the
accessibility principle to describe procedures for negotiating payments to providers for
insured services. Essentially, the provinces had to “provide reasonable compensation for
all medically necessary insurance health services, and the provinces are not required to
adopt binding arbitration but, if they do, the decision of the arbitration panel cannot be
altered by the government. . . .”119 Physician extra-billing and user charges would be
eliminated so as to provide uniform terms and conditions. Over the next few years, more
acrimony would occur, including a 25-day physician’s strike in Ontario over the issue of
extra-billing, which would lead to some hospital emergency rooms with no physicians.
By 1984 and the election of a Conservative government, Canadians had achieved a
functioning, largely integrated national health care program. Although the program would
be challenged during the next two decades regarding the adequacy of its funding, its
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constitutionality, and its effectiveness,120 the program remains today largely what was
implemented in the 1960s and highly popular among a majority of Canadians.
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Chapter 3
Canadian Ideology of Health Care

The road to Canadian universal health care ended in 1966 with the passage of the
Medicare program, which provided all Canadians with physician services that
supplemented the hospital and diagnostic services already being provided to most
Canadians since 1957. The development of Medicare began formally with the Royal
Commission on Health Services (Hall Commission) hearings and its report, followed by
numerous federal-provincial meetings involving Prime Minister Pearson and his cabinet,
provincial premiers and the ministers of health, and a variety of other government
officials, key groups, and individuals. The parliamentary debate that began in the fall of
1966 culminated in the passage of Bill C–277, the Medical Care Insurance Act, by the
House of Commons on December 8, 1966, with a vote of 177–2 and passage in the
Senate on December 16, 1996.
Federal-provincial meetings and parliamentary debates provide a focus regarding
the ideological views of political leaders, but it is the Royal Commission hearings that
provide insight into the ideological views of key interest groups, such as the various
medical societies, the insurance industry, organized labor, church organizations, and
other social service agencies. Critically important to understanding the ideologies
underlying Canada’s Medicare program is the Royal Commission’s final report, much of
which was used by the government in its design of the Medicare program’s ideology and
specific strategies.
Analysis of the Hall Commission report, interest group briefs submitted to the
Hall Commission, meetings of political leaders, and parliamentary debates reveals two
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basic worldviews regarding universal health care. The liberal-progressive group
supported a federal-provincial-administered universal, comprehensive, and national
health insurance program largely financed by taxes. This group included the Royal
Commission on Health Services, the Liberal government under the leadership of Prime
Minister Pearson, the New Democratic Party (NDP), the Canadian Labour Congress
(CLC), the Canadian Federation of Agriculture (CFA), and the Canadian Association of
Social Workers (CASW). Provincial premiers from Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and
the Maritime provinces (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island) were
also in this Liberal camp. Opponents to a national medical services program and
supporters of maintaining a private-sector approach for the vast majority of Canadians,
with government assistance to the poor and medically indigent, included the Conservative
party in parliament under the leadership of John Diefenbaker, the remainder of the
provincial premiers, the Social Credit Party (SCP), the Canadian Medical Association
(CMA), l’Association Des Médcins de Langue Française du Canada (AMLFC), the
Canadian Manufacturers Association (CManA), the Canadian Chamber of Commerce
(CCC), the Canadian Health Insurance Association (CHIA), and the Trans-Canada
Medical Plans (TCMP). Other organizations, such as the Canadian Public Health
Association (CPHA), and the Anglican and United Churches, generally supported the
national medical services program and had more specific recommendations rather than a
comprehensive approach to the problems outlined by the Hall Commission.
The world views of these two major camps focused on four major points, all with
significant ideological differences: 1) the roles of the federal and provincial governments,
2) the role of the private sector, 3) the freedom to choose, and 4) the financing of health
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care reform. Remarkably, little disagreement existed between these various entities
regarding the general nature of the health care problems facing Canadians and the fact
that Canadians needed better access to health care, which would require some level of
government intervention.

Nature of the Health Care Problem
Foremost, the Royal Commission on Health Services, federal and provincial
governments, and the key interest groups agreed that many Canadians lacked adequate
health care. All groups and individuals who appeared before the Commission expressed
deep convictions and a sense of urgency about the need to improve the Canadian health
care system. According to the Hall Commission’s report, “there was no dissent that some
form of government action was needed to bring all Canadians the best possible health
care. There were divergent opinions as to how this objective could or should be attained
and the extent to which governments should participate.”1 Although the Commission
noted that many organizations viewed Canadians as already receiving of a high level of
health services, serious gaps existed, as reported by the various medical groups, as well
as other gaps discovered by the Commission through its research arm.2
Two factors arose that became problematical for the Hall Commission. First,
many organizations and provincial governments involved in providing health care were
disorganized, their approaches haphazard. Second, many groups narrowly focused on the
basic problem of providing medical care rather than on the whole range of services and
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related health care issues. Both of these problems became evident in provincial
government actions during the period of hearings and deliberations.3
Three provinces—Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Ontario—introduced legislation
regarding medical services. Saskatchewan enacted its compulsory medical care plan,
which caused significant friction with physicians as the plan was implemented. Alberta
and Ontario implemented voluntary programs for specific and largely impoverished
populations, with premiums subsidized by the government and paid to private insurers.
The Commission found these programs problematical because of the disharmony they
created between government and providers in that provincial programs had been
implemented without regard to adequate standards, financial resources, or provision for
sufficient professionals. The Commission firmly held that the lack of integrated and
cooperative health planning contributed to gaps and problems in providing the best health
care for all Canadians.4
The major interest groups submitting briefs to the Hall Commission reached
similar conclusions. Health care resources—professional, technical, service, and
facilities—were either lacking in many areas, especially rural ones, or were disorganized,
untimely, uncoordinated, and/or fragmented. While the private-sector voluntary insurance
programs had insured approximately 50 percent of Canada’s population, and some
provincial governments—Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Ontario, and
Manitoba—provided health care to the indigent and medically needy, many Canadians
still lacked a method to obtain health care in this fragmented system of care.
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To improve the health of Canadians, new programs and significant additional
resources would be required, and their provision would be the responsibility of the
federal and provincial governments, given the provincial responsibility for health care
and the funds available from the federal government. More comprehensive services
would be needed, including additional services for treating tuberculosis and mental
illness, both services frequently mentioned by provincial leaders as priority additions. A
continuum of care would be required to cover health care from birth to death and from
diagnosis to rehabilitation. Children and the elderly should be given special
consideration, initially. Over a period of years, health care for all Canadians would
eventually become comprehensive, coordinated, integrated, and universal. Achieving this
end would require significant additional funding to develop new resources, especially
physicians, nurses, paraprofessionals, technical assistance, new facilities, and continued
advancements in technology, diagnosis, and treatment. In addition, prevention, individual
responsibility for one’s health, and public health initiatives needed to be emphasized.
Finally, cooperation and harmony between the various levels of government, professional
groups, and the private sector, including the business and the insurance industry, would
be critical to achieving these aims.5 What was needed—greater access to health care for
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all Canadians and a more coordinated and rational health care system—was clear to all
concerned; political and special interest groups, however, differed on how to achieve that
future state. To properly determine how federal and provincial governments should
interact and what the role of the private sector should be, the Commission began its
conclusive report by focusing on the broader and necessary question of society’s
relationship to the individual. The foundations of these philosophical questions would
become the basis for Canada’s Medicare program.

Philosophical Underpinnings of Medicare
Determining the most appropriate courses of action, given the wide disagreement
about roles, responsibilities, programs, and solutions to problems, depended on the
answer to a critical question posed by the Commission: What is society’s interest in the
health of its individual members? Fundamental to any program or set of legislative
proposals must be society’s support of an individual’s interest in his/her own health.6
Public interest would assist in determining government’s proper role.
The Commission placed individual responsibility for one’s health as a cornerstone
in its final report and recommendations. Individuals had a responsibility for their own
personal health and their family’s health, since individuals exercised a great deal of
control over their own health and their families. From temperate living to diet to
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cleanliness to rest—these and other factors were important in health maintenance and
largely under the control of individuals. With the advancement of science, individuals
must assume responsibility for the prudent and economical use of health services,
periodic exams, immunizations for children, and a reasonable assignment of a portion of
their incomes to meet health care costs. Finally, each Canadian also had to assume
financial responsibility for providing health care resources for the nation, including
environmental controls, education of medical professionals, and research into the nature
and treatment of diseases. “These obligations and responsibilities we believe to be wholly
compatible with the democratic concept of the individual in a free, self-government
society,”7 the Commission concluded. Although the individual citizen’s responsibility for
his/her own health was the first building block of a healthy Canada and consistent with
individualism, society’s interest in the individual’s health grew during the 20th century,
and society’s interest would be a second cornerstone to health care reform.
In the past, the community’s response to the individual focused on preventing and
controlling communicable diseases. Given the calamities of the 20th century, including
two world wars and a major economic depression, a new recognition emerged of a
deepening of our humanitarian concern for our fellows . . . recogniz(ing)
that the well-being and happiness of the society is simply the sum total of
the well-being and happiness of its individual members . . . and mental or
physical disease or impairment . . . strictly by the laws of chance, could
strike us at any moment.8
Because society had become insurance minded such that individuals no longer had to
bear the full risk of illness or accidents, a realization that the resources of the whole could
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be used to strengthen families and individuals to manage themselves took hold. This
philosophy, embedded in Judeo-Christian concepts, led to a growing consensus that all
must contribute to assisting those who need help, since accidents and illness are
unpredictable, and anyone can be afflicted.9 In essence, a foundation of Canadian health
care would be both community- and individual-based, a balancing of the rights of
individuals with the needs of society.
The Commission believed that failure to act on behalf of all of society’s members
was costly to the society, and this conviction became a second reason for expanding the
public interest in individual health. Similar to what had occurred in both Britain and the
U.S. during World Wars I and II, the rejection rates of Canadian military recruits were
high, which could be detrimental to the nation’s defense. Also, the 1951 Canadian
Sickness Survey indicated a severe drop in the nation’s productivity as a result of
inadequate health of its citizens. Finally, the rising welfare expenditures experienced by
provincial and local governments resulted, in part, from inadequate health care. The
Commission believed that if society invested in the health of individuals, a variety of
positive consequences would occur, including sickness prevention, disability reduction,
and productivity increase. As society focused on the health of its individual members, it
would reap present and future benefits and ensure the continuance of democracy and
Canada’s growth as a nation.10
Given the threat that communism posed during this period, the Commission noted
that cooperation to provide adequate health care ensured that Canadians would not be
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drawn to totalitarian regimes that promised excellent health for their citizens. “If a
democracy fails to meet the legitimate aspirations of its people there can be few who
doubt that alien philosophies will win the right to try,”11 the Commission’s report
warned. The Commission contended, too, that the economic aspirations of citizens and
the economic capacity of a nation were as dependent on good health as they were on
education. Clearly, the Hall Commission believed that the public interest in health was a
vital and critical aspect of the future growth of Canada as a nation, both economically and
politically.
To support the individual’s responsibility for health through public and group
involvement, the Commission identified five major areas as public and group
responsibilities. First, public health services would be expanded to include such things in
the public interest as immunizations and drinking water monitoring. This would free up
time for those private and volunteer agencies currently involved in those projects to
address other unmet health care needs, such as mental health and cancer clinics. Second,
health care personnel education must ensure an adequate supply of professionals, and
professional training must involve all persons in treating the indigent. Middle and upper
class patients would also be part of the treatment pool. Third, provision and operation of
hospitals would remain a public responsibility, including assurance that all provinces
enjoyed an adequate number of hospital beds. Fourth, health care personnel and other
resources would be equally distributed across provinces and within provinces to ensure a
high standard of care for all Canadians. Finally, insurance for the bulk of Canadians was
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“absolutely essential for all but a minority of wealthy Canadians.”12 While many
Canadians received coverage as a result of work, less than 50 percent of the population
had adequate coverage. Insurance for all would spread the risk over the entire population
and cover comprehensive services, such as mental health, dental, optical, and drugs, not
just hospital, diagnostic, and physician care.13 By closing the gap between scientific
knowledge and skills, and the inadequate financial and organizational arrangements that
existed, these public and group responsibilities would ensure that the health needs of
Canadians were met. Achieving this objective would require organizational, legislative,
and financial programs to ensure that the entire range of health care knowledge and skills
be made available to all Canadians, without any barriers. To meet this challenge, the
Commission adopted a Health Charter.14
The Health Charter stated that “the achievement of the highest possible health
standards for all our people must become a primary objective of national policy and a
cohesive factor contributing to national unity, involving individual and community
responsibility and actions.”15 Achieving this objective required that a comprehensive and
universal health care program be implemented in accord with the constitutional
arrangements between the national and provincial governments, freedom of choice for
individuals, self-government and freedom of choice for professionals and institutions, and
pre-payment methods to finance health care. All was to be accomplished with the full
cooperation of all the vested interests from the government to individuals and directed
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toward the most effective use of all resources to attain the highest possible standards of
physical and mental health.16
The Royal Commission on Health Services clearly viewed access to a broad array
of health care services as necessary to achieve the level of health care described in the
Health Charter. To this end, the Royal Commission also described how the federal and
provincial governments must cooperate in a variety of areas with all elements of society.
To realize the goals inherent in this Health Charter, a recommended course of
action would be based on social principles that required all elements of society to
participate, with the assurance that individuals retained freedom of choice and that
professional self-government remained intact. This comprehensive program would
require careful federal and provincial planning over many years to fully implement. To
ensure adequate human and facility resources, federal and provincial cooperation would
be accomplished by a federal-provincial health conference held within six months of the
final report, with the purpose of developing planning groups that would lead to
provincially designed programs.17
The Hall Commission provided principles and recommendations that would guide
the development of Medicare in 1965 and 1966. The Commission was certain that the
plan would ensure the continued development of the nation by providing all Canadians
with the highest standard of a comprehensive array of health services, which would
become available over a number of years as additional resources were developed. With
federal participation focused on the provision of financial resources, provinces would

16

Ibid., 11–12.

17

Ibid., 13–15.

88

develop and implement programs that ensured universality, comprehensiveness, public
administration, and portability. To this end, the “highest possible health care for all
Canadians” would be achieved in time.
While the Hall Commission provided an ideological basis for the new national
health care program for Canadians, the role of the private sector, significant in many of
the reports to the Commission, was minimal, with private-sector insurance companies
functioning as fiscal intermediaries for improving service delivery and quality, and for
educating professionals. The Commission viewed the solution to health care problems as
an issue to be resolved by government, not the private sector.

Federal and Provincial Government Responsibility
The Commission’s recommendations in the health services program area clearly
noted that comprehensive and universal health services would occur only with federal
and provincial government action that engaged the nation’s resources. Building upon the
success of the federal-provincial program to bring hospital and diagnostic services to
Canadians, the federal and provincial governments would enter into agreements, financed
by grants from the federal government, to develop and implement comprehensive,
universal, and provincial programs covering medical services, dental and optical services
for select groups, prescription drugs, prosthetic services, and home care services. The
constitutional division of federal and provincial responsibilities regarding health care
must remain intact by ensuring that provinces not be required to meet rigid guidelines for
development of their programs other than 1) ensuring universality regardless of age,
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condition, or ability to pay; 2) applying uniform terms and conditions to all; and
3) adhering to basic features of the programs.18
Key elements of the Commission’s report that would guide the joint actions of
federal and provincial governments included ensuring an adequate ratio of professionals
to consumers in each province and guaranteeing good pay for health care professionals,
in order to attract young people to the field. Health care benefits, including hospital and
diagnostic care, had to be portable from province to province and available on uniform
terms and conditions. Health care professions would remain free, independent, and selfgoverning. Provincial administration would utilize a commission reporting to the
provincial minister of health, which would represent all key parties, including the public,
professionals, and government. The provincial commission would assume responsibility
for the insurance program, and existing voluntary prepayment agencies would function as
intermediaries. Statistical reporting for all services would, along with program
evaluation, determine problem areas. The federal government would share in the
administrative expense. Democratic participation in local, provincial, and federal health
planning councils would ensure that needs were met. Finally, health services for Indians
and Eskimos would remain a provincial responsibility and would stay the same in
comprehensiveness and delivery as those services provided to other Canadians.19 The
Hall Commission’s report provided clear direction for federal and provincial action to
achieve the Health Charter, direction that respected the constitutional authority of the
provinces over health care and the federal government’s ability to provide the financial

18

Ibid., 13–15.

19

Ibid., 18–21.

90

resources necessary to achieve the Commission’s goals. Also evident was the minor role
of the private sector. The Hall Commission clearly viewed government as the major
driver to achieve universal and comprehensive health care.
Two key meetings between federal and provincial officials, which reviewed and
discussed the findings of the Royal Commission on Health Services, further discussed
and reviewed the roles of the federal and provincial governments. In her opening remarks
to the Federal -Provincial Meeting of Ministers of Health in July 1964, Judy LaMarsh,
the federal Minister of Health and National Welfare, indicated that many of the principles
of the Hall Commission report had been government policy for many years, including the
principles of a “planned and coordinated approach to the development of comprehensive
health service and the acceptance of the pre-payment principle for financing these
services.”20 The Health Grants Program and the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic
Program had set federal government precedents for medical services.21
Many of the ministers shared only preliminary views of a national health
program. Quebec’s Minister, Dr. Dominique Bedard, stated that since health was a
provincial responsibility, Quebec would exercise its full authority and only accept funds
and not principles, should a federal-provincial program be developed. Second, Quebec
citizens would receive the same standard of health care as provided by other provinces.22
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland, generally in agreement with the
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principles and concepts of the report, shared concerns about the financial resources
required of provinces.23
Eric Martin, minister of Health for British Columbia, embraced the notion of a
universal and comprehensive federal-provincial program if the program maintained
provincial autonomy, the federal government shared the costs of such a program, freedom
of choice and self-governing was respected, and if the program was phased in based on
provincial determination. Also important to British Columbia was the provincial right to
use deterrent and utilization fees.24 Martin’s basic disagreement with the Hall
Commission report was the use of a provincial commission to administer the health
insurance program, stating that such a recommendation was outside the purview of both
the Royal Commission and the federal government. Finally, Martin reiterated the
Commission’s recommendation that a federal-provincial conference be held within six
months, and he strongly supported the federal government’s leadership to enact a
comprehensive and universal program.25
D. G. Stuart, Saskatchewan’s Health minister , strongly supported the
Commission’s recommendation to expand services to cover gaps and reach higher health
care standards. Alberta’s minister, Dr. Ross, the most negative regarding the
Commission’s report, stated that any federal-provincial conference should be concerned
with priorities, and health care was clearly a provincial responsibility. Ross believed that
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Canadians should have the opportunity to provide for themselves, and he felt that
“individual responsibility was needed in order to forestall excessive demands.”26
According to Ross, a program such as the one the Commission was recommending would
have a large economic impact that would be felt for a long period, and the Commission’s
“philosophy of the welfare state as expressed in the Report of the Royal Commission was
not acceptable to his province.”27 Lastly, the concerns of Ontario and Prince Edward
Island focused on more funding for the treatment of the mentally ill and those with
tuberculosis.28
This preliminary review of the report demonstrated significant ideological
agreements and disagreements among provincial health ministers. Most of the ministers
agreed with the principles of the report, although ministers from the smallest provinces
frequently expressed concerns regarding financing mechanisms and the need for adequate
numbers of health care personnel. Disagreement regarding the nature of the federal
government’s role in health care was apparent in the responses from the Quebec and
Alberta ministers, with the Alberta minister supporting the extreme principle of
individualism in the provision of health care. The principles and recommendations of the
Commission would be discussed further during the July 19–22, 1965 Federal-Provincial
Conference of the prime minister, first ministers, and a variety of other government
officials.
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Federal responsibility and health services were the first two items in Prime
Minister Lester Pearson’s opening statement to the 1965 Federal-Provincial Conference.
Pearson outlined the federal ideology relevant to establishing a universal medical services
program throughout Canada. First, he spoke to the importance of a “co-operative
federalism, by consultation and cooperation in all matters of mutual concern.”29
Recognizing that provinces had wide jurisdiction and responsibility in a number of areas,
the role of the federal government was to make the federal governance structure more
effective for the benefit of all citizens, which often required a co-mingling of federal and
provincial responsibilities and concerns regarding the issues and problems provinces
faced, such as education and health, as those problems continued to become more
burdensome and complex. Thus, the federal government’s task was to recognize and
support provincial needs, expressed by Pearson when he stated that
. . . the federal government has a responsibility within the constitution to
the whole of Canada . . . a responsibility we are not going to betray. We
will act with full awareness that Canadians as a whole established for
themselves a national government with broad responsibilities in order that
it could take the action necessary on behalf of all the Canadian people
represented in their parliament.30
With this statement, the federal government was prepared to assist provinces in carrying
out their constitutional duties regarding health care and ensure that all Canadians
benefited.
Noting that health services were the most important responsibility, Prime Minister
Pearson acknowledged that the federal government would establish, as a matter of policy,
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a national health care program that would allow all Canadians to obtain the best possible
health services, irrespective of their ability to pay, clearly supporting the
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Health Services. Although Pearson
agreed that health care was essentially a provincial responsibility, the federal government
now, too, had a responsibility, given that “ . . . the scope and nature of health care
problems had risen to a level of national concern.”31 Pearson acknowledged, however,
that while all the provinces had agreed that providing comprehensive health care on a
prepaid basis was an objective, differences existed regarding the specifics of the
programs and how the programs should be financed.32
Bringing the necessary financial resources to bear so that services would be
available on a national standard to all was the federal responsibility, if all Canadians
agreed and approved that a certain standard of service was needed and necessary. Failure
to ensure that “Canadian standards must be made possible for all Canadians” would be a
failure of federal responsibility. Thus, Prime Minister Pearson made a case for strong
federal involvement and proposed financial support for provincial programs, not on a
cost-share basis common to other programs, but by contribution of a pre-determined
size.33
To ward off provincial objections that the federal government would dictate
program specifics and respecting the autonomy of the provinces in matters of health care,
Pearson proposed that provinces only be required to demonstrate general understandings
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for four criteria, rather than detailed agreements. Detailed agreements, utilized when the
Hospital and Diagnostic Services Act was enacted, created difficulties for some
provinces. The four criteria, similar to those outlined in the Hall Commission report, were
1) scope of benefits, 2) universality, 3) public administration, and 4) portability, and
Prime Minister Pearson noted that these criteria would be reviewed further by the
provincial ministers of health, with the federal minister of Health and Welfare to
determine an appropriate definition of the Medicare program.34
Scope of the benefits included physician services, with general practitioners and
specialists as a minimum standard for all provinces. Other services, such as dental or
prescription drugs, could be included at a later time, and how they were phased in was a
provincial matter. If consensus existed by all the provinces regarding additional services,
the federal government would raise its contribution accordingly.35 Universality required
that all residents of a province be covered using uniform terms and conditions, which
meant there would be no barriers such as means testing, pre-existing conditions, or age.
Everyone would qualify for the same benefits, regardless of whether they paid a premium
to the province or, if indigent, were provided subsidies.36 During discussion of the
government’s proposal, it was decided that deterrent charges and co-insurance were best
left up to the provinces. Deterrent charges and co-insurance were viewed somewhat
negatively by the federal government because it was thought that they would limit access
to those without sufficient funds. Concern was expressed also for those who did not want
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to participate because of religious reasons.37 Public administration required the plan be
administered by a provincial government or a provincial nonprofit agency and that the
provincial governments take full responsibility for the program. However, private
insurance programs could still operate by providing insurance for services not covered by
the provincial plans.38 Finally, portability required that benefits be transferred as
Canadians moved from province to province, a principle that recognized the increased
mobility of Canadians, whether for new jobs or leisure travel.39 With agreement by the
various senior officials of the federal and provincial governments of the required
elements of a Medicare program, how the federal government would make funds
available became a discussion point.40
Other problems that required timely resolution between the federal and provincial
governments included pharmaceuticals and health care personnel. Concern over the
availability, cost, and quality of drugs was being addressed by a parliamentary committee
that had as its goal to make more drugs available on a pre-paid basis, which was
important to any comprehensive health services program. Second, ensuring that an
adequate supply of professionals would be available to provide health services, now and
in the future, would be addressed using a federally funded Health Resources Fund that
would target funding for research centers, teaching hospitals, and medical schools. How
those funds were to be used would be addressed by provincial health ministers and
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federal officials.41 Prime Minister Pearson concluded his address by urging that the
federal and provincial governments move forward on achieving this task with a “high
sense of common purpose.”42
For many of the provincial leaders, little disagreement existed regarding the
federal goals for health care, although most of the premiers wanted more emphasis on
mental health, tuberculosis treatment, and health professional education. Moreover, while
health care was one of the priorities for many of the conference attendees, economic
development and education remained the critical priorities for the other premiers. Related
to economic development and education was the need to reexamine Canadian federalism
in relation to health care, given the changing needs of the country.
Strong support for a comprehensive and universal program for all Canadians
came from the British Columbia premier, W. A. C. Bennett; Saskatchewan’s premier, W.
Ross Thatcher; and New Brunswick’s premier, Louis J. Robichaud, and each minister
viewed the essential federal role as providing sufficient funds to implement such a
program. Premier Bennett strongly endorsed—without reservation—the federal proposal,
if the federal government paid 50 percent of the cost. Premier Thatcher, in whose
province citizens already enjoyed comprehensive and universal coverage, supported
expansion of the program nationwide but only after the medical profession, hospitals,
governments, and the public could implement effective cost controls. Because
Saskatchewan was already enjoying a comprehensive health care program, employment,
natural resource, and industrial development remained its priorities, although
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improvement in health care was vital to ensure the highest quality of care. Additional
federal funds would allow Saskatchewan to improve its health care program while having
funds available for other priorities.43
While endorsing education as New Brunswick’s priority, Premier Robichaud
believed that the Commission’s principles were practicable, workable, difficult to attain,
but not impossible to achieve. Improved health services required additional support for
public health initiatives, as they provided the best value for the funds expended, more
funds for mental health and tuberculosis treatment, and an equitable basis of health care.
Three principles, according to Robichaud, should apply to any national program:
1) comprehensiveness, such that no one was denied care based on location, physical
condition, or finances; 2) transferability; and 3) most importantly, equity. Equity, defined
as those who paid a standard rate of tax being able to receive a standard level of service,
was important to a province that lacked sufficient funds for health care. Premier
Robichaud also emphasized that deterrents and co-payments should be prohibited since
they taxed the sick to pay for the rich. They violated the principle of denying health care
to all people, whatever cost.44
The most serious objection to the government’s health care principles came from
Quebec’s premier Jean Lesage. Quebec, having studied the health care problems of its
citizens and having reviewed the Hall Commission report, planned on providing its
citizens with a comprehensive insurance program under provincial jurisdiction, adapted
to provincial needs, and solely operated outside of any federal-provincial program.
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Premier Lesage stated that health care was solely a provincial responsibility and that
Quebec would opt out of any program within its sphere of competence when it could
operate the program more effectively than the federal government. Quebec simply needed
federal monies to operate a medical insurance program it designed and administered,
which was its right and obligation as a province. The additional federal funds could best
be used, according to Lesage, not in the form of block grants, which obligated a province
to particular principles or administrative structures, but by an abatement of some federal
taxes to the provinces. Quebec did not see its position as an obstacle to a national
program and to other provinces establishing their own programs conjointly with the
federal government, as it might agree on cost sharing or principles. Quebec’s priority at
the conference was the redistribution of tax revenues so that it could maintain autonomy
in social programs.45
Two other provincial premiers weighed in on health care. Ontario Premier John
Robarts, supporting Prime Minister Pearson’s notion of cooperative federalism, believed
that the conference’s focus should be on economic growth and development. Rather than
speaking to the federal Medicare proposal and the four principles, Robarts urged the
federal government to provide largely unconditional block grants, as suggested by the
Hall Commission, to tackle the difficult problems of mental health and tuberculosis care,
hospital construction, and research.46
Manitoba’s premier, Duff Roblin, noted that Manitoba’s comprehensive health
care program for those on social assistance resulted in over 72 percent of the province
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having medical insurance, and the province planned on achieving universal coverage in
the future. Like other premiers, health care priorities for federal funding included mental
health, tuberculosis, and costs to administrate hospital plans, additional education for
medical professionals, pharmaceuticals, and facilities in remote areas. Like Premier
Robarts, Roblin made no reference to the federal medical proposal.47
Additional views of the government’s role in health care came from the
parliamentary debates on the Medicare bill. Debate centered on a Conservative Party
amendment, introduced at the beginning of the debate, and within its criticism,
ideological issues were apparent, especially related to the role of government. Introduced
by B. P. Reynaud (Simcoe East-PC), the amendment read that the provision of medical
services for all Canadians on a prepaid basis would not occur until the co-operation of the
provinces was secured, the principle of voluntary choice by the individual recognized,
adequate provision made for research and training of doctors and other medical
professionals, and immediate provision made for medical services for persons financially
unable to participate.48
While this amendment was defeated soundly on December 8, 1966, the discussion
about it clearly showed the ideological divide between Liberals and Conservatives
regarding the role and power of the federal government to mandate participation using
the withholding of federal funds as a powerful and compelling tactic.
According to John Diefenbaker, leader of the opposition Conservative Party, two
provinces felt coerced. Manitoba, which wanted only an 80 percent participation rate to
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meet the universality principle, believed it was being pressured, since any province not
meeting the principles would not receive funds until 1972. Quebec strongly believed that
it should be allowed to develop and implement its own program without being required to
follow federal principles. Yet if Quebec opted out of the federal program, Quebec
citizens would be required to pay federal taxes for a national medical services program
that provided medical care to other Canadians but not Quebecers, since Quebec would
not receive any funds for its own program until 1972. Moreover, taking the funds
required that Quebec adhere to the federal principles, clearly a violation of its rights and
an encroachment on the authority of provinces regarding health care. This was not Prime
Minister Pearson’s idea of co-operative federalism, but rather, a form of centralization.49
Some Quebec representatives believed that federal action might lead to renewed
nationalism in Quebec, since Quebec’s Premier Lesage stated that Quebecers wanted to
be “masters of our own home.50”
Diefenbaker, a supporter of the Hall Commission and its report, indicated that he
favored Medicare for all Canadians but believed that the Liberal government had rushed
into creating a bill without adequate consultation with the provinces, and “confederation
cannot be maintained without cooperation.” He advocated that in order to ensure fairness
to all provinces, all provinces must be consulted to determine the basis for the conditions
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the government proposed.51 Clearly, Conservative support for Medicare rested on issues
regarding the appropriate role of the federal government.
The most comprehensive response to the Conservative’s amendment and the
Conservative position in relation to the role of government came from Tommy Douglas
(NDP-Burnaby-Coquitlam), leader of the National Democratic Party and father of
Canada’s Medicare program. Douglas believed that passing the Conservative’s
amendment would kill a bill that was developed in response to the Royal Commission on
Health Services—a commission implemented by the Conservative government led by
John Diefenbaker and with a report strongly supported by Diefenbaker when it was
published. Douglas reiterated that provinces were not required to adopt the principles and
argued that when Conservatives implemented the Hospital and Diagnostic Services
program in 1957, principles of participation were not mandatory.52 Finally, Douglas
argued that the Medicare bill was only enabling legislation; if the provinces met the four
conditions, then the government would pay one-half the cost.”53
With the exception of Quebec’s Premier Lesage, the Commission and political
leaders agreed that the federal and provincial governments involvement was the key to
improving health care. Provinces would design and implement the programs, and the
federal government would provide funding. The level of control over both program
design and funding remained somewhat contentious though ultimately resolvable.
Throughout these discussions, the role of the private sector remained minimized when
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major interest groups, many representing the private sector, presented briefs to the
Commission, urging the continuation of the public-private partnership. Only a few
groups—organized labor, social workers, and farmers—would oppose private-sector
participation.

Government and the Private Sector
As a result of the failure of voluntary insurance and the financial problems many
individuals and families faced, proponents of a national program believed Canadians
simply did not have the means to provide for their own health care or that of their
dependents. Frequently, this situation resulted from lack of funds, since obtaining
services was negatively correlated to income, according to the Canadian Sickness
Survey.54 Other causes included a lack of physicians or facilities, fragmented or
uncoordinated care, inability of practitioners to utilize medical knowledge effectively, or
simply, living in slums. Good health was a function of a wide variety of factors, from
nutrition to housing.55
Since many Canadians lacked protection covering their health care needs, the
Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) recommended a comprehensive program to the
Commission. Foremost, the health care needs would be best served in a public program
that would provide comprehensive services. Health care should be a public service,
universally available to all, without limitations, and equitably financed, including
freedom from co-pays and deductibles, since these prevented people from seeking health
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care. To achieve the highest level of health care for Canadians, health services would be
organized by federal and provincial governments to provide optimal distribution and
coordination of a variety of services, programs, and personnel. Program administration
would include an appeals procedure and an advisory council to represent all the various
interest groups so as to ensure one group didn’t dominate. Finally, the national program
must fill the gaps in facilities and in technical and professional personnel to ensure
comprehensive care is available nationwide.56
Unlike plans to extend voluntary insurance to all Canadians, the CLC sought a
major reorganization of the health care system, which it argued was deficient in many
ways. The new focus on a comprehensive, universal, and government-administered
health care system resulted from the failure of voluntary insurance to make universal
health care a reality, a growing awareness of the effect of the environment on health,
advances in medical knowledge, expectations of the public regarding good health care,
and a new sense of urgency to create a unified and comprehensive program under the
control of the federal government.57
Only a public program could make health care available to all without regard to
finances, location, or health status because only the government commanded the financial
resources and ability to plan, organize, and implement a comprehensive program. The
private sector, failing to make comprehensive care available to all, caused Canada to lag
behind other industrialized countries in providing health care for its citizens. Only public
control could lead to universal coverage, with additional taxes required. Since public
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funds would be used to operate a national program, private agencies would not be
appropriate mechanisms for the delegation of authority. Protecting the public interest
required a public program.58
The Canadian Federation of Agriculture (CFA), composed of a large variety of
rural groups across the provinces, also advocated for a national health plan, but unlike the
CLC, it believed in utilizing its own principles, which it had developed in 1942 and
which required citizens to participate financially, if able. As a result of the remote and
scattered populations of rural communities, the CFA called for a compulsory national
medical care program that would be implemented in cooperation with the provinces.59
Rather than a purely federal program, which the CFA originally advocated in 1943, the
constitutional division of authority for health, the trend of public policy for joint
programs, and an awareness of the flexibility of provincial programs led the CFA to
advocate for a joint federal-provincial program with individual financial participation,
with a provision that the lack of financial means would never prevent any individual from
receiving health care.60
The CFA believed that health care was a right of all Canadians and that it required
a national commitment, since the private sector had not solved the health care problems
of the rural areas. Since voluntary insurance failed to provide rural Canadians with full
coverage for illnesses and accidents, and since rural communities tended to have more
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sickness and fewer services—providers and facilities—available to them, rural
communities were in crisis.61
Voluntary private-sector plans were problematical for other reasons to the CFA,
which stated that
[t]he voluntary approach, however elaborated or supplemented, leaves
very much in the hands of the medical profession the questions of
administration, of rates of remuneration, of control of misuse, of
organization of medical services, of co-ordination with public health
services and so on.62
Government programs rather than voluntary programs provided for government review,
as well as a continuing interest in the effectiveness and efficiency of services provided to
the consumer. The CFA believed that government involvement would ensure universal
coverage, program effectiveness, and financial accountability; the voluntary approach
could not assure those ends. Most importantly, health care would not be under the
exclusive control of the medical profession.63
Government involvement would not be destructive to the medical profession, as
claimed by many, including the CMA, for this view assumed that the public, through
government, was irresponsible and that the medical profession was crass. The CFA
supported the medical profession in emphasizing the need to maintain high standards and
professional competence, to promote the ideals of public services, and to guarantee
adequate remuneration for doctors’ services. How medicine was practiced was left to the
physicians. Government programs would serve to provide the economic basis to improve
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standards of care and responsibility, not destroy all that the medical profession had
achieved.64
The idea that health care was an inherent right also received support from the
Canadian Association of Social Workers, which represented 2,600 social workers in
many areas of health care. To realize that right and the democratic philosophy that all
individuals are provided with the opportunity to develop to their full potential and make
their most effective contribution to society, the CASW advocated a national health care
program. The CASW argued that poor health was costly to society, and current programs
based on the ability to pay provided different levels of health care delivery. Society,
through the federal government, must ensure that health care was available to all.65
A national health program would resolve many of these issues. Such a program
would be comprehensive, universal, funded by tax dollars, administered by provincial
governments, and portable throughout Canada, characteristics later adopted by the Hall
Commission. Services would be provided based on medical need and not on financial
status and provided in a manner that respected the dignity, privacy, and self-respect of the
individual. If people chose other private-sector insurance sources, they were free to do so,
which was the opposite of the CLC approach that mandated only a public program. A
government-administered program funded by taxes would make means testing
unnecessary, ensure program universality, and avoid stigma or differential treatment for
the indigent. To ensure that all would participate equally, co-insurance and deductibles
would be opposed, since they deterred people from seeking treatment unless they had the
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financial means to pay those charges.66
The United Church, representing over 3,300 ministers and 4 million Canadians
who called the United Church their religious domain, believed that health care, as a social
concern, required that the strong must bear some burdens for the weak. To that end, the
United Church General Council in 1954 and again in 1960, “urged all government
authorities in cooperation with the medical, dental, nursing and related professions to
establish an integrated, contributory comprehensive national health insurance program.”67
The United Church did not provide specifics regarding the various roles of government,
the private sector, or professional groups. The Catholic Church, the second largest
religious group in Canada, did not submit a brief to the Hall Commission.
During the parliamentary debates on the Medicare bill, Tommy Douglas also
reminded his colleagues that the Hall Commission was very clear that it did not approve
of public-private programs similar to those in British Columbia, Ontario, and Alberta
because they created a system of haves and have-nots—those who can pay and those who
cannot pay. The Hall Commission wanted one program for all Canadians, a program that
was publically sponsored, comprehensive, and publically administered. The program had
to be universal because the risk and cost needed to be assumed by all citizens, not just
those who chose to have insurance.”68 Support for the public sector during the
Commission hearings was abundant as was opposition to government involvement.
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The most vociferous opponent of a government medical services plan was the
Canadian Medical Association, which strongly opposed the development and
implementation of the Saskatchewan medical services plan. The CMA, whose
membership included over 80 percent of Canadian doctors, believed that all Canadians
should have the highest standard of medical care, available on a prepaid basis, with
government, organized medicine, and other groups cooperating to achieve this end.69 For
those who needed health care but lacked the necessary economic resources, such care
would be provided by physicians either gratis or on a sliding scale. The CMA clearly
stated that government involvement should be limited to insuring only a small portion of
Canada’s population: the medically indigent and those demonstrating need. Such
government-funded insurance would be provided by voluntary plans or plans providing
socially assisted medical insurance. Government-controlled, universal, compulsory, and
tax-supported comprehensive medical services were neither necessary nor desirable;
voluntary programs had made sufficient progress in providing health insurance to those
that needed or wanted medical insurance.70
During the 1950s, the CMA supported the development of pre-payment plans
through the formation of the Trans-Canada Medical Plan, a physician-controlled medical
insurance program, and through its involvement in the Canadian Conference on Health
Care, a consortium of private sector organizations which included the TCMP, the
Canadian Health Insurance Association, and the Canadian Insurance Association (CIA).
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Voluntary prepayment plans allowed individuals with moderate incomes to better budget
for health care problems, and most importantly, voluntary programs allowed individuals
to choose the program that met their needs, thus enabling Canadians’ freedom of choice.
Competition between the variety of available private-sector plans led to improvement in
the benefits offered, lowered the cost of insurance, and increased the number of
individuals insured. In 1950, approximately 20 percent of the Canadian population had
some type of health insurance. By 1960, approximately 52 percent had some form of
coverage, and the CMA predicted that by 1970, two-thirds of Canadians would be
covered. This increase was largely the result of the extension of group coverage to small
businesses and families.71 The CMA pointed to these statistics as demonstrated proof that
the private sector was, indeed, responsible and successful.
Although Canadian doctors did not deny services based on ability to pay, the
CMA believed that all Canadians, including the indigent, ought to benefit from the same
type of health insurance available to others, though not through a “single, monopolistic,
compulsory” program.72 In British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and
Nova Scotia, the provincial governments ensured medical services for the indigent and
remunerated physicians at agreed-upon rates for those enrolled in the provincial
programs. Additional medically indigent, estimated at 25 percent of provincial
populations, could be provided with government-paid voluntary insurance, using a means
test and a sliding scale to determine the amount of any premium. Means testing was
viewed as an effective device to determine need, and it was a tool that the CMA believed
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was being maligned on a false premise that it was humiliating and embarrassing for
recipients. Pharmacy services would also be provided to the medically indigent in all
provinces.73 To the CMA, government involvement was an anathema, and it did not
commit its organization on the subject of whether the federal government had authority
and, if so, the type of authority in matters of health.
The CMA’s French counterpart, l’Association des Médcins de Langue Française
du Canada, had a more stringent view of federal involvement in health care and the role
of the private sector. The AMLFC, representing over 4,000 physicians throughout
Canada, profoundly believed that health care was the sole responsibility of the province
and that any medical insurance plan should be available universally on a provincial basis,
with the provincial government performing only a supplementary role. All insurance
plans would be administered by an independent body and open to private enterprise. Most
important to the AMLFC, the program would be a contributory mutual system plan
requiring contributions from employers and individuals.74
While medicine had made great advances in prolonging life and decreasing the
cost of sickness for many and the proportion of individual income available for medical
care had increased, many Canadians still could not afford to protect themselves from the
calamities of illness or accidents and yet were deprived of the benefits of medical science
available to other Canadians. Rather than simply provide health care insurance to all, an
individual initiative would require that individuals contribute according to their ability
and that the Canadian people and medical profession fulfill their collective responsibility
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to the nation by agreeing to the use of tax dollars and appropriate levels of remuneration.
Similar to the CMA principles, the AMLFC would not support state medicine but
supported any other medical plan that safeguarded the freedom of the medical profession
in all respects.75
The AMLFC rejected any role of the federal government in provincial health,
including the role of financing health care. The federal government, it believed, should
return taxing power to the provinces so that the provinces could implement programs
solely designed and administered by them, and the federal government should cease its
involvement in the social security and hospital services programs. The AMLFCA asked
the Quebec government to reject any involvement in any federal-provincial medical
insurance program. A “mutual-assistance” program involving the private sector would
allow the Quebec government to develop a medical insurance program without outside
interference, based on socio-economic conditions, mentalities, geography, and the
aspirations of the Quebec people. In doing so, the liberties of Quebec citizens would be
protected.76 Such an ideology was consistent with the Révolution tranquille (Quiet
Revolution) emerging under the leadership of Quebec’s Premier Jean Lesage. The
Révolution tranquille focused on the secularization of society, with the provincial
government assuming responsibility for education and health, which had been under the
control of the Catholic Church. This period also witnessed the development of a
separatist faction within Quebec. The AMLFC’s complete rejection of federal

75

Ibid., II-V.

76

Ibid., 4–5

113

involvement was unique among medical groups and consistent with the principles of the
Révolution tranquille.
While the AMLFC rejected any level of federal involvement, the Trans-Canada
Medical Plans sought a limited role for government. The TCMP—with physicianadministered medical insurance organizations in seven provinces—reported success in
enrolling over 4 million Canadians by 1962, obtaining the participation of over
85 percent of all Canadian doctors, and accomplishing these goals in an efficient, costeffective manner. However, to the TCMP, health care availability and accessibility
remained the unsolved problems.77
Availability, a function of the number of facilities and personnel, could be
addressed best by the allocation of additional funds for new facilities and more health
care professionals. Accessibility, according to the TCMP, partly a function of facilities
and human resources, remained largely a problem of finances, especially for those over
65 years of age, the unemployed, the poor, the medically indigent, and those with preexisting conditions. Clearly, gaps existed in coverage, and the government could assist in
filling those gaps by working with voluntary insurance groups.78 Historically, the TCMP
had developed social, economic, administrative, and medically sound principles, such as
efficiency, efficacy, and peer reviews relevant to health insurance and had applied those
principles to its provincial programs. The TCMP argued that governments, by their
nature, were not as capable of adhering to those principles as competently as voluntary
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insurance agencies.79 Another group of private-sector insurance companies also wanted
to extend coverage to additional Canadians using this successful private-sector model.
The Canadian Health Insurance Association, representing 95 percent of the
private insurance companies in Canada (though not the TCMP), provided health
insurance to approximately 10 million Canadians, and it strongly believed that voluntary
insurance could one day be made available for all, regardless of age, occupation, place of
residence, or health. In its brief, the CHIA focused its discussion on issues of health care
financing, although it stated that additional government intervention was needed to
support the development of more public health programs, health care professionals,
medical research, medical facilities, and medical services; to reduce the number of
alcohol-related accidents; and to provide adequate financial support to care for the needy,
especially the mentally ill, the chronically ill, and the aged.80
Since the rapid growth of voluntary insurance beginning in the 1940s, the CHIA
believed that health insurance was now accepted by much of the public and viewed as a
necessity of life. Competition within the private sector to provide health insurance led to
a greater array of benefits for subscribers, and additional benefits added to the health and
economic security of Canadians. Such growth in availability and access was likely to
continue, as well as additional benefits. To achieve coverage for all Canadians, a
proposed private sector-based medical insurance plan, approved by many of the CHIA
members, could be implemented.81
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Voluntary insurance would be maintained because of the past success in insuring
Canadians, and voluntary financing of health care was consistent with the philosophical
leanings of Canadian life. “Canadians have a desire, even a deep determination,” the
CHIA claimed, “to pay their own way in this field and to retain the choice of doctor,
patient, and carrier which is inherent in the voluntary insurance system.”82 Such a
philosophy—that individuals are capable and have a responsibility to make decisions in
their own best interests—was consistent with individualism.
According to the CHIA, compulsory government insurance was not needed, given
the success of voluntary insurance, and a high level of government expenditures in any
government program would dampen national productivity. Government’s role should
remain the elimination of barriers that inhibited the voluntary system from operating
effectively and efficiently, including the removal of taxes on medical insurance
premiums. And if government did this, the proportion of those covered by health
insurance would increase significantly. Other roles would include ensuring funds for new
resources, medical research, licensing standards for professionals, government
supervision of insurance companies, and financial assistance to the indigent and those
with disabilities and chronic illnesses.83 To this end, the CHIA proposed to the
Commission a model medical insurance policy that would improve accessibility.
Two plans—basic and premium—would be made available to all Canadians
without regard to age, health condition, occupation, or geographical location.
Competitive and cost-effective premiums for insurance would be based on a community

82

Ibid., 3.

83

Ibid., 5, 27–29.

116

rating rather than experience rating, which lowered costs for high-risk persons. Standard
policies would include hospital medical services and other diagnostic services not
covered by the provincial hospital plans. Group insurance would be emphasized, given its
efficiency.84
The CHIA determined a number of advantages to this approach versus a
government-managed monopolistic medical insurance program. First and foremost, this
plan preserved individual freedom of choice regarding the right to buy insurance and the
type of insurance selected, based on one’s needs and individual financial condition.
Freedom of choice of the physician for the patient and the patient for the physician would
be preserved, since state systems required more control and less choice. Second, the
government’s role would be limited to assisting the indigent and chronically ill,
legislating to remit taxes on health and sickness insurance, and creating a reinsurance
company to manage risk. Such a minimal level of involvement would ensure that
excessive expenditures of government taxes would not lead to future political and
economic problems and a deterioration in the quality of health care provided, all possible
under a government-managed health insurance program. The CHIA argued that using the
market for health insurance would provide better service, more flexibility, a variety of
coverage types and benefits, and the freedom for consumers to shop for a package that
met their needs—that is, their economic ability to pay. The CHIA plan, compared to a
government plan, provided benefits to all the major interest groups.85
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Two major organizations representing business, the Canadian Manufacturers
Association (CManA) and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce (CCC), also believed
that voluntary insurance remained a superior solution to a government insurance
program. The CManA, representing over 6,400 entities that manufactured over 75 percent
of Canadian products, stated that voluntary insurance provided insurance to a majority of
Canadians and had the “. . . advantages associated with free enterprise, flexibility to
adjust to changing needs, and a degree of competitiveness to act as a spur to
administrative efficiency.”86 Large businesses believed that their employees were
adequately protected, while particular classes of persons, such as those with pre-existing
conditions and the aged, required government assistance, along with additional facilities
for the indigent. To ensure that government support was appropriate, the CManA urged
that means tests be used for the indigent, as many could afford to pay for health
services.87 Use of government funds for medical services for all Canadians would detract
from providing better services and facilities in areas where health care standards were
subpar and, thus, would lead to more severe economic problems for the nation.88
The CManA feared that any government health care program would lead to
excessive taxation, which severely limited a Canadian manufacturer’s ability to compete
internationally. Canadian wages were the second highest in the world, and health
insurance as a fringe benefit added to the cost of goods. Furthermore, there was already
sufficient pressure to expand social and welfare programs at the federal and provincial
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levels for the aged and others. Additional expenditures for a government medical services
program merely replaced or duplicated existing voluntary programs, with no assurance
that a government program would provide Canadians with the best possible health care
and that such a program could be controlled regarding cost and abuse. 89
For the CManA, the problems and failures of the British National Health Service
demonstrated how government health programs were ineffective in a variety of ways,
most especially in the recruitment and retention of physicians. Given the opposition to
any national program by Canadian physicians, implementation of a national program
might lead to a deterioration of quality or problems in attracting young people to
medicine, or it could lead to a great emigration of physicians from Canada.90 The second
major Canadian business group, the Chamber of Commerce, held similar views.
The CCC, representing small businesses throughout Canada, strongly supported
voluntary insurance to ensure that individuals assumed their “. . . primary responsibility
to make provision for and pay the costs of medical care for himself and his family . . .
(and) a priority in budgeting for adequate personal and family coverage for medical
expenses.”91 Personal responsibility—the principle of individualism—was a core value
for the CCC, and since Canadians enjoyed a higher standard of living than other
countries, evidenced by per capita incomes and possession of durable goods, Canadians
were in a position to pay for adequate care if they gave health care personal budget
priority. Given the growing number of voluntary insurance policies, the CCC was
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convinced that Canadians were maturing in judgment regarding their responsibility to
ensure their own health and the health of their dependents.92
The CCC contended that if government assumed responsibility to provide medical
care to all Canadians, the tax burden would increase for all, and government health care
would be “. . . inconsistent with the concept of personal freedoms through which Canada
has risen to its present level of economic and social well-being. We believe,” the CCC
brief continued, “that Canadians are prepared to pay the price for their freedom and to
assume the responsibilities associated with it.”93 Government’s focus should be on
providing for those without adequate resources, as determined by means tests, which
would be the least disastrous approach.94
According to the CCC, a government-run national health care program would lead
to widespread and dire consequences for Canadian health care and Canadian society.
Foremost, a government-run program would lead to excessive control of the health care
professions, the regimentation of medicine, and interference with the freedom of the
people. Second, the CCC argued that social benefit programs, like medical insurance,
were tools of collectivists who desired a redistribution of income and that such programs
created the illusion that governments can create utopias. Presently, the CCC contended,
Canadians remained unaware of how taxes were collected and redistributed, and
Canadians had an erroneous view that government services were free. Third, if
government assumed the full cost of health care services, the value of those services
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would “. . . cheapen in the eyes of the public, loosen the restraints on individual
responsibility in the use of such services, and weaken the sense of individual
responsibility in caring privately for family members.”95 Finally, as excessive
government funds would be expended on medical care under a government program,
government expenditures would be a major detriment to achieving a $76 billion GNP by
1980.96 Thus, any government medical system—“socialized medicine”—would damage
the economy irreparably and compromise every Canadian’s freedom.97
Freedom of choice, personal initiative, and responsibility were hallmarks of the
CCC and other private-sector organizations, along with a strong belief in competition and
private enterprise. Public policy should be aimed toward maintaining free enterprise and
competition and creating opportunities for individuals to determine how and when to
spend their personal incomes. When Canadians had incentives of risk and reward, then
energy, initiative, enterprise, and individual choice—which, ultimately, govern the
production of goods and services—would lead to prosperity for all. When the state
provides for competent individuals, the incentive to provide for oneself is lost, and when
multiplied over many individuals and organizations, private enterprise and competition
would suffer. In the end, the high standard of living currently enjoyed by Canadians
would decline.98
The role of government, according to the CCC, was to ensure through legislation
and serious consideration of any further welfare that personal freedom is preserved.
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Major proponents of a national medical care system did not disagree with the notion of
choice in some areas but not to the extent of Conservativess.

Freedom to Choose
Evident in the CManA, the CCC, and the CHIA positions is the belief that a
government-run program would eliminate Canadians’ right to choose whether they
wanted health insurance and from whom they would obtain health insurance, since only
one compulsory program would be available. Opponents of a national program believed
that individuals must be free to choose how they expended their incomes, be it on health
care or some other item such as an automobile or a home. Freedom to choose was one of
the basic freedoms that all Canadians enjoyed, and it would be clearly lost, they believed,
under a mandatory program.
Other concerns regarding freedom of choice arose from the CMA. The physicianpatient relationship was the cornerstone, the foundation of Canadian healthcare.
Physicians and surgeons, who were certified by professional societies, must be able to
choose the nature and location of their practice. Physicians must not be encumbered in
medical decision-making. Patients should choose their physician, and physicians should
choose their patients, whom they would treat, if qualified to do so. Finally, physicians
would determine how they would be remunerated, and remuneration—a matter for
physicians and patients or for those representing the patient—must be renegotiated as
economic conditions dictate.99 The issue of remuneration was one of the critical issues
during the 1962 physician strike in Saskatchewan. Similar to the CMA principles, the
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AMLFC would not support a state-run health care program, but it supported all other
medical plans that safeguarded the freedom of the medical profession in all respects.100
Two proponents of a national health care program—the Canadian Federation of
Agriculture and the Canadian Association of Social Workers—also supported physicians’
right to choose how and where they practiced, their choice of patients, and patients’ right
to choose their health care providers. The practice of medicine, the CFA and the CASW
believed, should be left to physicians.101 The Canadian Congress of Labor—the other
supporter of a government program—had a radically different view of freedom of choice
under the voluntary health care program that presently existed in Canada.
The CCL questioned the CMA’s belief that true freedom of choice between
doctor and patient was the cornerstone of health. For the patient, they contended, a
variety of factors enter into the choice of a physician, factors such as physician
personality, location, charges for services, effectiveness, and willingness to make house
calls. For doctors, the choice of a particular potential patient might also be determined to
some extent by the patient’s expectations of the physician, his/her ability to pay, and the
patient’s social and economic status. Thus, in a profession that emphasized solo practice
and fee-for-service, free choice was not so cut and dried as it might appear, especially if
the doctor’s choice of patient and the patient’s choice of provider conflicted.102

100

Ibid., II-V.

101

Canada, Royal Commission on Health Services, Brief to the Royal Commission on Health Services from
the Canadian Association of Social Workers, (RG 33, 78,22, 330), 12–13; 101 Canada, Royal Commission
on Health Services, The Canadian Federation of Agriculture Submission to the Royal Commission on
Health Services, March 27, 1962, (RG 33, 78, 15, 290), 10–11.
102

Canada, Royal Commission on Health Services, Submission to the Royal Commission on Health
Services, Canadian Labour Congress, May 1962, (RG 33, 78, 21, 319), 16–17.

123

One of the major issues during the parliamentary debates also involved freedom
of choice for individuals, which Conservatives believed was denied by the Medicare bill.
Universality meant compulsory participation and increased taxes or premiums.
Individuals could not opt out, nor could they choose their own insurance company, since
the programs would be publically administered. Professionals would also be compelled to
participate. Such compulsory action violated one of the Hall Commission principles of
freedom of choice.103
Finally, Tommy Douglas had a different view about mandatory participation.
Douglas argued that the government needed to use the force of law to achieve socially
desirable outcomes. “Individual choice, in some cases, must be sacrificed. Governments
did not give people choices regarding education or paying taxes to support schools,” he
argued. “Was not health care a similar issue, one that needed to be mandated for the good
of society?”104Mandatory participation, according to Douglas, served not only the
interests of every Canadian but the continued development of Canada as a nation.
Freedom of choice for providers, citizens, and the provincial governments would be
constrained or enhanced, in part, by how health care reform would be financed. How to
finance health care reform was the last ideological issue that divided Canadians, and the
source and level of financing remained a function of the role of government.

Financing of Health Care Reform
How health care would be financed depended largely on the role of government.
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Under Pearson’s proposal presented at the First Minister’s Conference, the national
program would be funded through taxes. For individuals, more of their individual funds
would be given over to public revenues, through taxes, to meet the costs of the new
program and achieve service improvements, but individuals would no longer be required
to pay for health services directly or through existing insurance programs. The funds
raised by both the federal and provincial governments would have to be sufficient so as
not to add to budget deficits, and they would have to be substantial enough to provide
funds for other health services programs, not just pre-paid medical services. Initially, the
federal government proposed a contribution of funds “equivalent to 50 percent of the
national per capita cost.”105 Provincial premiers agreed that financing was the appropriate
role of the federal government, and federal government’s formula was not debated nor
were the conditions of participation.
The most extreme position regarding health care financing and the role of the
government arose from the AMLFC, the Quebec-based physician organization.106 The
federal government, the AMLFC believed, should return taxing power to the provinces,
which had been taken away during the Second World War. Since Quebec advocated a
purely provincial approach to health care reform, all that was needed was funding, and
returning taxing power ensured that no conditions were attached to the funding. Quebec
did not support any additional federal funding for a national program.107 Quebec was also
concerned that failure to participate in any new federal program would deny them
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additional funds for health care until 1972, even though Quebec citizens would be
required to pay new federal taxes for the national program from the time of its inception
in 1967. Paying taxes to the federal government for five years without the authority to
design and implement its health care program and without receiving any financial benefit
from the taxes citizens paid would violate Lesage’s view that Quebecers wanted to be
“masters of [their] own home.”108
For the Liberal proponents of a national program, financing to achieve a universal
and compulsory program would require the vast resources of the federal government
since numerous provinces, such as Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick
lacked the financial resources to provide universal and comprehensive services.
Proponents of a national program believed that financing should come primarily from tax
dollars, since private-sector insurance would mean a continuing role for the private
sector.
Private-sector pre-payment plans were problematical for the CLC. Such plans
often included only diagnostic and curative services and rarely included rehabilitation
and preventative services. Plus, these plans could not guarantee that services would be
available at particular facilities; they frequently did not completely pay for services; and
finally, they were little concerned with quality. Only federal and provincial financing of a
public program would ensure comprehensiveness and accountability. Finally, the use of
means tests, deductibles, and co-pays—common in insurance plans and government-
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subsidized insurance for the poor—must be excluded because they were barriers to access
and only slightly related to health care costs.109
The CFA also agreed that a national program would require significant
government financing, although it strongly supported the idea that individuals should
make some financial contribution, if able to do so, although the financial status of
individuals should never affect their ability to obtain good health care, nor, given their
right to health care, should the cost of such care pose an undue burden on individuals and
families given the right to health care. A universal program using both moderate
premiums and federal and provincial tax revenue was achievable and would require a
redistribution of income between individuals, provinces, and areas.110 As a result of the
increased incomes of Canadians, the CFA believed that many individuals could well
afford to pay and should pay a share of their health care costs rather than placing the
entire burden on tax revenue.111
The CASW believed that a government-administered program funded by taxes
would make means tests unnecessary, ensure program universality, and avoid stigma or
differential treatment for the indigent. To ensure that all would participate equally, coinsurance and deductibles were opposed, since they deterred people from seeking
treatment unless they had the financial means to pay those charges.112
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For opponents of a national health insurance program, financing to support
additional government intervention was needed to support the development of more
public health programs, health care professionals, medical research, medical facilities,
and medical services; to reduce the number of alcohol-related accidents; and to provide
adequate financial support to care for the needy, especially the mentally ill, the
chronically ill, and the aged113
In the area of government-supported health insurance for the indigent, the
CManA and other groups urged that means tests be used for the indigent, as many could
afford to pay for health services.114 Supporters of voluntary programs believed that
deductibles and co-pays should remain since they supported individual responsibility for
health care and reduced health care costs. For groups such as the CManA, CCC, and
HIAA, government funding through increased taxes would place undue burdens on
individuals and, ultimately, reduce the competitiveness of Canadian businesses. The
predominance of funding, these groups believed, must remain in the private sector and be
shared by employers and business.

Summary of the Ideology
Ideology concerning a national medical insurance program in Canada revolved
around four distinct needs. First, the need for improvement in health care and in methods
to achieve that goal, such as system restructuring and resource development, generally
found agreement among diverse parties. What remained in conflict were the strategies to
113
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achieve that goal, that is, the need to define the roles of the various levels of government
and the voluntary health insurance agencies. Core Canadian values—freedom of choice,
individualism versus collectivism, free enterprise, and competition versus government
paternalism—would underlie how health care should be provided to Canadians,
especially regarding the role of government and the private sector.
The origins of the Liberal camp view can be found in the Royal Commission on
Health Services report, which concluded that all Canadians were entitled to the best
possible care and that that care would occur through cooperation between the federal and
provincial governments, the private sector, professional organizations, and Canadian
citizens. Canada’s health care problems involved a significant lack of human- and
service-delivery resources, a lack of availability of services especially in rural and urban
areas, and inadequate health insurance coverage for most Canadians.
It was generally accepted that health care was foremost an individual
responsibility for which society had a significant vested interest. By assisting the
individual to achieve the best possible health care, Canada would progress as a nation,
socially and economically. To ensure individual and societal responsibilities would be
achieved, the Hall Commission recommended a national health care program, funded by
the federal government through new individual and corporate taxes and designed and
implemented by the provincial governments, which would achieve the goals of
universality, comprehensiveness, portability, and public accountability, while
maintaining the proper roles of the federal and provincial government in Canada’s
federalist system.
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The proponents of a national program—including the Hall Commission, the
Canadian Labour Congress, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, and the Canadian
Association of Social Workers—believed that the private-sector system had failed to
provide health care protection for the vast majority of the population. The private-sector
health insurance role, these groups claimed, should be limited to an intermediary
function. Businesses should support the national interest by paying additional taxes and
participating in the development of new resources, funded by the federal and provincial
governments. Individuals should support the national interest by paying higher taxes and
focusing on prevention and wellness. For the greater good of society, participation in the
public health care program should be mandatory for all individuals, since only public
programs would be available. This elimination of choices was no different than other
citizen responsibilities, such as paying taxes or attending school, and mandatory
participation was necessary for the greatest good of society. Society, as a whole, had a
duty to care for the individual, which is a collectivist view.
The proponents of maintaining the voluntary programs argued that the private
sector had achieved success in insuring more Canadians and would continue to make
progress in the years ahead. Government’s role, they believed, should be limited to
providing subsidies to the poor, the disabled, and those with preexisting and chronic
conditions, so that they, too, could purchase insurance. These groups and individuals
opposed to a nation program believed that such a government-controlled program would
deny Canadians the freedom to choose whether or not they wanted health insurance. Plus,
they foresaw a national program, funded by new taxes on businesses and individuals, as a
potential economic albatross, deleterious to Canadian economic competitiveness and
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contradictory to the values that had made Canada a great nation—free enterprise and
individual responsibility. Government involvement in health care, they feared, would
dampen Canadians’ spirit and, ultimately, damage the Canadian health care system itself.
In summary, in Canada—as was true in the U.S.—the fact that health care needed
significant improvement and reform was not the issue; rather, how such improvement and
reform should be achieved remained the source of disagreement. The conflicting
ideologies about the roles of government and the private sector, and the deeply held
values concerning freedom and responsibility—both personal and collective—were at the
heart of a great debate.
While the ideological differences appear broad and deep when the briefs from the
private sector are examined, the differences between the various political groups involved
in the implementation of Medicare appear to be less conflicting. Essentially, the
provincial premiers—with the exception of Quebec’s premier, Jean Lesage—accepted the
basic tenets of the Hall Commission, with differences concerning the role of the federal
government focused on the level of funding and on federal requirements for participation.
Any mention of private-sector participation was lacking in these discussions and during
the parliamentary debates. Government’s role in creating a national program had tacit
agreement.
The House of Common’s major concern focused on the federal-provincial roles,
with some concern for individual choice. Little debate concerned the Hall Commission’s
basic findings and its proposed minimal role for the private sector. The chasm of
ideological differences—the roles of pluralism and individualism—were most apparent
during the Hall Commission’s hearings. In the end, members of Parliament
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overwhelmingly approved the Medicare program in 1966, in a landslide vote similar to
how they had approved the Hospital and Diagnostic Services Act in 1957. Ideologies had
been merged and agreement had been reached on a national program that would provide
health care to all Canadians.
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Chapter 4
Health Care in the United States
While the search for national health insurance in the United States began in the
early 1900s , many of the ideas for NHI put forth by American reformers originated in
Europe. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck instituted a variety of social insurance
programs, beginning with sickness insurance in 1883, accident insurance in 1884, and
finally, old age and invalid insurance in 1889. A key reason for Bismarck’s programs was
to gain worker loyalty, given the suppression of socialist activities in 1878, which
resulted in high levels of socialist activity and agitation. Initially, sickness insurance was
limited to a small group of workers but expanded over the years.1
England adopted a variety of selective social insurance programs during the early
1900s. These programs included, for example, minimum wage laws, old age pensions,
and school meals for poor children. The 1911 National Insurance Act provided sickness
insurance to some low-income workers, in addition to unemployment insurance. Family
health care was not included. The Liberal government, under Prime Minister David Lloyd
George, enacted this health insurance program, as well as the other programs, because the
government believed that “. . . Britain was falling behind the race for national efficiency.”
As a result of the Boer War and their possible decline as a world power, a drive to
improve British competiveness required improvements, often using business models in
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all areas of society, including education, industry, public health, and military reform. 2
Interestingly, Germany provided some of the models utilized by Britain, and many
European traditions served as a basis for social reform in the U.S. 3

First Attempt: American Association for Labor Legislation Proposals
At the turn of the 20th century in the U.S., fraternal, welfare, and charity
organizations provided social services and relief to the poor, workers, and their families.
The fraternal societies, providing the bulk of services, organized themselves around
religious affiliation, ethnicity, or other characteristics. These societies provided for
medical care, but frequently, a lack of physicians and hospitals and the state of medicine,
which was not yet scientifically based, led to poor medical care.4
Some employer and union benefit programs supplied health care insurance.
According to Beatrix Hoffman,
The AALL (American Association for Labor Legislation) estimated in
1916 that one quarter of unionized workers received benefits from their
unions. However, AALL’s estimate of 5% of all workers in unions meant
few American workers were insured. Benefits were both a recruiting tool
for the unions and protection for workers. These health care benefits
included either medical care or sick pay; rarely did a worker receive both.5
Commercial health insurance, available to workers and the general public, grew during
the first twenty years of the 20th century. However, this type of insurance was expensive
for insurance companies since many of the common diseases of the day, such as
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tuberculosis, diabetes, and venereal disease, were expensive to treat, and collecting health
insurance premiums, similar to collecting life insurance premiums, added significant
costs to running the insurance business. Private health insurance would expand finally in
the 1930s as the state of medicine advanced and collection methods became more
efficient.
The first movement leading to expanded worker health insurance began with the
1905 founding of the AALL, the American branch of the International Association for
Labor Legislation (IALL). The IALL, founded by French, German, and Belgian
economists in 1900, worked to enact a variety of uniform labor protection statutes,
including night work for women and safety standards for phosphorus factories.6 The
AALL, in league with other reformers, achieved early victories in state legislatures to
enact workers compensation insurance and unemployment insurance.
On a national level, presidential candidate Theodore Roosevelt strongly supported
health insurance for workers, and the 1912 Progressive Party platform included worker
medical care in its plank entitled “Social and Industrial Justice.”7 Including health care as
part of a larger set of measures was the work of Jane Addams and Louis Brandeis, both
progressive social reformers. Eliminating poverty and disease required health insurance
and adequate medical care. While the Progressive Party failed to win the presidency,
improving the plight of workers and others continued on the state rather than federal
level.
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Beginning in 1915, AALL’s Committee on Social Legislation sought to have a
model health insurance program, entitled the “The Standard Bill,” enacted by state
legislatures. This bill blended the British and German models, which included wage
replacement and medical care for workers. The plan granted medical services, physician
visits, surgery, nurses, drugs, and supplies for workers earning under $100 per month and
their families. Also, sick workers would receive two-thirds of their wages for up to 26
weeks, and workers could elect to purchase hospital insurance. The standard plan,
financed with contributions from employers, workers, and the state, would not involve
the federal government.8 The standard bill achieved limited success at the state level
because of the financial burden it placed on states.
Although by 1917 eighteen legislatures had debated AALL’s model legislation,
only two legislatures—California and New York—introduced the bill for consideration.
The bill received mixed support. Samuel Gompers, long-time president of the American
Federation of Labor (AFL) and a member of the AALL board until 1915, withdrew his
support for health insurance in 1916. Health insurance remained a major benefit provided
by many AFL unions in order to gain membership; the AALL bill would create
competition. Moreover, Gompers found the AALL’s insurance policies antithetical to
workers looking out for their own interests, and he strongly believed that government
intervention ultimately crippled workers’ rights. He found the bill contrary to his core
values of voluntarism and individual freedom.9 Others, including many in the labor
movement, did not hold the same views.
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The bill garnered support from some unlikely allies and opposition from those
who would suffer financially if the legislation were enacted. Many local unions and their
leadership strongly supported the AALL’s proposal. Initially, the AMA, along with other
progressive individuals and groups, cautiously supported the legislation. Major resistance
came from businesses, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), insurance
companies, fraternal organizations, and other mutual aid societies.
Although Governor Alfred Smith had endorsed it, this legislative effort died in
1920 when the New York legislature failed to pass the bill. For the most part, AALL
legislation did not pass because its opponents, including business and, ultimately, the
AMA, linked the plan to socialism and characterized it as a gateway to Bolshevism and a
threat to the American economic system. Finally, New York legislators voted against the
bill on the grounds that passage of it would lead to a loss of power by industry and state
over the administration of health care.10 In California, the bill, though introduced, was
never considered by the full legislature.
In addition to anxieties created by the Red Scare and the militant opposition of
insurance companies and business, the AMA turned against the AALL’s program
because it believed that this social legislation threatened physician autonomy, physician
incomes, and the quality of health care. Commercialism placed too high a regard for
remuneration rather than the physician-patient relationship.11 By 1920, the American
Medical Association passed a resolution opposing “ . . . any plan embodying the system
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of compulsory insurance against illness.”11 The opposition of the AMA would remain a
major barrier to NHI enactment for the next fifty years.

Private Sector Development of Health Insurance
The next stage for NHI began in 1927 with the creation of the Committee on
Costs of Medical Care by President Herbert Hoover. The committee—composed of fortyeight persons, including physicians, public officials, and business leaders—studied how
to organize curative and preventative medical services that included 40,000 people in
eighteen states. The 1932 final report strongly favored providing voluntary insurance on a
group practice basis, extending public health services, and using insurance or taxation to
cover medical costs. Though physicians were members of the committee, the AMA
immediately condemned the recommendations as socialist, and none of the physicians on
the committee supported the committee’s final conclusions and recommendations.12
The committee’s work, however, produced positive effects throughout the nation.
During the five years of the committee’s life, numerous states considered compulsory
health insurance legislation. The American Association for Social Security (AASS)
developed a model compulsory health insurance bill, which was introduced in a number
of state legislatures, including California. The California Medical Association briefly
supported this bill in 1934.13 Other medical societies, such as those in New York and
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New Jersey, expressed disagreement with the AMA regarding compulsory health
insurance.14
At the national level, President Franklin Roosevelt established a cabinet-level
Committee on Economic Security (CES) on July 29, 1934. The committee, chaired by
Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins, developed the framework for the Social Security Act.
During their deliberations, the committee seriously considered and then rejected the
proposal to include health insurance in the final bill. According to Funigiello,
Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins later explained that the CES had
postponed writing national health insurance into the bill for fear that
opposition from the AMA and its business and congressional allies would
kill the entire Social Security Act.15
The AMA opposed any federal involvement in health care, though the AMA now
supported forms of group health insurance.16
Although the Social Security Act excluded medical coverage, work continued
within the Roosevelt administration on NHI. Committees within the Executive branch
examined the question of the health and welfare of federal employees. The National
Health Survey examined incapacitating ailments that affected over 800,000 families.17 A
1938 National Health Conference supported by President Roosevelt led to
recommendations for federal involvement in health care that would provide health
security for all Americans. Once again, the AMA opposed this effort, citing its concerns
about the economics of such a program for physicians and the potential loss of freedom
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and status of physicians, which might occur with government intrusion in health care.18
However, the AMA opposition could not prevent the new federal movement toward
improved medical care for Americans.
The first federally sponsored NHI bill, The National Health Act, introduced by
Senator Robert Wagner (D-NY) in 1939, sought universal coverage, though Senator
Wagner wanted to encourage the development of NHI without the use of a federal
mandate. Health insurance would be voluntary and state based.19 FDR’s 1938 presidential
campaign supported universal health care coverage, although FDR excluded mandatory
health care in his 1939 legislative agenda. He chose not to support the Wagner bill
because of his long-time belief in private enterprise and his concerns about entanglements
with the AMA and other important business allies.20
The drive for improved medical care continued during World War II, with new
NHI bills, proclamations, and other federal actions. On June 3, 1943, Senator Wagner,
Senator James Murray (D-MN), and Representative John Dingell (D-MI) introduced a
comprehensive social insurance bill, containing coverage for health, permanent disability,
unemployment, and temporary disability. The bill, however, languished in a variety of
congressional committees. On January 11, 1944, President Roosevelt proposed an
Economic Bill of Rights, including the “right to adequate medical care” and the “right to
adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and
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employment.”21 Neither of these efforts was successful, given the ever-growing
conservatism of a Congress that shunned federal involvement in favor of a private
enterprise endeavor. Private enterprise would prove to be more successful than federal
involvement in obtaining NHI.
Though the 1930s and 1940s provided numerous opportunities for federal action
to achieve some form of NHI, those efforts failed, in part, because of the AMA’s
opposition to any plan threatening how physicians practiced their craft and the methods
of remuneration. President Roosevelt remained ambivalent to universal health coverage,
not wanting to interfere with private enterprise or risk the ire of the AMA or business.
Even if Roosevelt had supported NHI, his fight to enlarge the Supreme Court cost him
the prestige and political capital necessary to pursue his legislative goals. Finally, the
number of conservative congressmen (both Republican and Democrat) who opposed
NHI, increased throughout this period.
Since the federal government failed to enact any form of universal coverage
during the depression and war eras, voluntary insurance, provided through the private
insurance industry, grew during the 1930s and World War II. This growth of private
insurance, supported by the AMA, businesses, and federal laws, set an important and
critical precedent for U.S. health insurance, which continues to the present day.
Blue Cross, Blue Shield, and other private insurers expanded their business during
this period because of concerns about government intervention and favorable state and
federal laws. Blue Cross, established in 1929, offered individual and group pre-payment

21

The Public Papers & Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Samuel Rosenman, ed.), Vol. 13 (NY: Harper,
1950), 40–42.

141

plans for hospital care. Blue Cross plans existed for single hospitals or communities, and
by the end of the 1930s, Blue Cross had over 1 million enrollees.22 Initially, the AMA
opposed these plans because they required prepayment, which the AMA viewed as a
threat to physician autonomy and finances.23 Blue Shield, a physician-based organization
first established in 1939 by California physicians, required only that insured doctors
accept a set fee for service. California physicians established this program “to head off
the threat of a state proposal for compulsory health insurance.”24 The private insurance
industry began to blossom.
By 1940, over 12 million persons possessed some type of private health care
insurance, and by 1945, that number had increased to 32 million. The largest growth
occurred with the Blue Cross and Blue Shield programs.25 In part, this growth resulted
from favorable legislation passed by states to exempt the Blues from typical insurance
regulation and taxes.26
During World War II, private insurance also prospered because of favorable
federal laws and concerns about government intervention. IRS rulings allowed business
to treat group health care benefits as a deductible business expense and as non-taxable to
employees.27 Moreover, the freeze on wage increases, agreed to by labor and
management, opened the door for increased benefits in lieu of wages.
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Concern about government intervention remained one of the key factors
explaining the rise of private insurance. According to Hacker,
. . . a range of groups—doctors, hospitals, insurers, employers—came to
see [private insurance] as a way of achieving not just their own
organizational imperatives but also larger political goals . . . a route of
escape from the looming threat of government action, one that also
delivered important benefits, from employee good will to the stabilization
of income, to those who adopted and championed it.28
The development of Blue Cross, Blue Shield, AMA support for group health insurance,
government tax breaks for benefits, and the growth of the private insurers during the
1930s and 1940s, put the U.S. on the path of employer-provided insurance rather than
government-provided insurance. This path would be solidified during the Truman era.

Truman’s Quest for Universal Coverage
President Truman, who was supportive of universal health care, initiated NHI
legislation twice during his term in office. His own experiences with poverty and with
witnessing neighbors and citizens going without health care due to a lack of funds
touched Truman deeply. He also remained troubled by the large number of men who,
during World War II, could not meet the physical requirements for recruits. Truman
viewed national health insurance as a proactive way to ensure an adequate supply of men
for future armed services duty, given the new 1948 Selective Service Act, which required
universal military training.29
Beginning with his 1945 health message to Congress, Truman proposed universal
health care coverage that would provide coverage for loss of wages due to sickness and
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medical care for workers and their dependents. He envisioned that citizens would be able
to choose their own doctors.30 The Murray-Dingell-Wagner bill, reintroduced in June
1945, received support from various groups, including the United Auto Workers (UAW),
the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and the National Medical Association (NMA),
an organization of African-American physicians. The AMA and conservative
Republicans like Senator Robert Taft (R-OH) remained strongly opposed. Other AMA
allies and NHI opposition included the American Hospital Association (AHA), the
American Dental Association, the American Bar Association, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce (USCC), the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), and the
American Farm Bureau Foundation (AFBF). 31
The 1946 election brought Republican majorities to both houses of Congress.
Undaunted, President Truman, in his January 6, 1947 State of the Union message to
Congress, requested an NHI bill similar to the Murray-Dingell-Wagner legislation. In
addition to national health insurance, Truman also urged that the legislation strengthen
federal support for public health. The years immediately after the war saw strong public
support for NHI.32 However, a Republican Congress and allegations that communists
were behind the Truman bill doomed any chance for NHI.33
The National Health Act of 1947, introduced by the AMA and Republicans,
countered the Administration’s bill. The National Health Act would provide medical care
for the indigent through grants administered solely by the states, along with physical
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exams for children, and money for cancer research. It would also fund the establishment
of a national health agency.34 Neither bill was enacted.
Undaunted by Congress’ failure to enact his national health insurance bill, NHI
became a major part of Truman’s 1948 campaign, and in his January 5, 1949 inaugural
address, he included universal health care as part of his Fair Deal. Once again, the AMA
joined with Southern Democrats to mount major opposition. Southern Democrats were
opposed to any form of NHI because it might require that health facilities in the south
become desegregated, an anathema to southerners. Other opponents included various
Catholic social service organizations, the USCC, numerous farm and patriotic
organizations, and the NMA, which had supported Truman’s efforts in 1946. Major
proponents of Truman’s plan included the AFL and UAW. On this occasion, public
support was equally split between NHI and private insurance. To many, an NHI program
appeared socialistic.35
To combat this bill, the AMA levied a special assessment on its members to fund
a massive public relations campaign, including radio coverage that focused on the
socialist nature of NHI, the failures of Britain’s National Health Service, and the
importance of voluntarism, which it characterized as the epitome of American values.
The AMA emphasized citizens’ freedom to choose their doctors and to determine how to
finance their health insurance rather than accept a government mandate.36
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Southern Democrats, concerned with the ramifications of any NHI bill on race
relations in the south, joined with Republicans to oppose it. They worried that NHI might
include provisions outlawing segregated health care facilities. Indeed, Southerners had
made their support of the 1946 Hill-Burton Hospital Construction Act contingent on the
preservation of segregated hospitals, given that the facilities where equal.37 Ultimately,
NHI failed, thus helping to perpetuate racial patterns in the South and the continuation of
private health insurance.
The growth of private health insurance alternatives also explains the death of NHI
during this period. As Gordon explained, “Employment-based health insurance grew in
response to the threat and reality of unionization, to federal incentives (especially during
the war), and to the persistent failures of health care legislation.”38 By 1950, the majority
of companies with more than 250 employees offered some form of health insurance, and
over 50 million Americans had some form of hospital insurance, though only 17 million
had insurance for medical services.39
Companies sometimes used benefits as an anti-union tool. By offering health
insurance in addition to other benefits, companies hoped to stave off union organizing.
Most importantly, government rulings regarding benefits and unionization supported
health insurance as a benefit during company negotiations with unions. In 1948, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruling that allowed
unions to negotiate for benefits, including health insurance, as benefits were a condition
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of employment.40 Given the defeat of Truman’s NHI bills and the new NLRB ruling,
unions backed away from actively supporting future NHI bills and used negotiations as a
way to further the growth of health care for their membership.41
During the 1950s, the percentage of Americans covered by health insurance
increased significantly as a result of previous government and private sector precedents,
economic growth, and a Republican administration unsupportive of governmentsponsored NHI. By 1954, over 27 million workers had health insurance, comprising
approximately one-fourth of all Americans insured.42 Universal coverage as provided by
the government, a long-time standard for many labor unions, gave way to private
insurance as the new standard. However, the problem of retiree health insurance
remained a significant factor, which would influence the next stage of health insurance
reform, as many retirees from companies were not included in the health insurance plans
of employers.43

Medicare and Medicaid Finally Realized
A new push for expanding government health care began during the Eisenhower
administration’s second term, although without the support from the president. In 1957,
approximately seven out of ten elderly had no health insurance.44 Organized labor,
concerned about its retirees, played a key role in endorsing the Forand bill. Introduced in
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1957 by Congressman Aime Forand (D-RI), the legislation would provide health
insurance for the elderly, specifically hospital, surgical, and nursing home care, and these
services would be funded by increasing the Social Security tax.45 Given the potential
opposition of the AMA, the Forand bill excluded medical services.46
The bill attracted strong support and vehement opposition. For the UAW, retiree
health care for union workers would be handled through a federal program, thus freeing
funds for other worker benefits. Once again, the AMA, along with the AHA, strongly
opposed any government involvement in health care, even for the elderly. The AMA and
AHA argued that the poor and elderly often received free care, and therefore,
government-sponsored health insurance was not necessary. The vehement opposition to
the Forand bill led to the introduction of other bills addressing elder health care,
including a bill by Senators John Kennedy (D-MA) and Clinton Anderson (D-NM). The
AMA’s opposition remained a critical factor in the Forand bill’s defeat in 1957 and again
in 1959.
The problem of health care for the elderly became a major campaign issue during
the 1960 presidential campaign because of their growing population, which translated to
more voting power for the elderly and a greater focus on their poor health and high
poverty rates. Some progress occurred early in the decade. Rather than passing the
Kennedy-Anderson bill, which provided comprehensive insurance through the Social
Security OASI (Old Age and Survivors Insurance) program and which bitterly divided
senators, Congress enacted the Kerr-Mills Act of 1960, which provided grants to states
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for the aged poor’s health care.47 Introduced by Senator Robert Kerr (D-OK), chairman
of the Senate Finance Committee, and Wilbur Mills (D-AR), chairman of the powerful
House Ways and Means Committee, and endorsed by President Eisenhower, Kerr-Mills
established the precedent of federal government responsibility for health care for the
elderly.48 However, Kerr-Mills provided support for only a small percentage of the
elderly population.
Two additional factors, combined with the Kerr-Mills legislation, set the stage for
passage of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. First, President Kennedy, a strong
supporter of health care for the elderly, campaigned on this issue during the 1960 election
campaign and asked for passage of a health care bill for the elderly in a special January
30, 1961 speech to Congress. He continued to support health care legislation during his
brief time in office. Second, Kerr-Mills was a resounding failure. According to Mayes,
. . . by 1963, only four states provided the full range of care for which
Kerr-Mills allowed . . . the five large industrial states—California, New
York, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Pennsylvania—were receiving up to
90 percent of all federal funds; whereas, their elderly populations
represented just 33 percent of the total country’s elderly population over
the age of 65.49
Kerr-Mills affected less than 1 percent of the elderly.50 The need to care for the elderly
remained unmet.
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Between 1961 and 1965, Congress considered numerous bills to address health
care for the elderly. One major bill, the King-Anderson bill, would have provided all
Social Security recipients with hospital, diagnostic, nursing home, and home visits, and it
included funds for medical school facilities and loans for medical students. The bill, to be
funded by increases in Social Security, would initially allow recipients to choose their
own physician, although money for physician services was excluded in order to dampen
AMA opposition.
The King-Anderson legislation, like Truman’s health care bills, encountered both
strong support and stiff opposition. The AMA led the resistance throughout the early
1960s, claiming that any federal funding for health care established a precedent for the
eventual government control of physician services. The AMA, mounting a massive
public relations campaign, claimed that the King-Anderson bill was socialist in nature.
Strong opposition came from insurance companies, including Blue Cross, which had
begun a new hospital insurance program for the elderly in order to avert federal
involvement.51 However, new proponents of health care for the elderly emerged,
including the National Council of Senior Citizens and the Physicians Committee for
Health Care for the Aged (a group of dissident physician members of the AMA). The
UAW also remained a strong and vocal supporter, and these groups mounted their own
public relations campaigns.52
By 1962, public support for passage of a health care bill for the elderly stood at
69 percent, and President Kennedy began pushing members of Congress to enact

51

Funigiello, Chronic Politics, 115–116.

52

Ibid., 117.

150

legislation named Medicare.53 Throughout this period, Representative Wilbur Mills (DAR), chair of the powerful House Ways and Means Committee, remained a major
stumbling block to Medicare’s passage because the proper funding mechanism could not
be found. All health and tax legislation originated in the Ways and Means Committee,
and the chairs of house committees, at that time, had significant control over what
legislation was considered and the form of that legislation.54 Mills, a strong supporter of
the AMA, remained a fiscal conservative regarding any expansion of Social Security.55
Mills wanted to ensure the fiscal integrity of the Social Security system by
keeping it a pay-as-you go system, legitimizing the absence of means testing, and
maintaining continued support by the middle class. Mills believed that income-transfer
programs, like Social Security and Medicare, needed a revenue mechanism and taxes, in
general, were appropriate sources of revenue. But numerous problems existed. First,
funding of Medicare through increased taxes would constrain the Social Security
program, as demands for more liberal programs would increase.56 Second, raising Social
Security taxes might create a revolt among businesses, as Social Security taxes—a wagerelated benefit—would be used to pay for a nonwage-related benefit, health care.57
Finally, the solvency of Social Security would be threatened by the escalating costs for
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hospital care.58 These concerns, major factors in Mill’s opposition, prevented the passage
of Medicare until 1965, although the issue remained politically alive.
In 1964, health care for the elderly became a major campaign issue. The
Republican Party and its candidate for president, Senator Barry Goldwater, strongly
opposed Medicare. President Lyndon Johnson and the Democrat Party strongly supported
Medicare, a pillar for his Great Society program. A landslide for Johnson led to forty-four
Democrat seats added in the House and four Democrat seats added in the Senate.
Medicare became President Johnson’s top legislative item, as noted in a January
7, 1965 speech to Congress. The King-Anderson legislation, as the administration’s bill
came to be known, was designated as H.R. 1 and S. 1, to clearly demonstrate Johnson’s
priority and the importance he placed on its passage. The King-Anderson bill would
provide hospital care and be funded by a 7 percent increase in the Social Security tax.
Mills, persuaded to support Medicare based on the election results, wanted a separate
Medicare tax rather than an increase in the Social Security tax so as to ensure Social
Security’s financial integrity.59
The AMA once again mounted strong opposition to the administration’s bill by
introducing its own bill, entitled the “Doctor’s Eldercare Plan,” which would provide
federal and state grants to the elderly for the purchase of health insurance, including
physician services insurance. Other plans included “Bettercare,” another voluntary
program introduced by Republicans for health care for the elderly. Both programs would
be financed through general revenue rather than Social Security taxes.
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Mills, known to his House colleagues as a master of compromise, found a way to
satisfy the president as well as many of the special interest groups involved in the
debate.60 By July 1965, Mills had fashioned a three-tiered approach to provide
comprehensive health care for the elderly and the poor. This approach produced a blend
of the Republican’s Better Care Plan, Johnson’s Medicare proposal, and Kerr-Mills.61
The Kerr-Mills program became Medicaid, a federal-state health care program for the
poor. Hospital services would be provided under a mandatory Medicare-Part A, funded
by a Medicare tax rather than an increase in Social Security. Physician services would be
provided under a voluntary Medicare-Part B program, funded by the recipient, a trade-off
to gain AMA support.
As a result of President Johnson’s campaign promise to pass health care for the
elderly, the growing voting power of the senior citizens, and the need to restructure health
care for the poor to contain costs, these bills passed the House on July 27, 1965, by a
307–116 margin and the Senate by a 70–24 margin on July 29, 1965. To honor Truman’s
work on NHI, President Johnson signed the legislation in Independence, Missouri, with
President Truman in attendance.
Medicare and Medicaid were compromises for many organizations. Hospitals
would receive reimbursement for all allowable costs, plus an additional 2 percent, and
Part A would be administered by one insurance company, Blue Cross, acting as fiscal
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intermediary. The only cost containment measure was a provision that utilization review
boards, established by the hospitals, review the medical necessity for all admissions.62
Medicare-Part B required that Social Security recipients, if they chose to
participate in this part of the Medicare program, pay an annual fee to obtain physician
services. Physicians would receive payments based on their prevailing charges, evaluated
as being consistent with customary charges and not higher than average charges for a
particular area. While physicians wanted direct billing of clients in order to avoid any
government involvement in providing care, fiscal intermediaries—often Blue Shield
plans—were chosen to administer the Part B program. 63
Medicaid, an elaboration of Kerr-Mills, required states to offer hospital,
physician, and nursing home services to the poor. States could determine the generosity
of benefits if they accepted federal funding through a federal-state matching formula.
States designated a fiscal intermediary to administer the program, and in twenty-three
states, Blue Cross prevailed.
With the elderly and poor receiving health care and with both hospitals and
physicians now obtaining reimbursement for services that they often provided free to the
elderly and poor prior to Medicare and Medicaid, the reality of health care for the frailest
of Americans precipitated a rapid rise in health care costs. This cost increase would affect
the efforts to obtain NHI in the decades ahead.64
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The rapid rise in health care costs began soon after the passage of Medicare and
Medicaid. Hospital and physician charges increased dramatically as a result of
reimbursement methodology contained in the bills. In order to pass the legislation,
proponents had dropped cost control limitations, and as a result, between 1966 and 1971,
the average annual increase in hospital costs was 14.1 percent, a 100 percent increase
from the 1960–1966 base period. In 1967, the first year of operation for Medicare, the
total costs for hospital and physician charges was $4.6 billion. By 1970, the total cost of
those services was $7.0 billion. As a result of the rising Medicare costs, the cost of all
health care increased during this period from $38.9 billion to $74.7 billion. Health care,
as a percentage of GDP, rose from 5.9 percent in 1965 to 7.6 percent in 1970.65 Because
of these cost increases, Medicare “acquired a negative reputation among the political
elites. The negative reputation diminished the political viability of Medicare as a model
for national health insurance.”66 Ironically, severe medical inflation would hamper the
quest for NHI during the early 1970s and remain a stumbling block in achieving NHI. By
the late 1960s, the provision of health care became a complex, multifaceted problem that
would remain largely unsolved.

Quest for National Health Insurance Stymied
In 1968, Walter Reuther, president of the UAW and long-time advocate of NHI,
formed the Committee of 100 for National Health Insurance (CNHI). This committee,
sponsored by the UAW, included trade unionists, social activists, politicians, physicians,
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and professors, and its membership called for new efforts to achieve NHI for all
Americans and efforts to tackle the rising costs of health care and inadequate service
delivery systems. The CNHI became responsible for developing and sponsoring the
Health Security Act in 1970, introduced by Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) and
Representative Martha Griffiths (D-MI), which called for the elimination of the privateinsurer role and the establishment of a single-payer system with incentives for group
practices, hospitals, and physicians to operate within a national budget.67
While the reasons for the CNHI’s pursuit of health care reform included
stemming the rising costs of health care and improving the organization and delivery of
services for all citizens, the CNHI’s goal to enact an NHI bill resulted also from the labor
movement reaching the upper limits in contract negotiation for benefits. Health care costs
were rising dramatically and undercutting union efforts to negotiate for higher wages and
other benefits. Achieving NHI provided negotiating room for labor’s contract demands
and new benefits to workers. Finally, being at the forefront of NHI would prove that the
UAW, which separated from the AFL-CIO in 1968, could be effective on a national
scale.68
In addition to the rising costs of health care evidenced by the growth of the GDP
devoted to health care, the organization and delivery of health services remained
problematical. Most health care services existed in the large urban areas, yet the innercity poor had limited access to these services. Rural areas also frequently lacked adequate
health care, given the paucity of physicians and nurses willing to serve there. When
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physicians practiced, they often did so in solo rather than group practices. Hospitals were
largely voluntary or administered by local governments. The number of physicians who
provided direct care services lagged behind the number of specialists.69 As a result, even
with the available health care resources, many Americans lacked access to adequate
health care.
Employers or the government provided the bulk of health care, yet approximately
20 percent of the population lacked any form of health insurance, and many others were
underinsured. Over 20–25 percent of those under 65 lacked hospital care and in-hospital
physician care, and only 38 percent carried insurance for home and physician office
visits.70 The lack of insurance most often affected those earning less than $2,000 annually
and who were non-white.71
In the early seventies, major concern about the inadequacies of the health care
system led to two efforts—in 1970–71 and again in 1974—to enact NHI. Prominent
individuals and groups believed that the time for NHI had arrived finally. By early 1971,
public support ran two-to-one in favor of national health insurance.72 A majority in
Congress favored one of a variety of major proposals, and Ways and Means Chairman
Mills assumed some version of NHI would pass.73 Major organizations such as the AMA,
AHA, NAM, HIAA, CNHI, believing that NHI was imminent, introduced bills that met
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their particular requirements, and during this period, over forty-four different bills were
introduced.74 Even two unlikely organizations—the AMA and the UAW—met in 1970 to
work out a compromise, but to no avail.75 The Nixon administration offered numerous
bills during this period, and on February 18, 1971, President Nixon gave a speech
outlining his NHI proposals and calling for quick action on NHI. Health care reform that
would benefit all Americans seemed inevitable.
Minimal action on NHI occurred during the Ninety-first Congress (1969–1971),
although there was significant congressional action on other health issues. Health carerelated bills enacted by the Ninety-first Congress included funding for family planning,
community mental health centers, mental retardation facilities, treatment for alcoholism
and communicable disease, the National Health Service, cancer research, health
manpower training programs, nurse training, a communicable disease program, and
renewal of the Hill-Burton Hospital Construction Act. During this period, Senator Ted
Kennedy introduced the Health Security Act, S. 4323 and S. 4297 in the Senate. Senator
Jacob Javits (D-NY) introduced a second and similar bill: The National Health Insurance
and Health Services Improvement Act of 1970. The Health Security Act, rather than the
Javits bill, would become one of the major pieces of NHI legislation considered early in
the 1970s, and it engendered considerable support throughout this period.
The Health Security Act of 1971, sponsored by Senator Kennedy and
Representative Griffith and developed by the CNHI, viewed health care as a right for all
Americans. This proposal would create a single-payer system, similar to Canada’s
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Medicare program, with federal government administration of the program through a
Health Security Board. There would be broad benefits for all Americans, and Medicaid
and Medicare would collapse into this program. Payroll taxes would be the primary
financing mechanism, with subsidies given to the poor to purchase insurance. Finally,
funds would be provided for improving health care facilities and increasing the supply of
health care professionals.76 The NHI bill, introduced by Senator Javits, would establish
an NHI program by extending the benefits received by those under Medicare to all
citizens, raising payroll taxes to fund the program, providing funds to stimulate the
development of new health care resources, and establishing federally chartered national
health insurance corporations.77
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare conducted hearings on
September 23–24, 1970. Key witnesses supporting the CNHI bill included such notables
as Leonard Woodcock, president of the UAW; George Meany, president of the AFLCIO; and Whitney Young, executive director of the National Urban League and a
member of the CNHI. Each of these witnesses believed that health care was a
fundamental right for all Americans, rather than a privilege for some Americans;
comprehensive benefits were needed; funding should come from payroll taxes with
subsidies for the poor; and a new health care delivery system would be required to ensure
the right for all.78
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Opposition to these plans abounded. For example, due to the high cost of a
federally run NHI program and the extensive role of the federal government, John
Veneman, under secretary in the Department of Health and Human Services, disagreed
with the approach both bills took toward national health insurance.79 Dr. Ernest Saward,
president of the Group Health Insurance Association, believed that new forms of service
delivery, similar to the Kaiser Foundation’s health maintenance organization (HMO),
would better serve the public than either NHI bill.80 The committee adjourned in
September 1970, without taking action on any of the bills. These bills would be
reintroduced in the next congress.
More extensive activity on NHI occurred during the Ninety-second Congress
(1971–1972), in spite of the fact that less health care-related legislation was introduced
than in the previous Congress. During this period, enacted legislation included funding
and expansion of cancer research; extensions and amendments to acts providing
construction of medical schools; the Nurse Training Act; and finally, the Health
Manpower Act, intended to increased the number of health care professionals in
underserved areas.
During this period, NHI took center stage. Over forty-four bills were introduced,
and extensive hearings were conducted in the House and Senate regarding major bills,
including the Health Insurance Partnership Act, sponsored by the Nixon administration;
the Health Security Act, sponsored by Senator Kennedy, Representative Griffiths, and the
CNHI; Medicredit, sponsored by the AMA; the National Health Care Act, sponsored by
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the HIAA; and a proposal developed by the American Hospital Association. These bills
covered a wide range of options, ranging from a single-payer system with complete
federal control to tax credits for obtaining insurance on a voluntary basis.
This focus on NHI during the Ninety-second Congress resulted partly from the
rising costs of health care, an issue highlighted in the Basic Facts on the Health Industry,
prepared by the House Ways and Means Committee in June 1971. This report spoke to
four key problems in the health care area. First, while, percentage-wise, the number of
physicians was increasing faster than the population, fewer physicians participated in
direct and primary patient care, with more involved in research, administration, and
medical specialties. Second, as a result of fewer health care services available to the poor
and non-white groups, these groups experienced higher rates of disabling illnesses and
mortality rates. Third, sole practitioners and voluntary hospitals provided the majority of
health care services. Although group practices and health maintenance organizations
provided more cost effective services, they were few, given the opposition of the AMA.
Finally, 80 percent of persons under 65 years of age had some form of health insurance,
which was most frequently supplied by employers and encouraged hospital care rather
than ambulatory care; whereas, 20 percent of the population had no health insurance.81 A
crisis in health care existed, and it was hoped that an NHI bill would be a potential
solution to these multiple and complex problems. Ensuring access to the underinsured
and uninsured remained one of the problems to be solved by NHI.
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Simultaneously, the Nixon administration engaged in a variety of activities to
achieve health care reform. Elliot Richardson, secretary of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (DHEW), presented a list of health care problems to the
Domestic Council on November 5 and 10, 1970. These problems, many similar to those
described by Ways and Means, indicated that the federal government lacked a clear and
comprehensive strategy for the development and provision of health care services. New
health care resources and new methods of providing services were required.82 During a
Domestic Council Meeting on December 11, 1970, Richardson further elaborated on
potential solutions, and the Council and Secretary Richardson committed themselves to
developing a National Health Strategy, since Richardson believed health care would be a
dominant issue in the 1972 national election. The centerpiece of this strategy would be
HMOs.83
The administration’s plan, set forth in a May 1971 white paper entitled “Towards
a National Health Care Strategy,” discussed the positive aspects of America’s health care
system, including the rise in life expectancy of Americans, the increase in the number of
physicians, the decrease in disability days, the increase in the number of Americans with
health insurance, and an increase in the amount of money spent on health care. Major
problems included a disproportionate increase in the health care consumer price index;
major disparities in health care for the poor, minority groups, farm families, and men, and
a lack of sufficient resources in many areas of the country.
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To resolve this myriad of problems, the administration developed multiple
strategies that focused on prevention, including such areas as nutrition, welfare reform,
family planning, and medical research; development of HMOs as a new and major
service delivery mechanism; improvement of the distribution of health care professionals
to underserved areas while increasing their supply; and developing more effective
methods of financing health care services. Key to its overall strategy was the view that
the private health insurance industry had to continue playing a vital role in the future of
health care, though important changes in that industry were necessary.84 The
administration’s white paper formed the basis of the various health insurance initiatives
proposed by the Nixon administration.
President Nixon introduced his ideas for health care improvement during a
February 18, 1971 special address to Congress. The Nixon proposals would provide a
“ . . . comprehensive national health insurance program . . . in which the public and
private sectors would join in a new partnership to provide adequate health insurance for
the American people.” 85 Senator Wallace Bennett (R-UT) and Representative John
Byrnes (R-WI) formally introduced the administration’s bill—the National Health
Insurance Partnership Act (NHIPA) of 1971 (S. 1632 and H.R. 7741) in the Senate and
House on April 22, 1971.
The Nixon administration bill contained three parts: First, the National Health
Insurance Standards Act (NHISA) would set standards for employer-based health
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insurance, including minimum expenses for employees and an employer’s requirement to
provide a minimum level of health insurance, including hospital, office visits, and
catastrophic coverage. Second, the Family Health Insurance Plan (FHIP) would replace
Medicaid by providing means-tested health insurance for persons not covered by
employers. This program would be administered on a federal, rather than a state level.
Medicaid would be limited to the blind, the indigent, the aged, and the disabled, and
Medicare would continue. The final part of the administration’s plan would encourage
the establishment of HMOs—entities with prepaid group health insurance.86 The
administration’s proposal was only one of many to be introduced during the Ninetysecond Congress.
In sharp contrast, the 1971 Health Security Act (S. 3 and H.R. 22), sponsored by
Senator Kennedy and Representative Griffith, would create a single-payer and
comprehensive health care benefits system that was developed and administered by
federal government. This program would be financed through payroll taxes with
employers paying 3 percent and employees paying 1 percent, and the federal government
would provide subsidies to the poor to purchase insurance. An important part of this act,
and one that would generate conflict for many groups, was the elimination of private
health insurance companies from performing any function in this new health care system.
The Health Care Insurance Act (S. 987 and H.R. 4960), known as Medicredit and
developed by the AMA, found sponsorship with Senator Clifford Hansen (R-WY) and
Representative Richard Fulton (D-TN). Medicredit would provide tax credits for health
insurance on a sliding scale and subsidies for the poor to purchase individual or group
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insurance. This proposed legislation garnered the most support from members of
Congress, with over 180 sponsors by 1974.
The National Health Care Act of 1971 (S. 490 and H.R. 4349), sponsored by the
Health Insurance Association of America, through Senator Thomas McIntyre (D-NH)
and Representative Omar Burleson (D-TX), would create a three-tiered system that
would remain privately based. Employer-based insurance plans, tax incentives for the
self-employed, state-sponsored insurance pools, and subsidies for the poor would form
the basis of this voluntary system. Federal standards for health insurance would be
promulgated to ensure consistency and quality.
A final proposal come from the American Hospital Association, although a bill
supporting the AHA’s proposal would not be introduced until the Ninety-third Congress.
The AHA proposal would create nonprofit health care corporations that would pool and
administer employment-based care and federally subsidized indigent care.87
Attention focused on the administration and Kennedy-Griffiths bills, given the
upcoming 1972 presidential election. The administration bill, supported by many
Republican members of Congress, garnered little external support because the largest
potential sponsors—the medical profession and insurance industries—supported their
own bills. The administration received some support from such groups as the NAM and
the USCC, although both groups also supported the HIAA bill. Support for KennedyGriffiths included such groups as the AFL-CIO, UAW, civil rights groups, American
Public Health Association, and the National Medical Association.88 Two contentious
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ideological issues that surfaced during this period’s debate are evident in these two
proposals: 1) the role and capacity of the private health insurance industry to provide
adequate health care coverage and 2) the role of the government in health care. These two
issues were just the tip of the ideological iceberg.
During a speech to the AMA on June 22, 1971, President Nixon declared that
total government involvement in health care would lead to only the government having
an interest in controlling costs and eventually to a federal domination of the entire
medical system. Doctors, Nixon warned, would have to contend with a large bureaucracy
that denied control of health care at the local level where health care was practiced and
should be controlled. According to Nixon, government, business, and industry could
solve health care problems together, and incentives existed to promote innovation and
experimentation. Nixon believed that individuals had a right to choose how they paid for
their health care and from whom they received health care.89
In remarks he made to the Ways and Means Committee on November 18, 1971,
Senator Kennedy argued that health care in itself is a right, and only the government
“could bring equity and greater rationality and economy to this Nation’s health care
system.”90 The crisis in health care resulted not from the malfunctioning of the current
system but rather, from an inadequate system of providing health care services. The
private health insurance industry, incapable of ending the crisis, remained beholden to
shareholders, whose primary concern was profit, and profit was often contrary to
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effective health care delivery. Only the harnessing of public monies could refashion the
health care delivery system to achieve more rational planning, budgeting, and
evaluation.91 These basic positions, irreconcilable to many, became the heart of the
ensuing congressional debate.
Substantive hearings on these bills and the myriad of other NHI bills began in
1971. The Senate Finance Committee conducted hearings from April 26–28, 1971. The
House Ways and Means Committee conducted 21 days of hearings from October 19–
November 19, 1971. Over 600 witnesses provided oral testimony, and the committee
received over 100 written statements or reports. However, neither committee put forward
a bill in 1971.
Although the Nixon administration attempted to resurrect the National Health
Insurance Partnership Act and HMOs in a special message to Congress on March 2,
1972, neither the Senate nor House took action on these bills, given the upcoming
election and other congressional business. In anticipation of resubmission of the bills for
consideration, the White House completed a comprehensive analysis of the Senate and
House hearings, including an analysis of the support each of the major bills received
during those hearings, the objections and concerns of the various committee members to
all of the various proposals, and major external sponsors and their issues with any of the
major bills.
The White House reported that the Health Security Act had thirty-two external
sponsors and four supporters on the Ways and Means Committee; the HIAA bill had
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eight external sponsors; and the AMA bill had five to six external sponsors, with five
Ways and Means Committee members supporting at least one of those bills. The
administration’s bill had twelve external sponsors, with six Ways and Means members
supporting its bill, and ten members of Ways and Means did not commit to any of the
proposals.92 Essentially, the ideological and programmatic differences in these four major
bills were so great that the result was a lack of significant support for any single one of
them.
In March 1972, Ways and Means Chairman Mills attempted to break the deadlock
by developing a new proposal for NHI, calling the administration’s efforts inadequate in
achieving equity. Mills proposed a national program similar to the Nixon plan, utilizing
both private insurers and prepaid insurers such as HMOs, with some provision for
catastrophic coverage. Mills also predicted that passage of any NHI by Congress would
not occur in 1972, though a bill similar to one he proposed might pass the House.93
On June 17, 1972, during the Democratic National Convention held in St. Louis,
Senator Kennedy and Representative Mills joined forces and presented a statement to the
Platform Committee calling for a national mandatory health care system with
comprehensive benefits in addition to catastrophic coverage. Incentives to improve
quality and control costs, in addition to allocating monies to increase the resources
necessary to meet the new demand, would be utilized. A new Department of Health

92

Memo from Jonathon Moore, DHEW, to Kenneth Cole, Chair, Domestic Council, Feb. 3, 1972, WHCF,
Subject Health, Box 2.

93

This was a press release dated March 1, 1971 and March 31, 1971, found in WHCF, SF Health, Box 2.

168

would be created to manage a national health budget.94 NHI was incorporated into the
1972 Democratic Platform, and this partnership of Kennedy-Mills would again become a
potent force in 1974. The 1972 Republican Platform, however, did not include NHI.
As the Ninety-third Congress convened in January 1973, many of the same NHI
proposals—reintroduced along with some new bills—saw little action until 1974. The
major reintroduced bills included the Kennedy-Griffiths Health Security Act (S. 3,
H.R. 22), along with bills supported by the AMA (S. 444, H.R. 2222) and HIAA
(S. 1100, H.R. 5200). None of these bills contained any major changes. The AMA bill
managed to obtain 182 sponsors in the House, the highest number for any bill.95 The
Nixon administration did not immediately reintroduce the National Health Insurance
Partnership Act (NHIPA).
New NHI bills were plentiful. Major bills included HR. 1, introduced by
Representative Al Ullman (D-OR) and developed by the American Hospital Association.
This bill utilized tax deductions and an employer-mandated payment of 75 percent of the
premiums. Health care corporations would be created, along with a new Department of
Health. Senator Javits introduced S. 915, which would expand Medicare to the entire
population, along with an expansion of benefits. This bill also included an employer
mandate. Senators Russell Long (D-LA) and Abraham Ribicoff (D-CN) introduced
S. 2513, which provided catastrophic coverage for those under 65 years of age entitled to
Social Security benefits. Dependents would be eligible, and a new program for Medicare
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recipients would be created. Private insurance would remain, although catastrophic plans
would be required to meet federal standards and guidelines.96
Consideration of the myriad of health care bills, including NHI, slowed
dramatically in 1973 and 1974, as Congress and President Nixon focused on Watergate,
the Vietnam War, and other major economic issues such as the oil embargo, rising
inflation, and unemployment. However, the fundamental disagreement between the
Nixon administration and the Democratic Congress on the role of the federal government
in any health care initiative remained a major impediment to any quick progress toward
health care reform. Congress continued to create categorical programs, that is, programs
targeted to a specific need or population, which set health care priorities for the nation,
and since categorical programs made funding available for direct services, Congress
controlled where and how the monies were spent. The Nixon administration’s New
Federalism program wanted to decrease the role of the federal government by providing
block grants to states and by giving states the ability to set health care priorities and use
funds with more local discretion in spending. This ideological divide also affected the
role of the federal government in the area of NHI.97
Congress, with an overwhelming Democratic majority, consistently prevailed in
this debate. Categorical programs such as those addressing biomedical research, child
abuse, lead-based poisoning, health planning agencies, and maintaining wage and price
controls for health care providers received funding approval in 1973. In 1974, Congress
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also passed, and President Ford approved, the National Health Planning and Resource
Development Act, which created new planning agencies at the state level to review plans
for new health care projects and provided for states to develop certificate of needs
programs for new health projects.98 The only major piece of health care legislation
sponsored by the Nixon administration and enacted by Congress was the Health
Maintenance Organization and Resources Development Act in 1973, which provided
funding and guidelines for HMO development on a national scale. The Nixon
administration believed that HMOs facilitated preventative care by finding medical
problems early and that this, in turn, would lead to lower medical costs, especially
unnecessary hospitalization.
NHI remained on the legislative agenda because the health care crisis continued to
escalate during the early 1970s. By 1974, health care costs had doubled since 1970, and
quadrupled since 1960. The causes of this unrelenting rise in health care costs included
1) general inflation affecting the entire nation, 2) new technology, and 3) greater
demands for services, given the expanded coverage brought about by private and public
insurance. However, more than 20 percent of the population still remained uninsured
throughout this period, and those with insurance often lacked comprehensive coverage
and preventative care.99 Little had changed since the beginning of the decade.
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At the beginning of 1974, although Watergate dominated politics, momentum and
support for NHI remained strong.100 For the administration, an enacted health care
program might deflect attention from Watergate. In Congress, support for NHI became
less partisan and less ideological. Newspapers, such as the Washington Post, declared
that “(t)he question is not whether the United States should have national health
insurance, but what kind it should have.”101 Newsweek declared, similarly, that NHI’s
time had come and that compromise was in the air.102
NHI remained a priority for the Nixon administration. Casper Weinberger, the
new secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, began drafting a
health insurance bill in June 1973, similar to the administration bill introduced in 1971.
His motivation was clear: 1) assure the public that the administration had a strong
proposal on health care, and 2) demonstrate that the administration was not paralyzed by
the consuming Watergate affair.103 Given the variety of other NHI plans introduced in the
Ninety-third Congress, the administration needed its own plan to have a place at the
bargaining table.104
In November and December 1973, Secretary Weinberger finalized the
administration’s NHI bill. Congressional Republicans believed that NHI would be a
congressional priority in 1974, and an administration bill was deemed necessary to

100

Ibid., 122; Mayes, Universal Coverage, 88; Gordon, Dead on Arrival, 33; Flint J. Walness, “The Ways
and Means of National Health Care Reform, 1974 and Beyond,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and
Law 24, no. 2 (April 1999), 307.

101

“The Health Insurance Debate,” Washington Post, May 26, 1974, C6.

102

“Insuring National Health,” Newsweek, June 3, 1974, 73.

103

Walness, “The Ways and Means of National Health Care Reform,” 312–313.

104

Quadagno, One Nation Uninsured, 120.

172

provide balance to the other bills, some like the HIAA bill as viewed as extreme by
many. After meeting with Nixon on December 8, 1973, Weinberger received Nixon’s
endorsement of the revised DHEW bill and agreed that NHI would be a priority for the
administration’s legislative agenda in 1974.105
The House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment conducted hearings on NHI from December 10–14, 1973. Rather than focus
on the specific bills, the committee focused on background issues, including the health of
Americans, equality of access, manpower needs, and health care costs. A variety of
witnesses indicated that any NHI bill would not necessarily solve the health care
problems of Americans.106
During the 1973 State of the Union address, Nixon shared his proposals for NHI,
and on February 6, 1974, Nixon sent a special health care message to Congress, with the
new administration bill (S. 2970, H.R. 12684), the Comprehensive Health Insurance Plan
(CHIP). CHIP contained an employer mandate, funded by employer-employee
contributions, and these plans would be administered by insurance companies. Though
employers would pay the bulk of the premium cost, the plan allowed employees to
participate voluntarily. The Assisted Health Insurance Plan (AHIP), part of CHIP, would
contract with insurance companies to provide health insurance to the poor, similar to the
benefits received by employees. Medicare would be revised, and states would control the
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CHIP program. Compared to the 1971 administration bill, more people would be
covered, with greater benefits.107
On April 2, 1974, Senator Kennedy and Representative Mills introduced a
compromise bill, developed in secret.108 They proposed an employer-mandated,
comprehensive set of benefits, with a payroll tax to finance premiums, a significant
administrative role for private insurers, and deductible and co-pays for individuals.
Believing that the insurance industry was powerful enough to block any NHI legislation,
Kennedy had retreated from his original position of denying insurance companies a role
in NHI.109
The reaction to the Kennedy-Mills bill was swift and across-the-board negative.
The AMA deemed the new proposal socialistic, and the CNHI denounced the bill because
of the extensive role of insurance companies and because the requirement of deductibles
and co-pays would be difficult for low- and middle-income families.110 Organized labor,
including the AFL-CIO, told its members to press for a “no” vote. Given Watergate,
organized labor believed that Democrats would make great gains in the November
election, and a single-payer system would prevail.111 The National Council of Senior
Citizens also refused to endorse the Kennedy-Mills proposal.112
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Activity to achieve NHI increased considerably. Nixon, in a May 20, 1974 radio
address, again emphasized the importance and priority for passage of health care
legislation. On May 22, Senator Kennedy announced that he was willing to work with the
administration. The following month, Vice-President Ford called upon labor to
compromise and predicted a bill would pass.113 Moreover, Secretary Weinberger began
negotiations with Kennedy and Mills. On May 3, 1974, formal hearings for NHI began in
the House Ways and Means Committee and continued through July 9, 1974. By the end
of the Ways and Means hearings in July 1974, enthusiasm had dampened, given the
impending impeachment of President Nixon, the potential cost of NHI on an already
inflation-ridden nation, and other legislative matters before the committee.114
On August 8, 1974, Nixon resigned the presidency. Four days later, in his first
address to Congress and the nation, President Ford requested that a national health
insurance bill be passed during the Ninety-third Congress. He supported a compromise
between the various sponsors of health care legislation and believed that a comprehensive
health insurance plan was necessary for the country. He asked, “Why don’t we write—
and I ask this with the greatest spirit of cooperation—a good health bill on the statute
books before this Congress adjourns?”115
Believing that an NHI bill was possible, the Ways and Means Committee held
sessions from August 19–21, 1974, during which the committee marked up a compromise
bill put together by the Ways and Means staff members—at Mills’ direction—which
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attempted to create a compromise, drawing on previous proposals. Most similar to the
Nixon administration CHIP plan, the compromise proposal provided comprehensive
benefits; mandated employer-employee coverage, funded using private insurance
premiums largely paid by employers’ increased payroll taxes; implemented similar state
programs for the self-employed and poor; and provided for administration by federal and
state governments. The proposed bill also provided a role for insurance companies—a
contentious issue for many—and gave subsidies for the poor. Medicaid and Medicare
would be folded into this new program, and all Americans would receive catastrophic
coverage.116
The committee met in a public session, with administration officials and
representatives from other interest groups present. Votes on all major aspects of the bill
were affirmative, with agreement on the comprehensive benefits, the employer-employee
mandate, and the health plan for the poor. However, on August 21, 1974, Chairman Mills
declared an end to the mark-up process. Given the close 13–12 vote on how to finance
NHI and rejection of the voluntary approach with a 12–12 vote, Mills believed there were
not enough votes for the compromise bill to prevail in the house.
On that same day, Representatives James Corman (D-CA) and Griffiths met with
the Ways and Means staff in an attempt to forge a compromise.117 Though Mills met with
President Ford after Ways and Means ended the mark-up session and indicated that a
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health care bill was still possible after the November elections, no other action was taken
during the Ninety-third Congress.118
As predicted by the labor organizations, Democrats prevailed in the November
elections, gaining fifty-four representatives and three senators. Similar NHI bills were
submitted as the Ninety-fourth Congress convened. However, in his 1975 State of the
Union Address, President Ford declared that bills requiring new funding would be vetoed
because of the already rampant inflation. The House and Senate conducted hearings
during 1975 and 1976, but no bill was submitted for consideration. By the end of 1976,
national health insurance remained a dream that would not be realized for many years.

Why NHI Failed—Politics and Ideological Differences
The period from 1970 to 1974 was an active though unsuccessful period for
passage of NHI, and scholars have suggested a variety of explanations to explain why
NHI failed. The most frequent explanations involve 1) the need to control spiraling costs
as a result of runaway inflation that outweighed the need to assist the uninsured; 2) the
intransigence of major labor organizations; and 3) the control of key resources by major
interest groups who opposed NHI, such as the HIAA and AMA. A less mentioned though
important explanation is the idea of commitment to the private health insurance sector.
The existing national policy of private health insurance as the primary way to provide
health care set an important and defining precedent for any future policy that required a
shift to significant government role.
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Given the spiraling costs of Medicare and Medicaid and the high levels of
inflation during this period, containing health care costs remained a priority and a key
reason for the failure of NHI. Laham summed this up, stating:
The health care cost crisis complicated efforts to establish NHI during the
1970s for two reasons. First, by raising patient utilization of health care,
especially among the poor and uninsured, the program threatened to drive
up health care costs, in addition to inflation. Second, to the extent that
public insurance coverage would have been expanded, the program
promised to boost the federal deficit.119
Providing comprehensive insurance to all Americans required the development of
additional health care resources, such as physicians, nurses, and hospital beds to be
funded by the federal government through general revenue. Mills, a proponent of NHI
but also fiscally conservative, believed that health care costs could be contained only by
funding with payroll taxes, not general revenue.120 More importantly,
. . . through taxation, Mills . . .[was] able to sell various economic and
social programs within the nation’s anti-statist culture. As chairman of a
tax-writing committee, Mills perceived the relevance of taxation to both
social welfare and economic policy . . . the agenda centered around
contributory, wage related social insurance. . .121
During the meetings of the Ways and Means Committee in August 1974, the issue of how
to finance health care expansion and the consequences of that expansion for the federal
budget were clear. Some members supported increased payroll taxes; whereas, other
committee members wanted to utilize the general revenue. Likely, lack of resolution of
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this issue led to Mills’ decision to abandon pursuing completion of the compromise bill
with the full House.
Finally, the need to control costs undercut efforts to serve the uninsured. The
rising costs of health care jeopardized middle class incomes. Rather than campaign for
the purist approach that provided comprehensive care to all, a moderate position of
insuring basic services for all was not utilized since the middle class would have paid the
price.122 Middle class support for any social bill was a critical element for Congress and
for Mills.
The intransigence of labor contributed a second major reason for the failure of
NHI during this period. Organized labor—both the UAW and AFL-CIO—had supported
the Health Security Act, the single-payer program, since the bill’s introduction by the
CNHI in 1969. This program, which did not include a role for insurance companies,
would provide union members and other workers comprehensive benefits at no cost to
individuals or companies. Enactment of this plan by the federal government would
reduce corporate costs and open up the possibility of negotiating future pay increases and
other benefits for union members.
This lack of compromise was especially poignant in April 1974 when the MillsKennedy bill was introduced. Labor rejected the proposal outright and withdrew support
for NHI for the remainder of the Ninety-third Congress. Compromise on breadth of
coverage and population coverage was not an integral part of labor’s health care
strategy.123
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Third, the power of major interest groups played an important role in NHI’s
demise in this period. A large number of competing NHI bills were introduced from 1970
to 1974, and finding a political compromise among those bills proved difficult, given
their vast differences, which ranged from a program totally run by the government with
no role for private insurance to a voluntary program using tax credits as an incentive.
These differences reflected the ideological concerns of their sponsors, and sponsoring an
NHI bill also guaranteed that group a place at the negotiating table. The opponents of a
strong NHI program were numerous, and all—including the AMA, AHA, HIAA, NAM,
and CCUS—had extensive resources, largely monetary, at their disposal to defeat an NHI
bill not to their liking. These groups maintained critical linkages to members of Congress.
For example, the Medicredit bill had 182 sponsors, including over half of the House
membership.124 Public relations campaigns, financed by these organizations, focused on
ideology and specific issues with the health care proposals. These campaigns influenced
constituent and public opinion, which, in turn, influenced congressional opinion.
Throughout the 1971 to 1974 period, numerous articles appeared in major news
papers and magazines supporting or not supporting NHI. Radio addresses by political
leaders, such as President Nixon and Senator Kennedy, kept NHI in the limelight
focusing on their particular ideology.. Organized labor held a major rally, ran newspaper
ads, and created a national speakers bureau to support the HSA bill and emphasize the
right of citizens to health care. When the Mills-Kennedy compromise bill was introduced
in April, 1974, organized labor mobilized their members to oppose it, largely on
ideological grounds that the bill denied the right to health care because the bill contained
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co-pays and deductibles. The AMA and HIAA maintained pressure on Members of
Congress to support their bills as a way to maintain the free enterprise system and deny
the beginnings of socialized medicine, and the AMA encouraged members to contribute
to President Nixon’s campaign fund in 1972 even though the AMA opposed Nixon’s
HMO proposal. 125
Finally, the precedent of an employer-based system, created in the 1930s and
backed by federal laws and collective bargaining, reinforced retaining this type of
insurance system. Policy precedent had been set. By the 1970s, health insurance was a
combination of public and private initiatives, though the public sector only provided
health care to the most vulnerable Americans. Over 90 percent of the population had
some type of health insurance, though few had comprehensive coverage and many
remained underinsured. How to change this complicated system of health insurance
stymied both opponents and proponents of government involvement in health care.126
Support for any one approach remained elusive.
While Kennedy, Griffiths, labor, and a variety of other reformers urged passage of
the Health Security Act, which denied any role for health insurance companies, this bill
did not command a majority. According to a report by the Nixon administration, only five
members of Ways and Means and thirty-one members of the Senate supported the act.127
The other health care bills incorporated an important role for the insurance industry,
although the HIAA bill itself had fewer sponsors than the Health Security Act.
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Throughout this period, a variety of NHI bills engaged the attention of Congress,
major interest groups, and the public emerged. There were clear differences between the
particulars of each bill, such as the comprehensiveness of benefits, funding, and the roles
of the government and the private sector. Underlying those differences were conflicting
ideologies regarding how health care and any form of national insurance should function.
Many of the key politicians and major groups believed that health care was a
right, consistent with the advocacy for rights during this period in U.S. history, but how
that right would be attained was a function of deeply held ideologies about America and
the roles of society and government with respect to health care.
Other politicians believed that health care was an individual responsibility,
consistent with individualism. Individualism could be best attained by ensuring the
success of the free enterprise system that supported private sector insurance and a limited
role for government.
A clash of ideologies regarding health care and universal coverage existed since
national health insurance became a goal of many disparate groups and individuals. At no
time in U.S. history has that clash of ideologies been more apparent than it was during the
1970–1974 period when key politicians and major and powerful interest groups offered a
variety of contrasting legislation that presented their views of how health care and health
insurance should function.
Clearly, groups with financial resources—such as the AMA, NAM, and HIAA—
had an advantage in that they could mount a public relations campaign and extend their
influence with Congress. But those groups and the bills they endorsed had significant
support not only because of the particulars of the bill but because of the underlying
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ideologies in them. The conflicting ideologies that clashed during this period remain the
untold story of the search for universal health care coverage during this important and
active period in the political history of the United States.
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Chapter 5
U.S. Ideology of Health Care
The large number and variety of U.S. Congressional NHI bills introduced in the
92nd and 93rd Congress from 1970 to 1973 by a wide variety of key national organizations
clearly demonstrate how NHI became an important priority for Congress and the Nixon
administration. With rare exception, President Nixon, Congress, powerful interest groups,
and the cultural leaders writing in the various media supported some form of health care
reform and NHI. An examination of the congressional hearings and other sources finds
few opponents of NHI; only three major national groups failed to support any form of
NHI: the American Association of Surgeons and Physicians, the National Association of
Independent Businessmen, and the Physician’s Health Congress.1
Oral and written testimony provided by administration officials, members of
Congress, and prominent interest group leaders reveals common elements within the
various congressional bills. Each major bill supported by the administration or major
interest group contained a specific view of health care. Testimony included information
and particular views regarding the breadth and depth of health insurance coverage,
accessibility to services, cost, and quality of medical care. Strategies and programs
focused on how delivery of care could be improved in order to ensure greater
accessibility, lower cost, and better quality. Along with how health care reform could be
financed, these programs and strategies contained solutions for providing additional
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coverage to citizens who lacked any form of health insurance or had only partial
coverage, which was a significant problem during this period. Within the oral and written
testimonies of hundreds of organizations and individuals with respect to the problems and
strategies, various ideologies regarding NHI are evident.
Particular and vibrant ideological themes emerged in the testimony of major
interest groups and political leaders. These themes included whether a right to health care
existed and how that right could be realized, the role of pluralism—governmental and
through the private sector—in the U.S. health care system, the freedom to choose
providers and insurance plans, methods to control costs and improve quality,
restructuring of the system to provide greater access to services, and public and private
sector methods for financing health care. NHI was not simply about providing coverage
for all Americans; rather, NHI concerned why and how the health care system needed to
be changed and the role of universal coverage as part of the solution.
To examine all forty-four bills or the major bills introduced during this period to
determine their underlying ideologies would be time-consuming, though ultimately a
productive and rewarding task that would provide a complete picture of the similarities
and differences of the bills and their ideologies. A more prudent strategy is to examine
President Nixon’s legislative proposals and selected bills developed by and having
support of major interest groups and significant numbers of congressional members in
order to determine whether major “ world views” existed. It will then be possible to
describe, analyze, and compare the nature of those ideological views regarding health
care. For the purposes of this study, ‘world view’ is defined simply as a broad set of
ideological principles shared among various groups and/or individuals.
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The major bills during this period included the Nixon administration’s two bills—
the 1971 National Health Insurance Partnership Act (NHIPA) and the 1973
Comprehensive Health Insurance Act (CHIP); organized labor’s 1971 and 1973 Health
Security Act (HSA); the American Medial Association’s (AMA) 1971 and 1973 Medical
Care Act (Medicredit); the Health Insurance Association of America’s (HIAA) 1970,
1971, and 1973 Health Care Act; the Mills-Kennedy 1974 Comprehensive National
Health Insurance Act (CNHIA); and the 1972 and 1972 National Health Reorganization
and Financing Act (NHRFA). Versions of these bills changed little from year to year. The
AMA’s Medicredit bill enjoyed the most support in Congress, with 182 sponsors, largely
Republicans and southern Democrats who held to a conservative fiscal and government
role view. The HSA bill had the second highest level of support, with 64 sponsors
(northern Democrats) by 1974. Major business organizations, such as the United States
Chamber of Commerce (USCC) and the National Association of Manufacturers
supported the Nixon administration bills and the HIAA bill. Social service organizations
generally supported either labor’s HSA bill or the Kennedy-Mills compromise.
A review of the various major bills reveals two major world views, differentiated
clearly along the ideological dimensions of the right to health care, pluralism and the role
of government, freedom of choice, and health care financing. Two other ideological
dimensions—cost and quality improvement, and restructuring of the health care system—
show significantly more similarity than differences between the various bills.
Two major ideological schools emerged regarding NHI. The liberal ideology—
championed by Senator Edward Kennedy and supported by the AFL-CIO, the UAW,
major churches, and various social services organizations—focused on health care as a
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right with barrier-free access, significant limits on choices for all stakeholders, an
expansive and central federal government role, and payroll taxes as the major financing
mechanism. This liberal view also proposed solutions to cost and quality issues and
described how the health care system needed to be restructured.2 A conservative
ideology—supported by the Nixon administration, the HIAA, the American Hospital
Association (AHA), the United States Chamber of Commerce (USCC), the National
Association of Manufacturers (NAM), and the AMA—focused on improved access to
healthcare, few limitations on choices for all key groups, a broad role of the private sector
with limited responsibilities for the federal government, and financing using the private
sector and general revenue.3 The conservative group also proposed numerous solutions to
lowering cost and improving quality.
An examination of each world view ideology provides specifics regarding key
ideological elements that clearly differentiated them: access to healthcare and health care
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as a right, pluralism and the role of government, the nature of choice, and financing.
Similarities in how proponents of each world view would deal with system restructuring
completes the discussion. The nature of the problem of U.S. health care, offered by the
major groups, will provide a background for understanding the basis for the relevant
ideological themes. Finally, how the critical elements affected the last opportunity to
achieve NHI in 1974, during the mark-up of an NHI bill in the Ways and Means
Committee during the first days of the Ford presidency, will be provided to demonstrate
the importance of ideology in the health care debates.

Nature of the Health Care Problem
Understanding and interpretation of the nature and intensity of health care
problems differed significantly. The liberal camp’s position, found in the testimony of
organized labor representatives and Senator Edward Kennedy, placed health care in a
state of crisis, fixable only by a redesign of the existing system. The conservative view
ranged from that of health care being in a state of crisis to the less critical conviction that
important problems needed to be addressed, and all of the major groups representing the
conservative ideology—President Nixon, the HIAA, the AMA, and the AHA—believed
that the problems could be solved by improving the existing system rather than by a
complete redesign.
According to testimony provided by Leonard Woodcock, president of the UAW,
and George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, numerous crises existed. Costs had
increased two times the consumer price index, using 7 percent of the GNP. The system
was wasteful, archaic, nonproductive, of poor quality, and lacking any incentives to
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improve. Because of disorganized services and a severe physician shortage, especially of
primary care doctors, services were frequently unavailable for many, especially in inner
city and rural areas. The number of noninsured and underinsured remained at
unacceptable levels, levels which led to unacceptable cost increases and human suffering.
Health care outcomes, such as infant mortality and life expectancy, were significantly
worse in the U.S. than in other industrialized countries and especially severe among
minorities. The nature and intensity of these problems, expressed by organized labor,
were not that dissimilar to the views expressed by the conservative camp, with the
exception of the AMA and the HIAA, which acknowledged the existence of only some of
these problems and did not interpret them as crises.4
In his February 18, 1971 message to Congress, President Nixon outlined the
medical crisis that existed, including cost increases from $63 billion to $70 billion in the
past 12 months; a 170 percent rise in costs from 1960; and federal spending of $21 billion
or 30 percent of the health care spending in 1970, compared with $3.5 billion or
13 percent of the health care spending in 1960. President Nixon noted that 60 percent of
the rise in health care costs resulted from medical inflation, which was increasing at two
times the rate of the consumer price index, while hospital cost inflation was at five times
the rate of the consumer price index. Inflation meant fewer dollars available to provide
additional health services.
Over the years, the increased spending on health care yielded positive results.
Many individuals received more and higher quality care as a result of new drugs,
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facilities, and medical techniques, while the number of disabled days for workers
continued to drop. Life expectancy showed improvement, along with other macro health
indicators, such as infant mortality. However, many still could not afford health care, and
even the rich had little or no immunity from a catastrophic illness or injury. There was
relatively little health care available in rural areas and inner cities, and the quality of care
varied by region and income. Receiving care on short notice was difficult, given the
inadequate supply of primary care physicians and outpatient facilities. A lack of focus on
prevention led to more sickness and intensive treatments, which ultimately cost more.
The country, while investing more dollars in health care, received less than its fair
value—that is, better health for all Americans in exchange for that investment.5
President Nixon believed that these deleterious conditions required change. “[I]f
we are to fulfill our promise as a nation,” Nixon stated, “[g]ood health care should be
readily available to all of our citizens.”6 Nixon attributed the declining death rate to the
10 percent growth in U.S. productivity; that is, as citizens lived longer, their increased
longevity contributed to the country’s expanding economy. Society had an economic
stake in the health of all its citizens. Providing health care for each individual served the
interests of society and fulfilled an important responsibility of government.7 In 1974,
Nixon pointed out systemic problems similar to those he noted in 1971; little had
changed. Access remained a serious problem in that 10 percent of U.S. citizens lacked
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any type of health insurance, and 40 percent lacked insurance covering physician office
visits, which Nixon believed created an incentive to use hospital services, a major
contributor to rising health care costs. Less than 50 percent of health insurance programs
covered catastrophic illnesses, which affected many elderly people.8 The health care
system needed restructuring using the resources of the public and private sector.
The AHA cited problems similar to those described by the Nixon administration,
viewing health care as a crisis. Foremost, services and manpower resources, using a
greater infusion of government funds, required significant expansion combined with a
more effective and productive use of existing resources. Cities and rural areas needed
attention. The habits of providers and consumers required significant modification to
focus more on prevention and cost consciousness. Quality remained a concern, along
with a high priority for reducing costs and breaking the inflationary trend of health care.
For the AHA, the federal government would take the lead in providing a framework for a
rationally staged program that required the commitment, time, and adjustments on the
part of all parties who were participants in or influenced the health care system.9
The HIAA agreed that the problems described by President Nixon and the AHA
existed, such as cost inflation, lack of sufficient providers and services, supply
distribution in inner city and rural areas, and inappropriate levels of hospitalization, but
these issues, they agreed, must be solved by building on the strengths of the system with
minimal federal involvement. The system was not in a state of crisis. The HIAA believed
that great progress had been made in covering more Americans, with 92 percent having
8
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some form of hospital insurance and 41 percent having some form of medical insurance
by 1974. To counter a frequent congressional criticism, the HIAA reported that insurance
companies did not make excessive profits, with an 8 percent administrative cost and
profit margins on many plans at only 2 percent, clearly not unwarranted according to the
HIAA. Finally, countering the charge that insurance covered only one-third of the cost of
health care, the HIAA claimed that over 90 percent of Americans had 50 percent of their
costs covered. Clearly, the health insurance industry’s message was that they acted in the
best interest of all citizens and would continue to do so.10
The AMA generally agreed that some major problems existed, but it insisted that
health care was not in a crisis state. Significant progress had been achieved in health care,
it pointed out. People lived longer, wounds mended faster, genetic defects were
diagnosed sooner, new vaccines were created sooner, infant mortality had been
dramatically reduced, and less time was required to train new physicians, which resulted
in an increasing number of new physicians each year. Dr. Parrott, chair of the AMA
Board of Directors, painted a very positive picture of the state of the nation’s health, quite
a different portrait than that drawn by the Nixon administration, the AHA, and the HIAA.
“On balance,” Parrot said, “we have a medical system with impressive accomplishments,
a system that is flexible and innovative, a system responsive to the need for change, and
improvement . . . the AMA strongly urges that you [committee] build on the very real
strengths that now exist.”11
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The AMA expressed concern that a significant portion of American citizens did
not share in the overall national affluence and advances in business, industry, education,
social welfare, and other positive elements of American life. Most importantly, separate
programs for the poor and disabled versus working Americans were unacceptable; one
health care system, both affordable and comprehensive, it believed, must exist for all
Americans.12
Major problems that remained included the lack of sufficient providers and
services in rural and inner city areas. Cost inflation, the AMA claimed, was the result of
hospitals, not physicians. Physician quality improvements and cost reductions showed
improvement as a result of physicians monitoring their own work. Most importantly, the
AMA believed that only two of three problems of health care—cost, quality, and
access—could be achieved at the same time given limited financial resources, and
improving access while emphasizing prevention and wellness were two major goals to
improve U.S. healthcare.13
In summary, the perceptions of the state of U.S. health care ranged from it being
in a state of crisis that required a complete restructuring of the health care system and
major improvements in the public-private partnership to it simply having problems that
could be solved by making adjustments to the existing system. All major parties agreed
that solving the existing health care problems would require government and privatesector participation, and that the roles of the public and private sector depended, in part,
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on whether health care was a right and, if so, how that right could be realized for all
Americans.

Right to Health Care Ideological World View
The liberal ideological world view, exemplified in the Health Security Act,
argued strongly that “ . . . health care was a right and necessity, not a luxury,” and
according to Leonard Woodcock, President of the UAW, “promotion of the general
welfare is one of the purposes for which this nation was created.”14 Religious groups—
such as the U.S. Catholic Conference, the National Council of Churches, Lutheran
Council, United Church of Christ, United Presbyterian Church, and the National Council
of Jewish Women—agreed that the provision of health care was a basic human right and
that government’s role was to ensure that right. To achieve that end, health care must be
universal, comprehensive, accessible, and ensure effective cost controls, and no barriers,
from means tests to deductibles, should prevent adequate health care. Many of the
religious organizations voiced general support for the Health Security Act, though
support for some of the specifics of the bill was not uniform among these groups.15
Under the HSA, all Americans, rich and poor alike, would be eligible for a
comprehensive array of services, including prevention, treatment, rehabilitation, and
maintenance.16 Health care services would be provided when needed, and health care
would not become a financial burden to people when they changed jobs or had pre-
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existing health conditions. To ensure this right, health care would have to remain constant
over one’s lifetime and provide health security for all.17
HSA advocates believed that their bill was the only truly universal bill because by
its provisions all Americans would be enrolled automatically in a program designed and
run by the federal government.18 Participation did not depend on whether or not
employers offered the program or if employees or others had the resources to voluntarily
pay for insurance. An inclusive program would ensure the right to health care and
importantly, it would reduce health care costs. All citizens would have immediate access
to the same array of health care services, with no barriers.
Many barriers to participation would be eliminated to ensure the right to health
care. Choice to participate was eliminated; participation was mandatory. Those with preexisting or catastrophic conditions would not be exempt from health insurance. Financial
barriers to health care would be eliminated, including the elimination of means testing for
the poor and working poor and no additional premiums for those with pre-existing or
catastrophic conditions.19 The HSA proponents believed that co-pays and deductibles
created barriers to access for those with limited means and, as such, prevented citizens
from realizing their right to health care. Further, co-pays and deductibles did not create
cost savings; rather, they increased costs. Denying access using deductibles and co-pays
resulted in people accessing the health care system when they were sicker, thus using

17

House, Committee on Ways and Means, “On the Subject of National Health Insurance,” 93rd Congress,
2 sess., 3493.
nd

18 18

Ibid., 3493; House, Committee on Ways and Means, “On the Subject of National Health Insurance
Proposals,” 92nd Congress, 1st sess., 515–517.

19

Ibid., 3493; House, Committee on Ways and Means, “On the Subject of National Health Insurance
Proposals,” 92nd Congress, 1st sess., 517.

195

more health care resources and leading to higher costs. To ensure that all citizens
accessed health care services in the early stages of illness, co-pays and deductibles had to
be eliminated.20
To ensure that elderly and poor Americans had access to services similar to other
citizens and that their equal right to health care was assured, Medicare benefits would
need to be expanded to include those offered by both comprehensive programs, and the
elderly would participate in the universal HSA programs. Most importantly, the federalstate Medicaid program would be eliminated, since the level of Medicaid benefits
provided and the requirements for Medicaid eligibility differed by state. Different state
requirements prevented poor Americans from gaining full access and comprehensive
benefits that other Americans, including the elderly, would receive. The right to
comprehensive health care, HSA advocates stressed, extended to all citizens.21
The conservative worldview emphasized that citizens should have equal access to
health care, but not an unqualified right to health care. President Nixon stated that the
federal government had a “special responsibility to help ensure that all citizens had equal
access, as had been done with education, voting, and work opportunities.”22 But access
meant simply that people would have only a greater opportunity to purchase health
insurance provided by private industry. This was an individualistic voluntary approach
designed to preserve the role of the private sector, reinforce the value of individualism,
and preserve freedom of choice.
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President Nixon’s 1973 NHIPA program would improve access by mandating
that employers offer health insurance that provided a minimum set of benefits for all
workers. Employees were free to participate or not participate in the employer programs.
For the poor, Medicaid would be eliminated, and a new program would be implemented
that provided the poor with a standard set of benefits, fewer benefits, however, than those
offered by employers. The poor would obtain health insurance from the private sector,
with premiums subsidized by federal and state governments.23 Nixon’s 1974 CHIP
program mandated that all employers offer health insurance, with voluntary participation
by employees. However, the CHIP bill’s benefit package for the poor would be the same
as for employees, and participation by the poor was voluntary.24
Under the Nixon administration bills, access improved in two ways. First,
virtually all citizens would have an opportunity to purchase health insurance because
employers were required to offer insurance and insurance would be available to the poor.
Second, benefit packages would be comprehensive for all in the CHIP bill. Benefit
packages included deductibles and co-pays as a way to reduce cost and prevent
inappropriate overutilization of services.25
Another advocate of the conservative world view, the AHA, seemingly
acknowledged the inherent right to health care, but similar to Nixon’s proposals, that
right was simply a right to access. To ensure the right to access quality care, the AHA
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proposed a three-part plan. First, employers would be required to provide the Medicare
level of coverage for their employees through the private sector, with expanded benefits
after 4 years, and individuals and self-employed persons would be able to obtain the same
level of benefits as in the employer plan. Medicare beneficiaries would see expanded
coverage with the merging of Parts A and B and the addition of catastrophic coverage.
Low-income individuals and families would have the same benefits as Medicare
beneficiaries, with plans for both groups administered by insurance companies under
state supervision. While coverage would be made available and access to health care
enhanced, participation by individuals was voluntary.26
The AMA also believed that “ . . . it is the basic right of every citizen to
have available to him adequate health care.”27 To achieve this goal, the AMA proposed a
national standard of benefits for all citizens; everyone would have access to a minimum
set of comprehensive benefits, including prevention, treatment, and catastrophic.
Employers would be required to provide pre-paid group practice, although employees
could opt out. Health insurance packages with the same minimum benefits required of all
health insurance policies would be affordable and available to the poor.28
To improve access for all citizens, the AMA proposed tax credits as an incentive
to participate in the program. Tax incentives, based on income, would provide an
opportunity to purchase a broad array of benefits, and the AMA asserted that tax credits
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were the most progressive way to fund a program. In the AMA view, payroll taxes under
a voluntary program were regressive and a deterrent to participation and access,
especially for low-income persons. It also proposed that Medicaid be eliminated since it
prevented equal access by the poor given the different state benefits and eligibility
requirements, and Medicare would remain intact with an expanded set of benefits.29 For
the AMA, access would be expanded through tax credits available to all.
The HIAA’s view of health care access, though expansive conceptually, remained
severely limited, since their proposal focused on a voluntary approach for all entities.
From an HIAA standpoint, “Every American should have access to quality health care
regardless of income, [and] comprehensive health services should be available to all
citizens regardless of ability to pay, subject to availability of services.”30 To achieve this
goal, the HIAA proposed a voluntary rather than mandatory expansion of employer
health insurance programs. Employers would be encouraged to offer health insurance
programs through tax incentives. Financial assistance to aid workers in purchasing
insurance and a comprehensive set of benefits would not be guaranteed, although
minimum standards for benefits would be established by the federal government.31
Since the poor had received the least amount of health care, the HIAA
recommended that attention be given to this group through development of state plans.
Medicaid would be eliminated, and the poor would be provided with subsidies from
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federal and state funds to purchase health insurance from the private sector. Medicare
would remain, with expanded benefits.32
All of the groups supporting a conservative ideology agreed that deductibles, copays, and means tests should remain mandatory. Deductibles and co-pays were incentives
to utilize the system appropriately and prudently, and they reduced costs.33 Means testing
would assure that people received subsidies based on need, which would also reduce
unnecessary costs. Neither the AMA, the AHA, the HIAA, nor Nixon administration
officials viewed deductibles, co-pays, and means tests as barriers to access; all were
necessary to lower costs and ensure appropriate access.
In summary, the liberal ideology, best expressed by the HSA bill, viewed health
care as a right, and the bill would create a program in which all citizens, regardless of
income, age, or other characteristics, would automatically be eligible to participate in this
universal and comprehensive program, with their health care right guaranteed by a
federally administered program paid by taxes, not premiums. All barriers to access would
be eliminated including means testing, deductibles, and co-pays. Conservatives qualified
this right by stating that it was the right to access, aided by cooperation between the
public and private sector, not the right to develop a federal program that eliminated the
private sector.
Conservative ideological proposals largely provided more opportunities for
access, such as employer mandates and elimination of the Medicaid program, but
universality was compromised. Access did not guarantee participation or universality,
32
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since numerous barriers existed for preventing citizens from participating. For example, a
lack of funds to pay for premiums might prevent participation, or an employee may opt
out of an employer plan, since those plans would be voluntary. The HIAA proposal did
not require employers to participate, thus limiting some workers’ choices to individual
policies, which were more expensive than group policies. The AMA plan, requiring
employer participation, offered only tax credits as an incentive to participate. Deductibles
and co-pays were seen as a cost-reduction necessity.
One item that all the various groups proposed was a minimum and comprehensive
set of benefits that emphasized prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation. If universal
health care coverage was enacted, a broader array of services would be available to all
citizens, compared to the emphasis on surgical care that existed at this time. Access to a
wider variety of services would be possible.
Evident in the discussion of the right to health care was the question of which
entity—government or the private sector—was most capable of ensuring the right to
health care and to improved access, and the specific roles one or both would perform.
This ideological conflict focused on the ability of the private sector and free enterprise
versus the federal government to strengthen the social safety net in a manner similar to
Social Security and Medicare programs.

Pluralism Versus a Government-Run Program
President Nixon and the major organizations representing the conservative view
uniformly believed that the right to access could best be achieved by utilizing the current
pluralistic system, with a variety of system improvements. Supporters of the HSA
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legislation believed that the pluralistic system had failed. They adamantly believed that
only a government-developed and -administered health care system could solve the many
problems facing U.S. citizens.
President Nixon noted that his proposed strategy in both the NHIPA and CHIP
bills would build on the strengths of the current system by creating effective centers of
public and private responsibility, which would maintain the pluralistic nature of the
American system. Government’s responsibility was to provide health care for the poor,
disabled, and elderly. The private sector was responsible for those in the labor force, and
only through the private sector could a diversity of heath care plans, free choice, and
competition be maintained. The public sector offered limited choices, if any at all.34
Nixon believed that the focus on the private sector was
based on the fundamentals of our political economy—capitalistic,
pluralistic, and competitive—as well as upon the desire to strengthen the
capability of our private institutions in their efforts to provide health
services, to finance such services, and to produce the resources that will be
needed in the years ahead.35
Elliott Richardson, secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(DHEW), supported the notion that the fundamental division of responsibilities between
the public and private sectors was “desirable, workable, and could serve as a basis for
improvement.”36 Specific responsibilities for the federal government included
promulgating regulations regarding minimum standards for coverage and benefits,
providing oversight, and operating programs for the aged. State responsibilities would
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include regulating insurance companies through the monitoring and enforcement of
federal regulations, and developing qualified plans for the poor.37
Richardson further argued that the private sector performed the most critical role
in the health care system. He charged that if health care were provided solely by a federal
system, as proposed in the Health Security Act, people would lose their choice regarding
how they paid for their health insurance. Creating a large federal system would lead to an
increasingly unresponsive bureaucracy, diseconomies of scale, and multiple problems of
coordination and communication. Most importantly, if only the government existed as the
health care provider, then consumers, employers, unions, and providers would lose any
stake in controlling costs. A system of federal control of costs would lead to federal
approval of hospital budgets, physician fees, and other steps, and eventually, the federal
government would dominate American health care.38 Finally, comparisons made by HSA
supporters to creating a health bureaucracy within the Social Security Administration
(SSA), similar to that created when the Social Security Act was enacted, were not
appropriate, according to Secretary Richardson. The SSA simply distributed money based
on formulas, a relatively easy task compared with the innumerable technical decisions
required in health care delivery and financing. The federal government lacked the
administrative capacity to take on such a task.39
The current system was attractive to the Nixon administration because it was a
known entity. Preserving the option for businesses to choose their own insurance
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providers ensured that businesses would choose those companies that provided the best
service. According to Casper Weinberger (who succeeded Elliot Richardson as Secretary
of DHEW after Richardson resigned in 1973 during the Watergate scandal), the basis of
the 1974 CHIP proposal was that it utilized the capacity of the health insurance industry
to provide services rather than implementing the “theory” contained in the Health
Security Act. For the Nixon administration, the private sector provided the most effective
means for making significant and solid progress.40
The HSA proposal, a government-run single-payer system similar to Canada’s
Medicare Program, was unknown and foreign to the U.S. way of implementing health
care, and its unknown quality remained a key criticism of the HSA proposal. A
partnership between the federal government, state governments, and the health insurance
industry would exploit the strengths of each entity. Both President Nixon and Secretary
Weinberger remained adamant that the federal government lacked the expertise and
capability to operate such a vast and complex program. 41
The AHA believed that the pluralistic system must be maintained with specific
and limited responsibilities for each of the federal and state governments and private
sector. Congress had a major responsibility to develop principles, goals, and
responsibilities as they pertained to the role of the federal and state governments and
program regulation. On a short-term basis, Congress must implement constraints on
wages and prices, along with immediate programs to control costs and improve quality,
for quality and cost improvements would lead to more comprehensive services. On a
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long-term basis, the federal government would serve as the catalyst for the changes
needed to control costs, improve quality, and regulate the health care industry through the
formation of a new federal agency.
A new Department of Health would develop minimum standards for health care
providers, similar to those mandated by the Medicare program, plus methods for
determining reasonable costs by institutions and providers. It would also establish the
basic level of benefits for all plans, including the scope of benefits, quality standards, and
comprehensiveness of services. Assurances would be obtained from the states to establish
a nationwide, uniform regulatory process. Finally, the federal responsibility would
include developing processes to coordinate all the various federal programs and voluntary
organizations providing health services, providing funds for health care corporations
(HCCs) and state regulatory control, and removing barriers to health care delivery.
Clearly, the AHA advocated a circumscribed role for the federal government, not the
creation of a monolithic bureaucratic system.42
State government would control regulation and planning. State health
commissions would review and monitor provider rates, premiums, and federally
determined benefits. Short- and long-term planning was most effectively accomplished at
the state level, given the diversity among communities, and such state-level planning
would ensure that a health care corporation—the AHA’s solution to fragmented and
uncoordinated care—was located in every major geographic area of the state. States
would receive federal funding based on federal approval of state plans to facilitate the
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organization, planning, development, and implementation of HCCs in all areas.43 State
health commissions would be responsible also for such tasks as maintaining a certificateof-need process, a rate-review process, and a prospective hospital budget-setting process,
and for ensuring provider compliance with the federal standards of quality, delivery, and
access.44 Again, a very circumscribed and specific role for state government would exist,
similar to that of the federal government.
The private sector would be responsible for the creation of the HCCs—not-forprofit community-based organizations providing comprehensive services to a defined
group in a defined geographical area, using a broad and synthesized group of providers.
Health care providers in a particular area would assume responsibility for meeting the
comprehensive needs of the community’s citizens. By more appropriately organizing
services and making them available to those in need, HCCs and the private sector would
become the basis for solving the access problem that existed in many rural and urban
areas. The HCC, formed by hospitals, doctors, or other health care providers, would
include important consumer representation on governing boards. Given the latitude in
planning and organization development, HCCs would be held accountable for
comprehensive, quality, and cost-effective services to the community.45 Financing this
new structure would require multiple sources, both public and private, rather than solely a

43

Ibid., 845–846.

44

Ibid., 848–849.

45

Ibid.

206

federally financed solution.46 For the AHA, each of the vital elements in the pluralistic
system of U.S. medicine would perform complementary roles.
The HIAA supported the conservative view that the current public-private system
required improvements, and the essential elements of the present pluralistic system
should be retained and reinforced, since a large monolithic and bureaucratic system
advocated by the HSA proposal would stifle innovation and flexibility. New programs
should be implemented only when unmet personal needs existed.47
The goal of the HIAA health care strategy—providing comprehensive health care
to more individuals—would be accomplished through three mechanisms involving
specific roles and responsibilities for the federal government, state government, and the
private sector. First, the federal government would establish minimum standards for
coverage, including acute, maintenance, preventative, and hospital care. Benefits would
be extensive, from eye care to dental to mental health. Standards would be phased in to
ensure the availability of facilities and providers and, thus, minimize the potential for
medical inflation. Second, private sector employers would provide health care insurance
plans on a voluntary basis, underwritten by private insurers, Blue Cross and Blue Shield
plans, and other prepaid group practice plans. Third, states would establish qualified
plans to provide coverage to persons in the low-income group and those with serious
conditions. State plans for these groups would be subsidized by state and federal funds,
and individual and family premiums would be based on ability to pay. State plans for the
poor would be administered by private insurance carriers, with premiums regulated by
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the state. Medicaid would be replaced, and other than a simple report of the prior year’s
income, no means test would be used. Medicare would remain essentially the same.48
The HIAA believed that this approach required only a small tax burden on
citizens, as the plan would utilize the strengths of the present system and minimize
federal involvement. Excessive government participation would lead to inflation and
higher taxes in health care, both sapping funds needed to deal with other societal
problems concerning the environment, cities, and poverty—problems that needed to be
addressed and resolved if the nation’s health were to improve. Transferring health care’s
burden to the federal government would be a tremendous tax burden; produce a system of
many unknowns; and remove the choice for many, except the wealthy, to select both
insurers and physicians.49
Regulation of the HIAA proposal would require little federal regulatory
involvement, since the present state regulatory system was sufficient, given its flexibility,
systems, and specificity regarding health insurers. However, the health insurance industry
noted that two areas—overutilization and overcharging—required additional regulatory
work by the health insurance industry, in concert with hospitals and physician groups, not
the federal or state governments. Physician medical societies and peer reviews were two
methods of dealing with overcharging by physicians. Overutilization, a major cause of
rising health care costs, was more difficult to control since anti-trust regulations
prevented insurance companies from examining this problem on a macro basis where
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critical information would be available.50 Clearly, the private sector could work together
to solve these problems without government involvement.
For the HIAA, the only choice for Congress was either building on the pluralistic
private insurance system or creating a large monolithic federal system. Believing that the
health insurance industry had a long record of accomplishments and significant potential,
the HIAA proposal best served Americans by providing comprehensive coverage while
preserving the freedom of employers and employees to choose whether they wanted
health insurance and by minimizing government involvement.
The AMA provided the most circumscribed role for the federal and state
governments, largely because Medicredit was not a comprehensive approach to the
plethora of health care problems; rather, Medicredit was an approach that improved
access and provided comprehensive services for all Americans.51 Other problems such as
resource development and allocation would be resolved using other legislation. The
AMA’s president, Max Parrott, chairman of the AMA Board of Trustees, believed that
. . . on balance, we have a medical system with impressive
accomplishments, a system that is flexible and innovative, a system
responsive to the need for change, and improvement . . . the AMA
strongly urges that you [committee] build on the very real strengths that
now exist.52
According to the AMA, the pluralistic health care system worked and responded well to
changing conditions, rising costs, and new needs, and pluralism was an inherent part of
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the American way of life and a key principle in any reform of the health care system.53
The Medicredit bill, essentially a health care financing bill, would require the federal
government to set minimum standards for benefits, provide funds to the poor to purchase
health insurance basis, and create a tax credit program for health care.54 The private
sector, through employers, would be required to offer mandatory health insurance
programs for their employees, using the minimum standard of benefits developed by the
federal government. State roles in planning and regulation would remain the same since
the health care system functioned well.
Finally, the Kennedy-Mills compromise bill, NCHIA, sought a program that
would draw on the strengths of both the private and public sector but create a broad role
for the federal government.55 This comprehensive, federally administered program,
similar to Medicare, would establish the benefits structure and develop conditions of
participation for all providers, similar to the Medicare program. States would be
responsible for ensuring that all providers comply with the standards of participation. An
additional federal responsibility would include the establishment of a Health Resources
Board that would ensure the availability of services throughout the country.56
The insurance industry would perform a role only as intermediaries, similar to
their role under Medicare, and insurance companies would compete for federal contracts.
The administrative task of a national program would be huge, given that the entire
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population would participate. By allowing insurance companies to provide their
administrative expertise, bureaucracy would not increase substantially. Inclusion of the
insurance industry, an anathema to organized labor, was a major reason for the loss of
organized labor’s support for this compromise bill.57
For conservatives, the pluralistic system could be revamped to provide additional
access, enhanced quality, and reduced cost, with specific roles for the federal
governments, states, and the private sector. The private sector functioned well and
demonstrated success in a variety of ways. For those supporting the liberal HSA
legislation, however, the pluralistic system had failed in all areas, and only a governmentdesigned and -administered system could correct the myriad problems and ensure all
American citizens the right to comprehensive, low-cost, and high-quality health.
HSA supporters believed that health care was a right and necessity for all
Americans but that it had not and could not be achieved because the public-private
system led to fragmentation and the inability to provide effective health care for all. The
public-private system, which had existed for over 30 years and been supported in its
development by the major labor unions, was unable to integrate all the various providers
under a unity of purpose, and it failed to become a major force in dealing with the health
care crisis. Only a federalized national system could supply consistent objectives to bring
order out of the present chaos; patchwork systems suggested by other proposals would
not be effective. Only a national system could reform the U.S. health care system so it
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could provide health care for all and promote the general welfare, which UAW President
Woodcock had argued was “one of the purposes for which this nation was created.”58
The HSA would be evolutionary both in system design and financing. The federal
single-payer program, financed by the private and public sectors through a variety of
taxes, would provide comprehensive services to all. The success of the Social Security
program demonstrated that the public would accept such a government system, and the
administrative capacity existed within the government to administer a national system,
given the positive experience of the U.S. Medicare program.59
The HSA national single-payer program would end all barriers to medical care,
while at the same time providing financial incentives for providers to lower cost and
improve quality. Costs would be reduced because there would be no need to check
individual eligibility since all persons were covered and providers would only have one
form to request payment, thus reducing duplication and waste. A national program would
create new opportunities for planning and cost reductions with economies-of-scale, and it
would provide opportunities for quality improvements, which fragmented programs could
not attain without implementation of a coherent national health policy. Most importantly,
the HSA would provide national accountability in all of its operations. Though the price
tag was significant, the HSA would require no additional funds; a rechanneling of all the
monies currently spent on U.S. health care—federal and private sources alike—would be
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sufficient to fund the program. Over time, ordinary citizens would spend less on health
care because all expenses would be covered without deductibles or co-insurance.60
The program, administered by a Health Security Board within DHEW, would
have a broad set of responsibilities, many of which would be delegated to regional
offices. The Board would be responsible for policy, development, and control of a
national health care budget, and for development of national quality standards and cost
control systems. To enhance resource development, 2 percent of the overall funds
budgeted would be used by the Board to develop new manpower, facilities, and forms of
service delivery, such as HMOs. New service delivery models would be developed by
teams of professionals. National standards would be established for all care providers,
and those standards would be monitored by mandatory utilization review groups in
facilities and by professional standards and review organization (PSROs), and with
additional mechanisms in place for individual providers. All providers would be required
to meet licensing and continuing education requirements. The Council would also be
assisted by an advisory board with consumers as a majority of its members.61
To channel all federal health dollars into the HSA, Medicare and Medicaid would
be integrated into this program. There would be no private insurance. To fund the
program, a payroll tax would be collected from all employers and employees, in addition
to taxes on unearned income. General revenue funds would be used in addition to these
taxes. A national budget would be established. Facilities would be reimbursed based on
prospective budgets, and professional providers could choose either fee-for-service,
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capitation, or salary as their method of payment. HMOs would be reimbursed on a per
capita basis.62
The HSA was the most radical of the various bills introduced into Congress.
Recognizing that labor unions were in the forefront of developing the private health
insurance system in the U.S. during the 1940s and 1950s, the labor unions were now
convinced that the unregulated private health insurance systems in the U.S. could not
control costs, improve quality, or provide adequate benefits for all. Organized labor could
no longer ignore the health care crisis for all Americans, as that philosophy was counter
to the philosophy of the trade movement.63 Congress could no longer accept that health
insurance companies were capable of bringing down costs and providing the key to fixing
the American health care system. A totally new system, rather than one building on the
old, was required.
Which system would dominate—a federal system or a pluralistic one—had
significant implications for the freedom to choose, which was a basic right of every
citizen and linked to another fundamental value, individualism. Freedom of choice was
another ideological divide.

Freedom of Choice
Whether the system remained pluralistic or became federalized had significant
freedom of choice implications for employers, consumers, and providers. In one respect
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only did all of the major proposals agree: individual providers should maintain their right
to choose how they practiced, where they practiced, and the patients they served, and
citizens should be able to choose their individual providers and where they received
services.64 The freedom to choose in these realms—a cornerstone of the U.S. healthcare
system—was sacrosanct. The AMA expressed this sentiment well for all the major
interest groups when it said that “it is a basic right of every citizen to have a free choice
of physician and institution.”65 Where proposals differed regarding freedom of choice
included the freedom to participate in a national health insurance plan, employer
participation in providing health care, and reimbursement methods.
The HSA proposal provided no choice regarding how citizens would obtain and
pay for their health insurance. Since a national health insurance program would replace
all private insurance in addition to Medicare and Medicaid, a citizen’s freedom to choose
would be limited to participating in the HSA program or not having health insurance,
since private-sector health insurance would no longer exist. For originators of the HSA
bill, the private insurance system had failed to control costs, improve quality, and provide
coverage, and it needed to be replaced completely by a public system.66 Providing every
citizen the opportunity to participate in a national system would ultimately improve
health care for all. Finally, employers would be required to participate. HSA supporters
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did not directly confront the lack of choice for citizens in how they would obtain their
health insurance. For its critics, the HSA national plan would “. . . deny people the right
to choose how they will pay for their health care costs . . .”67
Inherent in all of the conservative proposals was the choice to participate in a
health insurance program, although only of the proposals, the AMA’s Medicredit
proposal, spoke to the underlying reasons why the right to choose was critical. In a
submission to the Congressional Record on May 22, 1974, Senator Clifford Hansen (RWY), the Senate sponsor of the proposed legislation, stated that Medicredit, which
allowed citizens to purchase insurance by utilizing tax credits “affirms the traditional
American value of self-reliance and responsibility to provide for one’s own self what one
can. It encourages people to be responsible for their own health care.”68 The freedom to
choose health care insurance appears related to the value of individualism, that is, a
person’s capability to choose how they will live their lives. Consensus among the
conservative groups did not emerge on this important freedom and right. In one case, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supporting the conservative proposals for a pluralistic
system, stated that “employees should be required to avail themselves of health insurance
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if employers are required to provide it,”69 although the USCC did not support mandatory
employer participation, given the burden that would small businesses would incur.70
Unlike employees who could participate, the freedom to choose was limited for
private-sector employers. President Nixon’s proposals and the AHA, AMA, and the
compromise Kennedy-Mills bill required all employers to participate in a national
program while giving their employees the freedom to choose to participate or not
participate in that program.71 The most freedom of choice for the private sector came
from the HIAA proposal, which did not require employers or employees to participate, in
order to maximize the freedom to choose participation for all; however, the incentive to
participate for both groups would exist through tax credits for health insurance costs.72
Poor people would be free also to participate or not in state-run programs that
would replace Medicaid. To assist the poor in making the decision to participate, funds
would provided to them directly or to the states to ensure that financial barriers did not
exist; thus, the freedom to choose was enhanced, since financial support was available.
For the self-employed and the wealthy, also, participation would be optional.73
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Finally, a provider’s freedom to choose a method of remuneration would be
limited by new methods of reimbursement and regulations to lower cost and improve
quality. Each of these proposals would limit the freedom of providers to act
independently in the areas of cost and quality. All of the various proposals required a new
funding mechanism for hospitals, which would use prospective budgets rather than the
reimbursement system of cost-plus that existed at that time. Second, institutional
providers would be subject to utilization reviews that examined the appropriateness of
services and the standards upon which funding was based. Individual providers would be
monitored by professional review organizations to ensure the efficiency and quality of
their services, and payment would be withheld in the case of poor-quality or inefficient
services. Fees would be determined by state regulators. The freedom of institutions and
providers to deliver services in whatever manner they chose and to determine the
reimbursement methods that covered these services would be constrained by new review
and payment methods.74
The only objection to constraints for individual providers came from the AMA,
which believed that the government should not perform any role that regulated the
activities of individual physicians or their compensation. Unlike other bills that required
standards for insurance companies and providers, the Medicredit legislation contained no
such provisions, and there were no requirements for enhancing quality and controlling
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costs. Fees for services would be the usual and customary fees normally charged by
physicians.75
Controlling costs was linked to how health care reform would be financed, given
the spiraling costs of the present system and how costs would rise as more people gained
access. Financing would require the resources of government and the private sector, but
the nature of the split and the source of federal funds would become another major
ideological chasm.

Health Care Financing
There was general agreement that financing health care reform would require the
financial resources of the federal and state governments working with the private sector.
Each major proposal, other than the AMA proposal that would use federal tax credits to
finance health insurance, required that employers and employees split the costs of health
insurance. What differed between the bills proposed by the Nixon administration, the
HIAA, and the AHA versus the HSA and the CNHIA bills was the use of payroll funds,
general revenue funds, and the employer purchase of health care.
Within the proposals offered by President Nixon, the HIAA, and the AHA,
companies would purchase health insurance for their employees, with varying levels of
shared cost. The AHA and CHIP bills would require the employer to incur 75 percent of
the cost initially, with a decreased share for employers in later years, while the HIAA bill
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did not specify a particular split between employer and employee.76 The USCC,
supporting voluntary insurance for employers, adamantly opposed this percentage split
because of the potential harm that could befall small businesses, which would suffer
higher premium costs and, thus, exacerbate the health care inflationary cycle.77
The use of payroll taxes was another significant issue. The HSA and the
Kennedy-Mills compromise would utilize payroll taxes, similar to the Social Security
program, to fund health insurance for all citizens, the rationale being that payroll taxes
would provide significant revenue to fund a universal program and the federal
government would be responsible for the administration of the program. The employer
share of the payroll taxes would be greater than the employee share.78 The use of payroll
taxes, especially for Representative Mills, provided a direct relationship between costs
and available financing, and more future opportunity to control health care costs would
be available. The use of general revenue funds provided little control over costs.
The opponents of payroll taxes—the Nixon administration, the HIAA, the AHA,
the AMA, and the USCC—believed that payroll taxes were regressive in that all persons
were required to pay a fixed percentage of their income, which took more disposable
income from the poor. Most importantly, the use of payroll taxes would hurt businesses,
employees, and the economic growth of the country. If federal funds were required for
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the poor—who remained the responsibility of the federal government—the source of
funds should be general revenue funds.79
The poor would be provided with subsidies to purchase insurance, often using a
combination of funding sources, since all of the major proposals would eliminate
Medicaid. The CHIP proposal and HIAA would employ federal general revenue and state
funds supplemented by family income to purchase health insurance.80 The AHA proposal
would utilize indigent funds, if available, combined with federal general revenue and
Medicare payroll taxes.81 Under the HSA and CNHIA, payroll taxes and federal general
revenue would be used to provide health care for the indigent. The CNHIA would also
utilize income from the medically indigent, supplemented by state revenue.82
The AMA believed that only tax credits provided a unique approach, which
combined a progressive taxation method with incentives to provide and obtain health
insurance without spending tax dollars that were needed for other health and welfare
programs. The AMA believed that tax credits as a funding mechanism were more
equitable since all citizens under 65 years of age would be eligible for such credits to
offset insurance premiums for policies purchased from their employer or the private
market. Those with no tax liability, including the very poor and the very rich, would
receive a tax certificate for 100 percent of the cost of health insurance, and if the poor
required additional funds, the federal government would pay for their premiums using
79
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general revenue funds. For others, the tax-credit level would depend on income, with a
minimum of 10 percent tax credit. The AMA believed that tax credits were a more fair
and equitable method for guaranteeing coverage, since this method—the most
progressive taxation scheme available—depended on individual income, but with this
method, people would not lose income. 83
Financing mechanisms to broader access were a key part of all of the proposals.
The various bills also spoke to the issues of financing that would be needed to restructure
a system viewed by many as fragmented, uncoordinated, and lacking vital resources.

Restructuring the Health Care System
Each of the proposals, except that proposed by the AMA, expressed a belief that
the health care system required restructuring in order to increase the number of providers
and service delivery systems, to develop a new emphasis on wellness and prevention, and
to implement measures to reduce cost and improve quality.84 Foremost, additional
providers and professional resources would be needed to serve inner city and rural areas,
since these areas experienced chronic shortages. New funding would be available for the
development of additional professionals and new types of medical professionals such as
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physician assistants. The development of new service delivery models, such as the Nixon
administration’s HMO initiative or the AHA’s health care corporations, would link
prevention with more integrated care. Because hospital care was expensive, numerous
proposals supported the idea that ambulatory care needed to supplant the current use of
hospital care as the primary treatment.
A second emphasis by all major interest groups focused on wellness, prevention,
and public health programs, since good health, facilitated by those three mechanisms,
was broader than just medicine and hospital treatment. Prevention and wellness would
improve health care outcomes and lower the cost of health care, which in the view of all
the major stakeholders, was spiraling out of control. Public health initiatives would
implement broad community programs to improve community health.
Finally, each of the major proposals described the steps required to lower cost and
improve the quality of health care. To reduce costs, payments to hospitals would be based
on prospective budgeting rather than on cost-plus budgeting, since cost-plus budgets did
not provide any incentives to restrain spending. An emphasis on ambulatory care would
reduce the utilization of expensive hospital care. Hospital utilization review committees
would examine the appropriateness of hospital admissions and the nature and quality of
care provided. Professional standard review organizations would focus on physician care
for appropriateness, cost, and quality. States would continue to engage in planning to
ensure that local communities had the services necessary and the capital expenditures,
and states would continue to regulate insurance companies. Finally, the federal
government would establish minimum standards for health care organizations and
providers.

223

One area of disagreement between the major proposals regarding the role of
competition to lower cost and improve quality was linked to the role of government and
the private sector. Both the HSA and CNHIA would create a national program
administered by the federal government, thereby eliminating competition, at least
between insurance companies. Furthermore, rates for hospitals and providers would be
negotiated at the federal and state level. Insurance companies would no longer play a role
in the HSA proposal and only an intermediary role in the CHNIA proposal.
The Nixon proposals, along with those of the HIAA and the AHA, stressed that
competition—the heart of the U.S. economic system—was a major force in restructuring
and would provide incentives to reduce the cost of health care and improve quality. To
this end, these proposals supported a primary role for insurance companies, noting that
with increased competition, health insurance premiums would decline or new benefits
would be offered by insurance companies.85
For President Nixon and others like the AHA and AFL-CIO, new delivery models
would create more competition and lower costs. Nixon believed that new service-delivery
models, especially HMOs and prepaid group practices, would lead to lowered costs
because these new models focused on wellness and prevention.86 The AHA, on the other
hand, believed that competition between HCCs alone would lead to improved quality and
lowered cost.87 The HSA supporters claimed that competition in the private sector had
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failed to make the improvements necessary in access and delivery systems, and that only
federal government intervention could solve the health care problems of the U.S.
The AMA thought differently about restructuring; it believed that little
restructuring was necessary. In congressional testimony, the AMA clearly differentiated
its legislation from other proposals in a variety of substantive ways. First, the AMA
argued that health and medicine were different entities, and it admitted that organized
medicine (the medical profession) was powerless against many health concerns. Health
improvement occurred through a variety of other means, the AMA proposed, including
education, public health programs, prevention, and life style changes, rather than simply
by spending more money on health care. The practice of medicine itself, the AMA
claimed, was only a part of the solution. In effect, the AMA was saying that organized
medicine recognized its limitations in resolving the American health problem.88
Second, Dr. Max Parrott, chairman of the AMA’s Board of Trustees, and Dr.
Philip Roth, speaker of the AMA’s House of Delegates, did not think that health care was
in a crisis state; therefore, restructuring the entire system was not necessary. Major
problems facing the U.S. health care system involved the lack of emphasis on wellness
and preventative care, the need for new technology, and the inadequate distribution of
physicians in urban and rural areas. Cost, quality, and health care outcomes were neither
major nor critical issues for physicians. An application of economic principles would
refocus the nation on preventative care and wellness rather than on sickness care, and this
new focus was the core of their health care legislation. Roth noted that a new emphasis
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on prevention was not necessary because physicians already practiced preventative care
when dealing with individual patients. Improved health prevention would come about
only when new technology, systems, tests, and trained personnel were in place.89
Regarding the distribution of physicians, Roth agreed that physicians were fleeing
inner city and rural areas in pursuit of higher incomes and because many urban areas
were dangerous and rural areas lacked cultural and educational opportunities. To find
solutions to the maldistribution of doctors, Roth believed that incentives would not work;
rather, experimentation in other types of practices and the use of new types of
professionals would be more useful. To be successful, physicians had to accept these new
assignments and configurations of practice enthusiastically rather than be mandated by
government to accept them. 90
Finally, the AMA believed that health care cost inflation resulted from hospitals,
not physicians, raising fees exorbitantly. When Medicare began, the AMA claimed that
Medicare costs increased by 8.3 percent, but only one in three doctors raised fees, most
by one dollar. Increases in costs were greater in other areas, e.g., papering a wall, than in
medicine. The AMA believed that physician costs were handled adequately by the peer
review process, which examined the quality and efficiency of services. In addition,
physicians participated in professional medical organizations that were charged with
reviewing hospital admissions and claims for some commercial insurers. All of these
factors demonstrated the AMA’s belief that significant progress had been made in health
care and that major restructuring was not necessary.
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Summary of the Ideological Issues
Major ideological differences regarding health care reform existed in the various
legislative proposals considered by the 92nd and 93rd Congresses. The most significant
disagreements concerned the nature of the right to health care, the roles that government
and the private sector should play, the freedom of choices that should be available for
consumers and providers, and how health care should be financed. Liberals believed that
the public-private model that had existed for the past 30 years failed to ensure access and
to provide cost-effective and high quality health care for all Americans. The liberal camp
viewed health care as a right that could only be guaranteed by a complete restructuring of
the health care system, which would allow the federal government to implement a
national, uniform, and universal system of health care that would eliminate all barriers to
access, reduce health care costs, enhance service delivery systems, and improve the
quality of health care and the health of all Americans. In this model, citizens would have
only one health insurance program, thus eliminating choice, and health care would be
financed by payroll taxes, the only method that would contain the rising costs of health
care. Federal and state taxes would be used to supplement payroll taxes, and a new
public-private partnership would exist, though with more design and control by the
federal government.
The conservative camp believed that the current public-private model upheld the
key U.S. values of competition and free enterprise and that it was largely successful,
though clearly in need of improvements. By compelling or incentivizing employers to
offer health insurance and ensuring that the poor would participate in new private-sector
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programs rather than the Medicaid program, the American right to access health care
would be enhanced. Creating a large federal bureaucracy would stifle innovation, they
claimed, drive health care costs higher, and lower quality. Financing health care reform
would come from employer-based premiums and federal general-revenue funds. Given
the broad and central role of the private sector, significant new tax dollars would not be
required, and health care would not become a new tax burden for companies and
individuals.
Though none of the major bills were debated formally nor voted on by either
chamber during the 92nd or 93rd Congresses, some of these ideological issues mattered
when the House Ways and Means Committee met from August 19–21, 1974 in a last
ditch effort to enact NHI. Throughout the spring and early summer of 1974, the Ways
and Means Committee conducted extensive hearings on the various health care bills.
President Ford assumed office on August 8, 1974, and on August 14, 1974, he spoke to
the nation, requesting that an NHI bill reach his office before the November election.91
With that charge, Chairman Mills asked his staff to develop a compromise proposal that
included elements of all of the various health care proposals introduced during the 93rd
Congress.
From August 19–21, 1974, the committee considered the compromise bill, which
included mandatory programs for employers and employees, paid by payroll taxes;
elimination of Medicaid and Medicare, with enrollees becoming part of a national
program; comprehensive benefits for all; and a substantial role for the states and private
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sector. In many ways, the bill resembled the CHIP bill introduced by the Nixon
administration, with additional elements from the HIAA and HSA bills.
The committee reviewed the proposed legislation’s elements. On the second and
third days, the committee faltered on two issues, which led Chairman Mills to pull the bill
from consideration by the full House of Representatives because the votes on these two
issues were close. While the committee reached quick agreement on the comprehensive
benefits and cost sharing for families and employers, the two issues where substantial
agreement could not be reached were the method of financing and the provision
mandating insurance coverage. The issue of the private-sector involvement was not in
question, since the compromise bill would maintain a strong role for the private sector,
although this provision angered many of the Democrat members.
James Corman (D-CA) agreed that supporting the bill required that he and others
support funding through the insurance companies. Corman, a major supporter of the HSA
bill, adamantly opposed insurance industry participation in reform because of what he
considered their huge profits and often inappropriate behavior such as dropping those
with chronic conditions or refusing to insure people with significant medical conditions.
He agreed to support the compromise bill, in which “the American people would give
them [insurance companies] $40 billion,”92 but with a caveat:
If we make the decision, first if we are going to put the money through
private insurance companies, then we must have some kind of federal
standards for those insurance companies. We cannot leave it to the states
because there is such diversity of standards among the states and there
have been horrendous problems in the insurance field.93
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Based on principles similar to those put forth by Representative Martha Griffiths (D-MI),
an original sponsor of the HSA bill, Corman’s agreement to support the compromise bill
remained lukewarm because the bill contained a significant role for the private sector.
But given the number of Republicans and southern Democrats on the committee, Corman
and Griffiths understood that if a bill were to make it out of committee, eliminating
entirely the role of the private sector was not feasible, and a compromise had to be made.
The compromise bill required all persons—employees, self-employed, Medicaid
and Medicare recipients—to enroll. Other than employees who would participate in the
employer plans, the alternate plan would exist for all other citizens, and all citizens would
be required to participate.94 The major reason for mandating coverage was to achieve
universal coverage, which would drive the cost of health care premiums downward.
Mandating insurance for those not employed would ensure consistency.95 The
conservative members raised the major objections. Representative Sam Gibbons (D-FL)
stated succinctly,
I don’t think the Government should require anybody to buy a health
insurance policy from somebody on compulsion. I think the Chairman
ought to do two things: Take care of those who can’t take care of
themselves . . . to make every family buy a compulsory insurance policy
one way or the other is reprehensive to me. I can not see it.96
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Harold Collier (R-IL) stated that the legislation should help “those who could not afford
to get this type of protection” or those who could not obtain it.97 After Mills explained
why the government was responsible for the poor, Joel Broyhill (R-VA) asked Mills a
pointed question: “Would you go one step further and make it voluntary for all
employees as well as these unemployed individuals? In other words, if is mandatory only
for the employer and the poor that you just outlined I think we would be closer to
home.”98
Finally, Broyhill argued that people could choose for themselves: “Is the
gentleman suggesting those 40 million could not judge for themselves or make up their
own minds whether they want to have the voluntary insurance program or not? You are
leaving them to do what for themselves? What is wrong with that?”99
Within the liberal camp, Joe Karth (D-MN) objected to the mandatory nature of
the alternate program because people could not afford to buy health insurance due to the
prohibitive cost of premiums charged by insurance companies.100 The final vote on this
section of the bill was 11 opposed and 7 in favor. Mills decided to have both provisions
of the bill reworked because, as Karth expressed, “there are serious questions involved
here and we better take time to think about it.”101
The second controversial issue arose during a discussion of financing for
catastrophic insurance. First, the AMA’s Medicredit approach to finance was considered.
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Broyhill asked that the tax credit provision be considered by the committee because “it
was consistent with the free enterprise system . . . with the ability to pay, and a major step
towards national health insurance, and we could try it for three or four years before going
on to mandatory coverage up and down the line.”102 The committee vote was a tie103,
indicating that the compromise proposal would be difficult to pass.
The subject of financing health care again arose during the last two days of the
committee session, and during these discussions, the role of the federal government and
the benefits and consequences of using payroll taxes versus general revenue remained
critical issues for the committee. The inability to agree on the financing provision became
a second reason why Mills would not take the committee mark-up to the full House.
The first discussion concerned the progressivity versus regressive nature of the
payroll taxes versus general revenue. In one sense, payroll taxes were regressive in that
all paid the same percentage, yet they were progressive because “as income goes up, one
pays more and as income goes down, you pay less for the same protection.”104 General
income taxes were the most progressive. The committee’s task was to decide how
regressive or progressive they wanted that financing to be.”105
Both tax scenarios were problematical for Representative Omar Burleson (D-TX),
who believed that using payroll or general revenue tax dollars sapped the productivity of
workers, since taxes came from the “sweat and blood of 210 million people.”106 Mills
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was adamant that he would not agree to any additional funding from general revenue
because the future outlays were not predictable; payroll taxes would lead to more
predictability of costs.107 Suggestions were made to add a surtax on corporate and
individual income taxes as a way to pay for the proposal.108
Broyhill raised the issue that employers would be paying over $4 billion in
payroll taxes to support the alternate plan, and employers would be paying for insurance
their employees didn’t use, which Broyhill didn’t “see [that] as being fair”.109 William
Archer (R-TX) believed that the inequity wouldn’t exist if separate employers for a
husband and wife were paying the single rate rather than the family rate. Karth
complained about the net revenue loss from the bill and was emphatic that he wouldn’t
vote for a bill unless that loss was accounted for110 Representative Barber Conable (RNY) summarized the dilemma regarding financing, especially taxing employers so as to
reduce the general revenue outlay even though their employees wouldn’t benefit directly.
He likened this situation to Social Security and stated that this mode of financing was
“socially desirable.” Although he believed the payroll tax was less problematic than using
general revenue funds or an income tax surtax, he challenged the committee to find an
alternative. Conable stated that he was “ready to bite the bullet as long as somebody tells
me what bullet we are biting.”111
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As is evident from this sample of testimony, disagreement was both substantive
and widespread. Representative Mills did not call for a final vote on financing.
Clearly, ideology mattered when a compromise bill reached the committee markup stage. Representative Al Ullman (D-OR) summed up the problem well when he stated:
There is no consensus in this committee, first, that health care is a right of
every American. Some of us believe it ought to be, but I don’t believe we
are going to get that kind of consensus out of this committee this year. But
everyone from every camp that has spoken this morning has at least
agreement that the problem presented by huge medical costs should not be
a disaster for the American people.112
Little agreement existed within the key committee necessary to move health care reform
forward other than the potential effect of rising health care costs for Americans. Later in
the discussion, Mills suggested that another area of agreement was the need for
catastrophic insurance. But Mills didn’t want a piecemeal bill; he “wanted a total bill and
wanted it compulsory.”113
By the end of the 93rd Congress, NHI was dead, killed by the ideological
differences that existed between the liberal camps promoting a national program and
conservatives promoting improvements to the existing private-sector approach. The
differences between camps and within camps were too significant, and Chairman Mills,
the master of the Medicare and Medicaid compromise, was unable to bridge the gap. In
the next term of Congress, the major bills would again be introduced, but with inflation
by then rampant, President Ford decreed in his 1975 State of the Union address that all
new federal programs would be vetoed. Health care reform in the United States would
have to wait another thirty-five years.
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Chapter 6
Canada and the U.S.—Ideologies That Matter
In 1966, Canada completed the task of providing comprehensive and universal
health care to all of its citizens with the passage of Medicare, adding physician services to
the hospital and diagnostics services Canadians had already gained in 1957. Eight years
later, the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, after holding extensive hearings on 44
different bills over a three-year period—hearings that included hundreds of organizations
and individuals, including two presidents—was unable to agree upon a compromise NHI
bill that would provide universal and comprehensive health care to all Americans. In both
cases, debate transpired between powerful interest groups representing organized labor,
social service organizations, church groups, medical societies, health insurance
consortiums, hospital associations, and business groups. Politicians from the Right and
Left discussed and fought over a variety of issues. In both countries, the political
leadership of both countries—President Nixon and President Ford in the U.S. and
Canada’s Prime Minister Pearson—strongly supported NHI in some form.

Canada’s Success in Enacting NHI in 1966
Explanations for the passage of Medicare in Canada include the strong support
from organized labor; the National Democratic Party’s collaboration with Pearson’s
minority government; precedents set by Saskatchewan, which had implemented both
hospital and physician insurance; the federal Hospital and Diagnostic Services Act passed
in 1957, which provided hospital care to most Canadians; and other provincial actions
that provided health care to Canadian citizens. Scholars also acknowledge that the
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political structure of Canada—where legislation can be enacted more easily since the
prime minister and his political party control both the executive and legislative functions,
and party discipline is valued and strong—played an important role in the passage of
Medicare. Furthermore, Canadian federalism clearly gives jurisdiction over health care to
the provinces. Until this point, the role of ideology in Canada’s expansion of physician
services had been overlooked in favor of institutionalism and political structure
explanations, but the Royal Commission on Health Services hearings during 1962 reveal
a variety of ideological stances, especially regarding the role of government and the
private sector, and the individual’s freedom to choose. Once the political debate and
legislative process began in Canada in 1965, these strong ideological differences largely
disappeared, and agreement on legislation was reached.
Briefs submitted to the Royal Commission on Health Services by major interest
groups clearly demonstrated agreement on the health care problems facing Canadians.
These problems included a lack of services and providers in inner city and rural areas,
and gaps in insurance coverage for almost half the population. The hearings also
disclosed clear ideological differences regarding what path Canada should take to achieve
reform. The Canadian Labour Congress, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, and the
Canadian Association of Social Workers all advocated a national program, administered
through a cooperation of the federal and provincial governments, as the only means of
providing universal and comprehensive care. The private sector, represented by the health
insurance industry (the Trans-Canada Medical Plan and the Canadian Health Insurance
Association); business groups (the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian
Manufacturers Association); and medical societies (Canadian Medical Association and its
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French counterpart, l’Association Des Médcins de Langue Française du Canada ) wanted
to maintain the private-sector program, with government intervention to assist only the
indigent, the disabled, and those with preexisting and chronic conditions. The privatesector organizations believed that the private-sector had made progress, and maintained
that the system in place would support free enterprise, ensure Canadian competitiveness,
and allow Canadians more choice about their health care. The Commission report ended
the debate without a role for private insurance companies, but that would later be
modified by the federal government in its Medicare proposal, which allowed private
insurance companies to serve as intermediaries.
Why the Commission minimized the role of private-sector voluntary insurance
was not clear from its report or deliberations. However, the Commission contended that
society had a critical interest in the nation’s health and that the federal and provincial
governments held the responsibility for ensuring that interest because only with their
cooperation could the Commission create a national program that served all Canadians
equally. The Commission tacitly believed that the private sector was not capable of such
a task. What remained unclear was how the program would be designed and funded by
federal-provincial cooperation, and this planning would involve the two major
ideological differences: roles of the federal and provincial governments, and freedom of
choice.
Given the provincial responsibility for health care and the taxing power of the
federal government, the Pearson government designed a program that required provinces
to meet four general conditions—universality, comprehensiveness, portability, and public
accountability—that would achieve the Royal Commission’s mandate of universal
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services, with uniform terms and conditions, and adherence to program basics. Only by
meeting these four conditions would all Canadians be served. Funding based on these
conditions was an approach similar to that taken with the 1957 universal hospital services
program.
These conditions were sufficiently general so that provinces could develop their
own approach, thus, respecting provincial autonomy in health care matters. Only Quebec
argued for no conditions of participation; Quebec wanted funding from the federal
government to develop its own approach to health care, a position that supported its view
of federalism, with provincial autonomy in domestic matters. Discussion among the
political leaders focused more on other significant funding priorities expressed by the
provincial leaders, such as education and economic development, the need for general
conditions of participation, and the level of funding necessary to implement the program,
all of which represented issues involved with the role of the two levels of Canadian
government.
The major discussions involved freedom of choice, which was the second major
ideological area of difference among political leaders in the House of Commons. Conflict
regarding choices in the physician-patient relationship conflict was non-existent.
Physicians’ freedom to choose their patients and method of remuneration, and patients’
freedom to choose their provider were embraced by all and strongly supported by the
Royal Commission on Health Services. For Conservatives critics of the national program,
making the program mandatory for citizens and eliminating the role of private insurance
in providing physician services eliminated citizen choice. Freedom of choice was a
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hallmark of Canadian democracy, Conservatives believed, and citizens should retain that
right of choice in how to pay for their health care.
Both the Hall Commission and Tommy Douglas, leader of the National
Democratic Party, spoke to that freedom. The Commission’s definition of freedom of
choice only included the freedom to choose a physician or a physician to choose a
patient; lacking from its report was the freedom to choose to participate in a national
program. Douglas stated that mandatory participation, necessary for the development of a
nation, was not new to Canadians, since mandatory participation in nation building
occurred in areas such as education and taxation. Only if all the members of a nation
were healthy could the goal of national unity be closer to realization. Limiting the
freedom to choose would also speak to the Canadian value of collectivism, where the
interests of the nation often must supersede the interests and choices of the individual.1
The Liberals and NDP believed that mandatory participation was required; the
Conservatives supported choice to participate.
In the end, the final vote of 177–2 may indicate a level of ideological agreement
that superseded differences. Maioni argues that, given the deep ideological differences,
the lopsided vote in favor of Medicare suggested political expediency.2 Examination of
the ideological debates in the meetings between federal and provincial leaders and the
House of Commons lends scant support for this notion. Ideological differences focused
on the federal government’s role in relation to the four conditions, on funding methods,
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and on freedom of choice to participate for individuals and Quebec. Perhaps ideological
disagreement was more pervasive than the disproportionate number of ayes suggested,
but considering that the next federal election would be held in 1968, voting against the
bill would have been politically acceptable if such profound ideological differences did in
deed exist and support from the Canadian public for the Medicare program was not
overwhelming. Since the vote was nearly unanimous, such agreement might instead
suggest ideological agreement on the Medicare program and its principles, which
certainly was not the case in the U.S. during the 1970s.

U.S. Failure to Enact NHI in the 1970s
Explanations for the U.S. failure to provide NHI to its citizens during a time when
over 40 bills and the support of two presidents range from the power of key interest
groups to the political structure of the U.S., which contains many veto and influence
points as legislation is considered by Congress. Even with three years of hearings in the
House and Senate on a variety of health care bills, none was ever debated either the
House or Senate, although one legislative proposal, in August, 1974, was marked up for
house consideration but was tabled due to ideological differences.
Many of the major interest groups—from business to organized labor—and the
Nixon administration supported some form of NHI during this time. General agreement
on the breadth and depth of the health care problems facing the U.S. was evident. Costs
were climbing while quality issues remained. Many people lacked access, especially
those in rural and inner city areas, because of a lack of providers and service delivery
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systems. Most importantly, many persons lacked health insurance or were underinsured
and did not have the financial means to receive adequate health care.
Even with agreement on the health care problems facing the U.S., there was
significant disagreement about the solution. Major ideological controversies surrounded
the nature of the right to health care, the role of the pluralistic system, freedom of choice,
and financing. How to restructure the health care system remained controversial but not
significantly so. Other structural and institutionalism explanations for the failure to
achieve NHI cannot be ignored and remain important.
Foremost, the U.S. political system has a large number of veto and influence
points that affect the outcome of any proposed legislation. Before bills can be enacted,
they must pass muster with a variety of committees in the House and Senate before
consideration by the full Congress and, ultimately, the president. During this period, a
large number of bills circulated in both chambers and were considered by numerous
committees. These bills, sponsored by members of the House and Senate and developed
by the major interest groups—the American Medical Association, the National
Association of Manufacturers, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the AFL-CIO,
the United Auto Workers, and the American Hospital Association—offered a variety of
approaches to solving the myriad problems facing U.S. health care. The sheer number of
bills may have been a barrier in itself, because garnering sufficient support to move any
one bill forward in the legislative process was difficult with so many competing
strategies. Plus, given the variety of committees that considered health care legislation
and the number of interest groups involved, opportunities abounded for influencing or
vetoing a bill throughout this period.
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Most importantly, the long history of a semi-public system where business
assumed responsibility for providing health insurance to its workers was being pitted
against a federal government program similar to Medicare, which would provide
universal and comprehensive health care. A policy precedent supporting a pluralistic
system had been set, and efforts by proponents of a federally administered system would
encounter major difficulty changing that precedent.
Deep ideological differences were evident throughout the four years of hearings
on the variety of bills, and ideology was instrumental when Wilbur Mills, chairman of the
powerful House Ways and Means Committee, decided that a compromise bill—the first
NHI bill to achieve mark-up status—lacked sufficient support to be considered by the full
House of Representatives. Core differences between the variety of bills included four
major and related ideological issues: the pluralistic health care system, financing, the
right to health care, and freedom of choice. The most contentious ideological battles
concerned whether the pluralistic system—where citizens would choose to participate—
should be retained and improved or scrapped and replaced by a federally administered
and comprehensive health care program in which all citizens were mandated to
participate. This battle involved the core U.S. values of free enterprise, competition, and
individualism.
For the insurance and hospital industries, medical societies, and the Nixon
administration, the public-private system demonstrated much success since its inception
in the 1930s, and it could be improved with only a limited role for the federal
government. A single federal program, they believed, would create a large, unresponsive,
and inflexible bureaucracy that would stifle innovation and the efficient delivery of health
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care. The private insurance industry, in conjunction with business, successfully provided
some form of coverage to many citizens, and with future reduction in costs and financial
support of the government to provide subsidies for the indigent, more persons would be
able to obtain coverage, and a greater variety of benefits would be made available. Any
federal role, they argued, should be limited to providing funds for additional providers
and service delivery systems, supporting medical research, establishing standards for
benefits, and promulgating regulations regarding the insurance industry. Cost and quality
could be regulated by the states or by private-sector providers.
Financing health insurance using employer and employee contributions, which
affected most people, would remain, with tax dollars utilized only for the elderly, the
indigent, and others who required assistance. This method, rather than additional payroll
or general revenue taxes, they reasoned, would keep U.S. businesses competitive
domestically and internationally. Payroll taxes sapped the U.S. economy by taking away
money needed to ensure U.S. competitiveness and individual prosperity, and general
revenue funds took away from federal funding for other important domestic and
international programs. The private sector was the most appropriate sector for funding
and improving access to health care.
Furthermore, increased competition within the insurance industry and among
providers would lead to lowered costs and improved quality, and these additional cost
and quality improvements—already evident in the U.S. system with peer and utilization
reviews—would lead to lowered health care premiums and health care costs, also
benefitting U.S. businesses. In short, the private sector was capable of moving the U.S.
health care system forward.
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Opponents of the pluralistic system viewed the private sector as failing to provide
quality and cost-effective care to all citizens. Many citizens lacked comprehensive health
care coverage; most retained only surgical or hospital insurance, with little coverage for
catastrophic health events. Physician services insurance was available to only a small
portion of the population. Those in rural and inner city areas lacked adequate numbers of
providers and delivery systems, and few had even the most basic insurance coverage.
Proponents of a national health care program feared that the private sector’s focus was on
profit, not on assuring that all American’s received high-quality and cost-effective health
care. Only the federal government, they believed, had the financial and administrative
resources to develop and implement a national program that would provide
comprehensive coverage to all citizens, and only the federal government could ensure
that all citizens could realize their inherent right to health care.
The most appropriate funding mechanism for such a comprehensive and universal
program—one that would ensure the right to health care—would be through payroll
taxes, with employers responsible for a greater share and any excess contributions
supporting the poor and medically indigent. Using payroll taxes would put the brake on
rising health care costs because program improvements could only occur if payroll taxes
rose, which was more difficult to accomplish, according to Chairman Mills, than using
general revenue funds. General revenue funds would be used only for the indigent and
disabled, a more limited population and growth area. Business and working Americans
would support health care for all, a collectivist view. Supporters of a pluralistic system
rejected this view.
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Supporters of the pluralistic system acknowledged that access to affordable and
quality health care was a right, but they also believed that health care could be made
available to more Americans, over time, through improvements to the existing pluralistic
system—by providing subsidies to the poor to purchase insurance and tax credits to
others as an incentive to purchase insurance, and by requiring employers to provide
health insurance. Most importantly, access would be achieved by individual choice, not
by a government mandate, which would compromise the American ideal of freedom.
To protect one’s freedom to choose—one of the most important rights of any
citizen—employee participation in often mandatory employer programs would be
voluntary, as would participation by the poor in programs subsidized by the government.
In essence, this freedom of choice strongly supported individualism, a value which has
dominated U.S. life since the nation’s formation and which maintains that individuals are
responsible for and capable of living their lives and making choices as to how they will
provided for themselves.3 Choosing or rejecting health insurance, according to the
proponents of a pluralistic health care system, is one of the many choices individuals can
and should make.
Thus, the two clashing ideologies concerning the freedom of choice regarding
health care—with proponents of a federally mandated system arguing that such a system
was the only means to guarantee equal health care benefits to all, and those in favor of a
pluralistic system arguing that government-mandated health care went against the basic
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American freedom of choice—became a major stumbling block in Mills’ attempt to reach
a compromise bill in 1974.
Supporters of a publically administered program did not speak to the issue of
mandatory participation and the freedom to choose during the hearings, as did Tommy
Douglas in Canada. Perhaps the right to health care and the positive consequences for the
individual and nation were more important and took precedence over the freedom to
choose. What supporters and opponents did agree upon was the individual’s freedom to
choose his/her provider and the physician’s choice of patient.

Comparison of the Canadian and American Ideologies Governing NHI
The ideological narrative, missing up until now from the NHI story in Canada and
the U.S., is complex, and ideology clearly affected the debates and outcomes in each
country, although in different ways, as the U.S. failed in its struggle to achieve NHI, and
Canada’s was successful in providing universal health care coverage. While ideological
differences existed within each country’s debate about health care reform, comparison of
the dominant ideologies of both countries reveals some ideological similarities and
numerous profound differences.
A major similarity involved the nature of the health care problem. Political
leaders and their parties, and major interest groups, agreed that the state of health care
ranged from a crisis state to one that was not in crisis but faced major problems. In both
countries, many citizens lacked access to services because services were fragmented,
uncoordinated, or simply lacking in inner city and rural areas, especially for minorities in
both countries. Inadequate numbers of professionals and hospitals made obtaining timely
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services difficult. Health care costs were constantly rising, without a concomitant rise in
quality. Many services were either not covered or in short supply, such as mental illness
care or tuberculosis treatment. Finally, and perhaps most critically, many citizens in both
countries lacked any health care access at all because they simply did not have health
insurance or their insurance was limited to surgical care. How to solve these problems
remained the elusive goal of health care reform.
A second similarity involved a freedom of choice when choosing services and
patients. Without exception, the Hall Commission, political leaders and political groups,
and the major interest groups involved in the health care debate in both countries,
strongly supported the patient’s right to choose providers and the provider’s right to
choose patients, with the exception of emergency situations. In both cases, the right to
choose was a cornerstone of individual liberty and individualism: individuals can make
choices that best serve their needs.
A third major similarity involved the idea that government had a responsibility to
improve the health of its citizens. The Hall Commission spoke to numerous interests that
society had in individual health, including maintaining national unity, preventing the
spread of communism, and strengthening national defense. U.S. interests in citizen’s
health included ensuring fairness and national productivity, and improving health
outcomes so as to reduce costs. Where the two countries differed was on the question of
what the specific role of government should be. In Canada, it was agreed that government
should perform the central role in reform; whereas, in the U.S., the role of the federal
government was hotly debated.
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In Canada, federal and provincial government cooperation was the solution, given
the vast financial resources of the federal government and the provinces’ authority over
health care, and in many cases (e.g., Saskatchewan), provinces had successfully
implemented provincial health care programs on their own and by working jointly with
the federal government to implement the hospital services program in 1957. Because of
these successes, the Hall Commission focused on federal-government cooperation to craft
a nationwide program that would provide health care equality to all Canadians.
Government, not the private sector, the Commission concluded, must be responsible for
its citizens and the nation. This view is consistent with “statist paternalism,” one of the
key differences between Canada and the U.S.4 That is, government—like a father—must
provide for its citizens as a moral responsibility, and government—like a parent—can be
trusted to ensure the interests of its citizens.
Government involvement in health care in the U.S. received a mixed review.
Opponents of a national, universal program viewed federal government control as
problematic. Some maintained that direct responsibility for health care was not a federal
responsibility, and federal involvement should be limited to providing a broad outline for
reform, funding additional providers and services, and for taking care of those unable to
care for themselves. Federal involvement would stifle innovation and change, negatively
affect health care outcomes, and lead to excessive costs. Unlike Canadians, many
individuals and groups in the U.S. did not trust that the federal government could
accomplish the task of providing health care for all of its citizens. At the same time,

4

Jason Kaufman, The Origins of Canadian and American Differences, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2009, 12.
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proponents of a federal program believed the opposite and saw government as the
solution and the private sector as suspect. Those in favor of a federal program believed
that the private sector was interested primarily in profit and that it would fail to provide
for the people by leaving gaps in availability and accessibility. Only a federally
administered national program, they reasoned, could ensure health care as a right.
While private-sector involvement was championed by medical societies,
insurance interests, and business groups in the U.S. and in Canada as a way to preserve
the free enterprise system, drive costs down, improve quality, and ensure the nation’s
competitiveness in the international market, Canada minimized the private sector’s
involvement in the Medicare program to the status of intermediary; whereas, most of the
bills introduced in the U.S. maximized the private sector’s involvement as the main
providers of health insurance, another major difference between the two countries.
Private-sector health insurance began and grew for similar reasons in both
countries, but private sector involvement would achieve very different ends by the 1960s
and 1970s. Canada’s history with private insurance started later than the U.S., during the
1940s with the advent of the Trans-Canada Medicine Plan and the private insurance
industry after the Green Book proposals failed post-World War II. Since the government
would not be involved significantly in health care, the private sector, commercial, and
physician-sponsored health insurance, could now evolve and did so, in part, to stave off
future government involvement.
The creation of the U.S. public-private health care market began in the 1930s,
strongly supported by the American Medical Association as a way to exclude government
involvement in the medical arena and ensure that doctors would maintain authority over
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medical decisions and remuneration. Private involvement in health care was reinforced in
the 1940s and 1950s by numerous federal laws, including ones that considered health
care benefits as part of labor’s collective bargaining process.
In the end, employer-based health insurance, provided by the private sector,
remained the dominant force in the U.S. Federal involvement in health care would be
largely limited to providing for the elderly, the poor, and the disabled, as well as
providing funds for more providers and service delivery systems and options. In Canada,
the private sector would provide services, with the health insurance industry relegated to
an intermediary role, since the private sector was not capable of doing what the combined
efforts of the federal and provincial governments could do—ensure quality health care to
all Canadians.
A final difference between both countries focused on the freedom of choice
regarding participation in a universal health care program. In most of the bills introduced
in the U.S., citizens would retain the choice to acquire health insurance because that
stipulation protected their basic freedom to choose and supported the highly valued
ideology of U.S. individualism. In Canada, individual choice to participate would be
replaced by mandatory participation; only one health insurance program would be
available, and all Canadians would participate, with the program financed through higher
taxes or premiums. In the dominant Canadian ideology, paying taxes was a responsibility
individuals must assume, as was the responsibility for their own health and the health of
others. Mandatory participation by paying taxes for oneself and to support those of lesser
means supported the value of collectivism; that is, individual rights and actions must
sometimes be sacrificed for the good of the whole.
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With respect to health care, Canadian and U.S. ideologies share similarities and
differences. In Canada, individual sacrifice for the greater societal good—paternal statism
and collectivism—dominated the joint federal-provincial movement toward Medicare.
Government control was the ultimate solution to the health care problems that faced
Canada, and ensuring health care would lead to Canada becoming a stronger nation, both
economically and socially. In the U.S., retaining the important and age-old values of free
enterprise and individualism remained the basis for many of the suggested solutions to
improving accessibility and growth as a nation.
Today (2011), as in the 1960s and 1970s, the ideological battle about health care
goes on in the U.S., while Canada’s health care system retains the ideological pillars of
federal-provincial cooperation and collectivism, although struggles with critical issues of
rising costs, quality, and access to services remain a problem in Canada. Canadians have
great pride in their system and do not want to change its fundamentals. In the U.S., one
issue was dominant in the health care debates in the 1970s and again in 2009 threatened
to undermine recent reform: the role of individual choice. Should buying health insurance
be an option for Americans? The individual mandate—individualism—is at the core of
the legal actions that now seek to overturn recent U.S. health care reform, just as the role
of individual choice remained a stumbling block in Mills’ final attempt to bring an NHI
bill to vote in August 1974.
In summary, this study adds to the existing narrative about health care
reform in the U.S. and Canada during a similar period in history, the 1960s and 1970s.
The major issues were more complex than physicians trying to protect their ability to
practice independently, businesses supporting free enterprise, or labor unions wanting to
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pass the cost of health care on to the government. Ideological debates focused on rights,
roles of government, societal interests, and the responsibility of individuals to society as a
whole. How the U.S. and Canada viewed those issues reveals important similarities as
well as profound and significant ideological differences.
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List of Abbreviations
AALL

American Association for Labor Legislation (USA)

AASS

American Association for Social Security (USA)

AFBF

American Farm Bureau Foundation (USA)

AFL

American Federation of Labor (USA)

AFL–CIO

American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial
Organizations (USA)

AHA

American Hospital Association (USA)

AHIP

Assisted Health Insurance Act (USA)

AHIP

Assisted Health Insurance Plan (USA)

AMA

American Medical Association (USA)

AMHP

Alberta Municipal Hospital Plan (Canada)

AMLFCA

l’Association Des Médcins de Langue Française du Canada

ANA

American Nurses Association (USA)

APHA

American Public Health Association (USA)

BCCPS

British Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons (Canada)

BCHA

British Columbia Hospital Association (Canada)

BCHIS

British Columbia Hospital Insurance Service (Canada)

BCMA

British Columbia Manufacturers Association (Canada)

BCMP

British Columbia Medical Plan (Canada)

CASW

Canadian Association of Social Workers (Canada)

CCC

Canadian Chamber of Commerce (Canada)

CCF

Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (Canada)

CCL

Canadian Congress of Labour (Canada); Note: The Canadian
Congress of Labour (CCL) was founded in 1940 and merged with
Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (TLC) to form the
Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) in 1956.

CCP

Co-operative Credit Party (Canada)

CDC

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (USA)

CES

Committee on Economic Security (USA)

CFA

Canadian Federation of Agriculture (Canada)

CHA

Catholic Hospital Association (Canada)

CHC

Canadian Hospital Council (Canada)
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CHIA

Canadian Health Insurance Association (Canada)

CHIP

Comprehensive Health Insurance Plan (USA)

CIA

Canadian Insurance Association (Canada)

CIO

Congress of Industrial Organizations (USA)

CLC

Canadian Labour Congress (Canada)

CLIA

Canadian Life Insurance Association (Canada)

CMA

Canadian Medical Association (Canada)

CManA

Canadian Manufacturers Association (Canada)

CNHI

Committee of 100 for National Health Insurance (USA)

CPHA

Canadian Public Health Association (Canada)

CPMA

Canadian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (Canada)

CWA

Communications Workers of America (USA)

DHEW

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (USA)

FDA

Food and Drug Administration (USA)

FHIP

Family Health Insurance Plan (USA)

GDP

gross domestic product

HCC

health care corporation (USA)

HIAA

Health Insurance Association of America (USA)

HIDS

Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act (Canada)

HMO

Health Maintenance Organization (USA)

HSA

health savings account (USA)

HSA

Health Security Act (USA)

HSC

Health Security Council (USA)

IALL

International Association for Labor Legislation

IRS

Internal Revenue Service (USA)

KODC

Keep Our Doctors Committees (Canada)

MCIC

Medical Care Insurance Commission (Canada)

NAM

National Association of Manufacturers (USA)

NASW

National Association of Social Workers (USA)

NDP

New Democratic Party (Canada)

NFU

National Farmer’s Union (USA)

NHI

national health insurance
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NHIPA

National Health Insurance Partnership Act (USA)

NHISA

National Health Insurance Standards Act (USA)

NLRB

National Labor Relations Board (USA)

NMA

National Medical Association (USA)

OASI

Old Age and Survivors Insurance (USA)

OMA

Ontario Medical Association (Canada)

OMSIP

Ontario Medical Services Insurance Plan (Canada)

OSHA

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (USA)

PSRO

professional standards and review organization (USA)

SCP

Social Credit Party (Canada)

SCPS

Saskatchewan College of Physicians and Surgeons (Canada)

SHSA

Saskatchewan Hospital Services Act (Canada)

SMCIA

Saskatchewan Medical Care Insurance Act (Canada)

SSA

Social Security Administration; also, Social Security Act (USA)

SSI

Social Security Insurance (USA)

TCMP

Trans-Canada Medical Plan (Canada)

TLC

Trades and Labour Congress (Canada)

UAW

United Auto Workers (USA)

UFA

United Farmers of Alberta (Canada)

URC

utilization review committee (USA)

USCC

United States Chamber of Commerce (USA)
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